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Introduction 
Family firms are the most common type of business entity around the world (Faccio & Lang, 
2002). They represent more than two-third of companies in the world, and they provide about 
70% of the total employment (EY, 2015). Often they are undervalued and relegated to the 
category of small firms. However, even the giant enterprise around the globe can be family 
controlled. For instance, Ford, Koch Industries, Wal-Mart, LVMH, and Roche are family 
businesses. During the past few decades, given their contribution to the world economy, the 
academic research started to focus on their characteristics and their strategies that differ from 
those of non-family firms. Indeed, previous studies have shown that firm’s ownership and 
governance characteristics affect company's strategies (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Fernández & Nieto, 2005; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, 
& Grossman, 2002; Oesterle, Richta, & Fisch, 2013). 
Extant literature has recognised that family businesses have peculiar features (presence of 
family members both in ownership and in the management, combination of family values and 
business goals) influencing their strategic choices. Scholars have demonstrated the family 
influence on the firm’s international level, but with few exceptions, they failed to investigate 
whether and how the family control affects entry modes. When firms decide to internationalise 
their operations, an important strategy they have to implement concerns the entry mode. Entry 
mode research has identified numerous determinants (firm, country, and institutional level), but 
it almost neglected the effect of firm’s ownership and governance. This gap in the literature is 
quite surprising since foreign entry strategies are long-term strategies with important 
consequences on firm performance. This topic is even more crucial in relation to family firms, 
given that they are the most widespread type of companies around the world. Thus, the effect 
of their entry modes have widespread consequences for the world economy. The goal of the 
present work is exactly to address this gap in the literature. The aim of the thesis is twofold. 
First, it aims to provide an integrative framework of the literature on family firms and foreign 
entry strategies, identifying the main existing gaps in the research. Second, it aims to 
demonstrate empirically that family control affects entry strategies, studying the entry mode 
(joint venture versus wholly owned subsidiary in the second paper) and the establishment mode 
(greenfield versus acquisition in the third paper) of a sample of family and non-family firms. 
iv 
 
Differently from previous studies, the entry strategies have been studied here as bilateral 
choices, thus, both the family status of the MNE and of the local firms have been considered.  
The thesis is structured in three papers, one that is a literature review and two empirical papers.  
The first paper highlights the existing gap in the literature regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance and entry strategies. Thus, it reviews the relevant literature in the field of 
family business, with a particular focus on family firms’ peculiarities and on their 
internationalisation.  Moreover, it reviews the literature on foreign entry modes and it reconciles 
the literature on family businesses and entry modes, underlining how firm’s ownership and 
corporate governance is another important determinant of entry strategies, mostly neglected in 
previous research. Finally, this first paper presents the results of the few articles investigating 
the family firm’s foreign entry strategies and highlighting the existing research gaps which I 
filled in the second and third empirical paper.  
The second paper aims to investigate whether and how the family firms’ characteristics might 
affect the choice between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary. Using a sample of 898 
deals, completed from 2005 to 2015, between MNEs from 42 countries investing in Italy, this 
research also aims to investigate the family effect of both the MNE and the local company on 
the entry mode choice. The aim of the third paper is to investigate how the local firm’s assets 
affect the choice between greenfield joint venture and partial acquisition. Hypotheses were 
tested using a sample of 357 foreign entries made by firms from 31 different countries in Italy, 
over a ten-year period (2005-2015). The sample is composed by 121 greenfield joint ventures 
and 236 partial acquisitions.  
Overall, we make two main contributions to the international business and family business 
literature. First, the thesis extends our understanding of the determinants of entry and 
establishment mode choices, including in the analysis the effect of family ownership and family 
involvement using a transaction cost approach. Moreover, in doing so, we investigate the effects 
of family firms using data on ultimate ownership. To the best of our knowledge this is the first 
work to address entry mode issues in family firms with such detailed data. Second, it contributes 
to entry mode literature investigating the effect of ownership type of both the MNEs and the 
local company. 
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1 An integrative framework of family firms and 
foreign entry strategies 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Family firms are the most common form of business entity around the world (Faccio & Lang, 
2002). The peculiar presence of family members both in ownership and in the management of 
the firm, and the combination of family values and business goals that affect the strategic 
choices, require a specific knowledge to understand their mechanisms and choices.  
From a historical point of view, it is impossible to locate precisely in place or time the origin 
of the organisational form of the family firm (Colli, 2003). “They were in the absolute majority 
during the first industrial revolution, as well as in the pre-industrial period, going from the urban 
artisan workshop to the famous Medici Bank … to the sophisticated commercial and trading 
company of Andrea Barbarigo, “Merchant of Venice”…” (Colli, 2003).  
Nowadays family business still plays a key role in the worldwide economy. They account for 
two-thirds of all businesses around the world and are responsible for 60-90 percent of global 
GDP (European Family Business, 2012). Common wisdom associates the idea of family 
business to small and domestic firms, but even some of the largest companies in the world, i.e. 
Ford, Samsung, Wal-Mart, and with popular brands, i.e. Benetton, Lego, Mars, are family firms. 
Despite the relevance of family businesses in the worldwide economy, only in the 1990s, the 
field became a separate academic discipline (Bird, Welsch, Astrachan, & Pistrui, 2002). The 
development of the new field proceeded slowly, at least until 1995. Indeed, before that year, 
the number of the articles published in the field was limited, even if the first Journal entirely 
dedicated to family firms, the Family Business Review, has been released by 1988. 
Accordingly, academic research began to study family firms internationalisation only in the last 
three decades (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010).  
Prior literature has largely demonstrated that corporate governance characteristics (among 
others ownership structure) affect firm’s strategic decisions (Filatotchev, Dyomina, Wright, & 
Buck, 2001; Lien, Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev, 2005), for instance, internationalisation. 
However, the growing literature in the international business field concerning family businesses 
is more focused on the degree of internationalisation, and it has largely ignored how these firms 
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expand overseas (Lin, 2012). Indeed, the extensive empirical research on entry modes mostly 
focused on country, industry, and firm-specific determinants (Majocchi, Mayrhofer, & Camps, 
2013). Few studies investigate the role of ownership and corporate governance on foreign entry 
strategies. Moreover, only a slightly portion of them focus on family firms (Boellis, Mariotti, 
Minichilli, & Piscitello, 2016; Chang, Kao, & Kuo, 2014; Claver, Laura Rienda, & Quer, 2009a; 
Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; Kuo, Kao, Chang, & Chiu, 2012; Pongelli, Caroli, 
& Cucculelli, 2016).  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the existing gap in the literature regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and entry strategies. Thus, it reviews the relevant 
literature in the field of family business (with a particular focus on their internationalisation), 
the literature regarding foreign entry strategies, and the scant literature on family firms’ entry 
mode. The paper is organised into three main sections. The first section reviews family firms’ 
peculiarities. It begins by synthesising what are family firms reviewing the definitions used in 
literature to define them. It then goes on to review the main theories applied to family 
businesses. In light of the leading theories presented, the distinguishing features of family firms 
are described. Finally, the first section concludes reviewing the empirical studies on family 
firms’ internationalisation. The second section moves on to analyse previous literature on 
foreign entry modes. This section is composed of two parts. First, it presents the state of 
knowledge in the field, highlighting the main classifications used in entry mode research. 
Second, it reviews the entry mode determinants, accordingly to the main theories applied. The 
last section of this paper aims to reconcile the literature on family businesses and entry modes, 
underlining how firm’s ownership and corporate governance is another important determinant 
of entry modes, mostly neglected in previous research. This last section presents the results of 
the few articles investigating the family firm’s foreign entry strategies. Finally, concluding 
remarks highlight the existing research gap and insights for future studies.  
1.2 Family firms: definitions and theories 
1.2.1 Family firm definitions 
The first issue in the family business literature is how to define a family firm. Despite a huge 
number of articles published in the field from different perspectives (Corporate Governance, 
Accounting, Business History, Organizational Studies and International Business), research 
still lacks a single definition (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Steiger, Duller, & Hiebl, 
2015). Variations in the definitions might produce considerably different results (Colli, 2003). 
Indeed, reviewing studies on the effect of family control on firm’s performance (see Dyer 
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(2006) for a review) and internationalisation (Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Zahra, 2003), the 
obtained evidence is so far inconclusive. Three main approaches are defining a family firm.  
The first approach focuses on the influence that a family exercises on a firm through its 
involvement in ownership, management, and board of directors. Definitions based on the extent 
of family involvement are the most frequents, mostly because they are easy to operationalize 
(Chua et al., 1999) using secondary data. Moreover, the comparison of results arising from 
these definitions is straightforward. However, authors do not always use the same combination 
of ownership, management and governance criteria and this complicates the comparison. The 
different definitions used within the involvement approach can be summarised following an 
increasing degree of strictness in the defining requirements. The minimal requirement used is 
the family ownership. Some authors define family firms with reference exclusively to the 
threshold of stakes held by the family (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011; Bhaumik, Driffield, & 
Pal, 2010; Faccio & Lang, 2002; King & Santor, 2008). However, within the involvement 
approach, the most common definition combines ownership and management criteria (Kontinen 
& Ojala, 2010). Indeed, most of the researchers using this method combined ownership 
percentages held by the family with other requirements regarding the presence of family 
members in the management team (Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & 
Scholnick, 2008; Thomas & Graves, 2005). Alternatively, they define the family business with 
reference to ownership but then in the empirical analysis they control for the managerial 
involvement of the family (Majocchi & Strange, 2012). Furthermore, some definitions combine 
ownership with the presence on the board of some family members (Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & 
Kintana, 2010; Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). Gentry, Dibrell and Kim (2014) relaxed the 
ownership requirement and defined a business as a family firm if the founding family has at 
least two family members sitting on the board of directors. Kuo et al. (2012) have used a strict 
requirement of 50 percent of the directors members of the family. Other scholars used more 
inclusive definitions, requiring that a family owns a percentage of stakes, it has family members 
serving as managers and/or sitting on the board of directors (Lien et al., 2005; Sciascia, 
Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper, 2012). Even if the ownership criteria, alone or in combination 
with other requirements, is the most used, there is not a consensus on the minimum level of 
shares that a family must hold to satisfy the definition requirements. Thresholds of previous 
studies range from 5 percent (Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Jiang & Peng, 2011; Sirmon, 
Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008) to 50.1 percent (Carr & Bateman, 2009; Eberhard & Craig, 2013; 
Westhead & Howorth, 2006) of shares held by the family. The highest threshold of 60 percent 
adopted by Donckels and Fröhlich (Donckels, Fröhlich, & Frohlich, 1991) is an exception. 
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Usually, low thresholds are used for listed companies because the necessary equity holdings to 
control the firm is low when the ownership is widespread among many shareholders. Empirical 
studies on samples including both listed and non-listed companies use different threshold in the 
same analysis: 50 percent for non-listed firms and 30 percent (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & 
Lester, 2010; Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 2014) or 25 percent (Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta, & Pittino, 2014; Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013) for listed 
companies. Discrepancies among the requirements also regard the managerial prerequisites to 
define family firms. Indeed, even in this case, have been used different degrees of involvement 
of family members in executive positions. Some definitions do not specify the position or the 
number of family members involved in the management or on the board. They simply require 
that the owning (Cromie, Stephenson, & Monteith, 1995) or founding family (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a) run the firm. Some authors consider a firm as a family business only if at least 
one member is involved in the management (Eberhard & Craig, 2013). Stricter definitions 
require that the CEO (McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2008) and/or the 
Chairman (Davis & Harveston, 2000) are family members, or the involvement of multiple 
generations in the leadership, distinguishing (Calabrò, Torchia, Pukall, & Mussolino, 2013) or 
not (Zahra, 2003) between the number of family members involved or the type of position. The 
continuity of the family business across multiple generations is expressed differently from other 
scholars that require the firm is in the second or later generation (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Among the different definitions, the presence of the founding family in the company assumes 
a particular importance. Indeed a considerable number of studies requires that the founder or 
its descendants are involved in the management or the board (Bingham, Dyer Jr, Smith, & 
Adams, 2011; Hutton, 2007; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014; Wang, 2006). 
The second approach used to define family firms is to use the family’s vision (Mazzi, 2011). A 
major factor in these definitions is to ask the CEO or the Chairman if they consider the firm as 
a family business (Okoroafo, 1999). Moreover, this approach focuses on the intention of the 
family to maintain the control of the company over generations. Given the perceptual feature 
of this approach, data are collected through the submission of questionnaires and surveys. 
Authors referring to the essence of the firm highlight the crucial difference existing between 
two businesses with the same involvement of a family in ownership and management, but one 
is considering itself as a family firm and the other is not (Chua et al., 1999).  
The last approach combines both the involvement and essence approaches (Crick, Bradshaw, 
& Chaudhry, 2006; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). More narrow 
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definitions combined the perception of the firm to consider itself as a family firm, with family 
ownership and managerial criteria (Eberhard & Craig, 2013; Zellweger et al., 2012). Astrachan, 
Klein, and Smyrnios (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002) delineate this approach more 
formally, naming it F-PEC scale. They state that three dimensions should be considered to 
define whether and to what extent the family involvement influences the firm. These are Power, 
Experience, and Control. The Power dimension is measured by the ownership and management 
involvement of family members. The Experience dimension is measured with reference to the 
succession and the numbers of family members involved in the firms. The Culture refers to the 
extent to which family noneconomic goals and business goals overlap. Although the F-PEC 
scale seems to be the most completed approach defining a family business, only a few authors 
used it. Indeed, Steiger et al. (2015) in reviewing 238 articles on family firms, found that only 
5 percent of them use the F-PEC scale (Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, Menendez, & Schiereck, 2005; 
Merino, Monreal-Perez, & Sanchez-Marin, 2014; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 2008). 
However, more authors use this approach even if they do not make explicit reference to the F-
PEC scale (Davis & Harveston, 2000; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007). 
What emerges from the review of this vast variety of requirements, is that researchers applying 
different definitions fail to motivate theoretically the importance of the components used to 
define a family firm (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005). Furthermore, the lack of consensus 
on a unique definition might make difficult to compare findings of previous researchers. 
However, differences between countries, regarding culture and institutional environments, may 
affect the concept of the family firm (Carney, 2005). We can expect that the perception of a 
family firm in Asia would be different from the perception US. Thus, the operational definitions 
are context-specific (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011). Looking for a unique 
definition with the same operationalization of variables all over the world might not be the right 
solution. A solution to overcome the problems arising from the use of different definitions is to 
overcome the family versus non-family dichotomy (D’Angelo et al., 2016). However, authors 
avoiding the dichotomy, have the same huge amount of requirement combinations to measure 
the family involvement. Especially if they use dummy variables, as González, Guzmán, Pombo, 
and Trujillo (2013) do. Thus, authors should use continuum variables measuring the 
involvement of the family in ownership and management, instead to define a firm as a family 
or not (Lin, 2012). Table 1.1 presents the definitions of family firm used in the main articles in 
the field.  
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Table 1.1 Family Firms definitions 
Study 
Scale 
variables 
O
w
nership 
M
anagem
ent 
Board 
G
eneration 
Founder 
V
ision 
Definition 
(Donnelley, 1964)  x x  x   
“A company is considered a family business when it has been closely identified with at least two 
generations of a family and when this link has had a mutual influence on company policy and on 
the interests and objectives of the family” (Donnelley, 1964: 94) 
(Bernard, 1975)  x x     “An enterprise is controlled by the members of a single family” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Barnes & Hershon, 1976)  x      
“Controlling ownership is rested in the hands of an individual or of the members of a single 
family” (Barnes & Hershon, 1976: 106) 
(Alcorn, 1982)  x x     
“A profit-making concern that is either a proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. ... If part 
of the stock is publicly owned, the family must also operate the business” (quoted by Chua et al., 
1999: 21) 
(Davis, 1983)  x x     
“Family businesses are those whose policy and direction are subject to significant influence by 
one or more family units. This influence is exercised through ownership and sometimes through 
the participation of family members in management.” (Davis, 1983: 47) 
(Rosenblatt, DeMik, 
Anderson, & Johnson, 
1985) 
 x x     
“The majority ownership or control lies within a single family and in which two or more family 
members are or at some time were directly involved in the business” (quoted by Chua et al., 
1999: 21) 
(Davis & Tagiuri, 1985)   x     
“Two or more extended family members influence the direction of the business” (quoted by 
Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Stern, 1986)  x x     “Owned and run by the members of one or two families” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Pratt & Davis, 1986)  x x     
“Two or more extended family members influence the direction of the business through the 
exercise of kinship ties, management roles, or ownership rights” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 
21) 
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Study 
Scale 
variables 
O
w
nership 
M
anagem
ent 
Board 
G
eneration 
Founder 
V
ision 
Definition 
(Babicky, 1987)  x   x   
“A small business started by one or a few individuals who had an idea, worked hard to develop 
it, and achieved, usually with limited capital, growth while maintaining majority ownership of 
the enterprise” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Lansberg, Perrow, & 
Rogolsky, 1988)  x 
     “A business in which members of a family have legal control over ownership” (quoted by Chua 
et al., 1999: 21) 
(Handler, 1989)   x x x   
“Major operating decisions and plans for leadership succession are influenced by family 
members serving in management or on the board” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Leach et al., 1990)  x x     
“More than 50 % of the voting shares are controlled by one family, and/or a single family group 
effectively controls the firm, and/or a significant proportion of the firm's senior management is 
members from the same family” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Dreux, 1990)  x x x    
“Economic enterprises controlled by one or more families (that have) a degree of influence in 
organisational governance sufficient to substantially influence or compel action” (quoted by 
Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Lyman, 1991)  x x x    
“The ownership had to reside completely with family members, at least one owner had to be 
employed in the business, and one other family member had either to be employed in the 
business or to help out on a regular basis even if not officially employed” (quoted by Chua et al., 
1999: 21) 
(Donckels et al., 1991)  x      “Family members own at least 60 % of the equity” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Gallo & Sveen, 1991; 
Tsang, 2002)  x x x 
   “A single family owns the majority of stock and has total control” (Gallo & Sveen, 1991) 
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Study 
Scale 
variables 
O
w
nership 
M
anagem
ent 
Board 
G
eneration 
Founder 
V
ision 
Definition 
(Holland & Oliver, 1992)  x x     
“The decisions regarding the ownership or management are influenced by a relationship to a 
family or families” (quoted by Chua et al., 1999: 21) 
(Churchill & Hatten, 
1987)  
 x  x   
“It is either the occurrence or the anticipation that a younger family member has or will assume 
control of the business from the elder” (Churchill & Hatten, 1987: 52) 
(Welsch, 1993)  x x     
“Ownership is concentrated, and owners or relatives of owners are involved in the management 
process” (Welsch, 1993: 40) 
(Carsrud, 1994)  x x x    
“family business means a firm's ownership and policy making are dominated by members of an 
"emotional kinship group" whether members of that group recognize the fact or not.” (Carsrud, 
1994: 40) 
(Cromie et al., 1995; 
Smyrnios, Romano, 
Tanewski, Karofsky, 
Millen, & Yilmaz, 2003) 
 x x     
“We consider a business to be a family business if one or more of the following obtain: a) More 
than 50 per cent of the shares are owned by one family; b) one family can exert significant 
control over the business; c) a significant number of top managers are drawn from one family.” 
(Cromie et al., 1995) 
(McConaughy et al., 2001; 
McConaughy & Walker, 
1998) 
  x   x  
Founding family controlled firms are defined to be public corporations whose CEOs are either 
the founder or a member of the founder’s family.”(McConaughy et al., 2001: 36–37)  
(Barbera & Moores, 2013; 
Okoroafo, 1999)  
     x “…respondents identified themselves as family businesses.” (Okoroafo, 1999: 150) 
(Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 
2004; Chua et al., 1999)  x x x 
  x 
“The family business is a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and 
pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same 
family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across 
generations of the family or families.” (Chua et al., 1999: 25) 
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Study 
Scale 
variables 
O
w
nership 
M
anagem
ent 
Board 
G
eneration 
Founder 
V
ision 
Definition 
(Davis & Harveston, 
2000)  
 x x  x x 
“Whether large or small, family businesses are characterized by (a) having the entrepreneur- 
founder or a family member as president or chief executive officer, (b) employing members of 
the entrepreneur-founder’s family, and (c) managers defining their firms as family businesses.” 
(Davis & Harveston, 2000: 108) 
(Westhead, Cowling, & 
Howorth, 2001; Westhead 
& Howorth, 2006) 
 x     x 
“A firm is regarded as a family firm if it meets the following conditions: more than 50% of 
ordinary voting shares are owned by members of the largest single family group related by blood 
or marriage and the company is perceived by the chief executive/ managing director/chairman to 
be a family business.” (Westhead et al., 2001: 370) 
(Child et al., 2002)  x      
“A dominant family or entrepreneurial ownership (defined as a 30 percent holding or more)” 
(Child et al., 2002: 38) 
(Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 
2002; Memili, Chrisman, 
Chua, Chang, & 
Kellermanns, 2011) 
 x x x x   
“Operationalization of the definition [proposed by Chua et al. 1999] required consideration of 
family ownership, management, and trans-generational sustainability. These constructs were 
measured by the percentage of the business owned by members of the family, the number of 
family members involved in the management of the business, and whether the future successor as 
president of the business was expected to be a member of the family.” (Chrisman et al., 2002: 
118–119) 
(Zahra, 2003; Zahra, 
Hayton, & Salvato, 2004)  x x 
 x   
“Family firms were defined as those businesses that reported some identifiable ownership share 
by at least one family and had multiple generations in leadership positions within those firms.” 
(Zahra, 2003: 501) 
(Astrachan et al., 2002; 
Holt, 2012; Klein, 
Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 
2005; Merino et al., 2014; 
Mitter, Duller, Feldbauer-
Durstmuller, & Kraus, 
2014; Rutherford et al., 
2008) 
 x x x x  x 
F-PEC scale. Power: % of ownership; % of directors that are family members; % external 
directors nominated by the family; % of managers that are family members. Experience: 
generation that owns the company; generation that runs the company; % of family members that 
participate actively in the company. Culture: family culture influences the business. 
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Study 
Scale 
variables 
O
w
nership 
M
anagem
ent 
Board 
G
eneration 
Founder 
V
ision 
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(Ali, Chen, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003b, 
2004; Chen, Chen, Cheng, 
& Shevlin, 2010) 
 x x x x x  
“The founder and/or their descendants hold positions in the top management or on the board or 
are among the companies’ largest shareholders.”(Ali et al., 2007: 247) 
(Abdellatif, Amann, & 
Jaussaud, 2010; Allouche, 
Amann, Jaussaud, & 
Kurashina, 2008; 
Kurashina, 2003) 
 x x x    
“Kurashina (2003) considered three types of family businesses: Type B, in which family 
members hold management positions or are members of the board of directors, as well as the 
main shareholders. Type C, in which family members do not hold top-ranking management 
positions but are among the major shareholders. Type D, in which family members hold top 
management positions but are not among the major shareholders.” (Abdellatif et al., 2010: 111) 
(Chua, Chrisman, & 
Sharma, 2003; Claver, 
Rienda, & Quer, 2007; 
Claver, Laura Rienda, & 
Quer, 2009b; Claver 
Cortés, Rienda García, & 
Quer Ramón, 2008) 
 x x     “The family both owns and manages the business”(Chua et al., 2003: 92) 
(Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2004; Salvato & 
Melin, 2008) 
 x x  x   
“A family-controlled business is here defined as a public or private company in which a family 
(or related families) controls the largest block of shares or votes, has one or more of its members 
in key management positions, and members of more than one generation are actively involved 
within the business.” (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2004: 2) 
(Graves, Thomas, & 
Thomas, 2006; Graves & 
Thomas, 2004, 2008; 
Thomas & Graves, 2005) 
 x x     
“This study defines a family business as one that is majority family owned (>50%) and has at 
least one family member in the management team.” (Graves & Thomas, 2004: 14) 
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(Casillas & Acedo, 2005)  x x x x   
“1) Is the share capital of the firm controlled by any family group? 2) Is the firm’s general 
director or are most of the persons in a firm’s top management team members of that family? 3) 
Does any member of the second generation of the family already work in the firm?”(Casillas & 
Acedo, 2005: 142) 
(Lien et al., 2005)  x x x    
“Percentage of shares held by the family of the largest individual shareholder and CEO; Board 
Chairman; honorary Chairman; Vice-Chairman; Directors and Supervisors that share a common 
family name with the largest owner.” (Lien et al., 2005: 748) 
(Zahra, 2005)  x      “Family owned” (Zahra, 2005: 30) 
(Crick et al., 2006)  x x  x x x 
“1) If the senior executive considered their company as being a family business; 2) if the 
majority of ordinary voting shares in the firm are owned by members of the largest family group 
that are related by blood or marriage; 3) if the management team of the firm is comprised mainly 
of members drawn from the single dominant family group who own the business; 4) where the 
firm was not run by the founder, if the firm had experienced an inter-generational ownership 
transition to a second or later generation of family members drawn from the single dominant 
family group owning the business”(Crick et al., 2006: 501) 
(Wang, 2006)  x x x  x  
“Founding family ownership refers to firms with substantial common stock held by family 
members or with founding family members actively involved in the management or the board of 
directors.”(Wang, 2006: 620) 
(Fernández & Nieto, 2005, 
2006)  x x 
    “The SME belongs to a family with one or more members in managerial positions”(Fernández & 
Nieto, 2005: 82) 
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(Villalonga & Amit, 2006)  x x x x x  
“A minimum control threshold of 20% of the votes, being the largest shareholder or voteholder, 
having family officers or directors, or being in second or later generation” (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006: 389) 
(Basly, 2007)  x x     “Control of the capital and involvement in high management.” 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007)  x      
“Combined equity holding of the largest individual shareholder, and his/her close 
family.”(Filatotchev et al., 2007: 564) 
(Hutton, 2007)  x x x x x  
“Founders or descendants continue to hold positions in top management, on the board, or among 
the company’s largest stockholders.” (Hutton, 2007: 290) 
(Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester, & Cannella, 2007)  x x 
    “Multiple members of the same family are involved as major owners or managers, either 
contemporaneously or over time.” (Miller et al., 2007) 
(Naldi et al., 2007)  x x    x 
“1) Are ownership and management control of the company dominated by one family? 2) Do you 
consider your business to be a family business?” (Naldi et al., 2007: 38)  
(Banalieva & Eddleston, 
2011; Bertrand, Johnson, 
Samphantharak, & Schoar, 
2008) 
 x      “A family is the ultimate owner.”  
(Chen et al., 2008)  x x x x x  
“Founders or their family members (by either blood or marriage) are key executives, directors, or 
blockholders (continuous family ownership); members of the founding family have an equity 
ownership of 5% or higher.” (Chen et al., 2008: 507) 
(Miller et al., 2008)  x x   x  
“Owned and founded by family members, or individual owners, and run by these people as 
well.” (Miller et al., 2008: 59) 
(Sirmon et al., 2008)  x x   x  
“A family member is the CEO of the firm while the family owns at least 5% of the firm.” 
(Sirmon et al., 2008: 988) 
(Carr & Bateman, 2009)  x      
“A family owns over 50% of a private firm or more than 10% of a public company.” (Carr & 
Bateman, 2009: 736) 
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(Villalonga & Amit, 2009)  x x x x x  
“The founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director, 
or blockholder, either individually or as a group. (Second or later generation).” (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2009: 3057) 
(Bhaumik et al., 2010)  x      “A family is the single largest shareholder in a firm.” (Bhaumik et al., 2010: 443) 
(Ellul, Pagano, & Panunzi, 
2010)  x 
     “The ultimate owner is a family blockholder and owns at least 20 percent of the cash flow right.” 
(Ellul et al., 2010: 2431) 
(Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, 
Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, 
& Sirmon, 2014; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010) 
 x  x    
“Two or more directors must have a family relationship, and family members must hold a 
substantial block of voting stock.” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010: 232) 
(Miller et al., 2010; 
Minichilli et al., 2014)  x 
     
“Our definition of family control is based on the power to appoint the board of directors, both 
directly and through financial holdings (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Following this definition, we 
considered a private firm to be in family control when the majority stake was in the hands of one 
family (Westhead and Cowling, 1998). For listed companies, we tailor the threshold to the stock 
market under consideration (Minichilli et al., 2010) and put it to 30 per cent.” (Minichilli et al., 
2014: 1162) 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2010)   x x  x x  
“1) Founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director, 
or blockholder, either individually or as a group; 2) “founding-family-owned and managed firms 
in their second or later generation and family managed (i.e., those whose CEO is the founder or a 
member of the founding family);  3) not only founding families but also individual investors or 
families that are not (related to) the founder and the family is a blockholder (i.e., a beneficial 
owner of 5% or more of any class of stock); 4) second - or later-generation firms whose CEO is 
an individual blockholder or a member of a blockholding family (founding or nonfounding).” 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2010: 866–867) 
(Bingham et al., 2011)   x x  x  
“Founding family members remained as significant company shareholders, were still in senior 
management, or held a seat on the board of directors.” (Bingham et al., 2011: 572) 
(Herrero, 2011)  x x x    “Managers and/or some of the employees have familial ties to the owner.” (Herrero, 2011: 889) 
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(Kontinen & Ojala, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c)  x x 
 x   
“The family: 1) controls the largest block of shares or votes, 2) has one or more of its members in 
key management positions, and 3) has members of more than one generation actively involved 
with the business.” (Kontinen & Ojala, 2011a: 445) 
(Acquaah, 2012)  x x x    
“Family ownership, family members as managers, directors, or employees”(Acquaah, 2012: 
1222) 
(Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 
2012; Anderson, Reeb, & 
Zhao, 2012; Kuo et al., 
2012) 
 x    x  
“The family (founders or founders’ descendants) continues to maintain a 5% or greater 
ownership stake” (Anderson, Reeb, et al., 2012: 358) 
(Arregle, Naldi, 
Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012)  x 
     “One or more family members owning at least 50% of the firm’s shares.” (Arregle et al., 2012: 
1123) 
(Cucculelli & 
Marchionne, 2012)  x 
     “The ultimate owner [as defined by Bureau van Dijk) is a family.” (Cucculelli & Marchionne, 
2012: 493) 
(Jiang & Peng, 2011)  x      “Families hold a 5% or larger ownership stake.” (Jiang & Peng, 2011: 21) 
(Kuo et al., 2012)  x  x    
“At least 50% of the members of the board are members of the owning family.” (Kuo et al., 
2012: 253) 
(Muñoz-Bullón & 
Sánchez-Bueno, 2012)  x x 
    
“1) Presence of at least one family member on the board of directors; i.e., a family with one or 
more members was required to occupy managerial positions (Fernandez & Nieto, 2005). 2) 
Family members hold at least a 10 percent outstanding equity stake.” (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-
Bueno, 2012: 473) 
(Zellweger et al., 2012)  x x x   x 
“The firm identifies themselves as family firms (e.g., Westhead and Cowling 1998), the family 
held a controlling interest, and the firm employed at least two family members.” (Zellweger et 
al., 2012: 855) 
(Cerrato & Piva, 2012) x  x     “% of family members who cover managerial roles.” (Cerrato & Piva, 2012: 629) 
(Lin, 2012) x x      “% of family cash flow rights.” (Lin, 2012: 49) 
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(Majocchi & Strange, 
2012)  x x 
     “% stakes held by a family.” (Majocchi & Strange, 2012: 889) 
(Sciascia & Mazzola, 
2008; Sciascia et al., 2012; 
Sciascia, Mazzola, 
Astrachan, & Pieper, 
2013) 
x x x x    
“% equity held by the owning family and at least 1 family member in the management or on the 
board of directors.” (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008: 338) 
(Calabrò et al., 2013)  x x  x   
“A family is the single largest owner; the CEO is a member of the owning family (Sirmon et al., 
2008); more than one generation actively involved in the business (Zahra, 2005).”(Calabrò et al., 
2013: 510) 
(Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 
2013)  x x 
    “Family involvement – in ownership and on a board – and essential element of having the 
family’s name in the firm’s name.” (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013: 340) 
(Eberhard & Craig, 2013)  x x    x 
“A business that: (1) considered themselves as a family firm, (2) majority family owned (>50%), 
and (3) had a family owner in management.” (Eberhard & Craig, 2013: 390) 
(Kappes & Schmid, 2013)  x x x  x  
“Founding family directly or indirectly holds at least 25 percent of the firm’s voting rights and/or 
a member of the founding family is represented on the management board and/or supervisory 
board.” (Kappes & Schmid, 2013: 552) 
(Kotlar & De Massis, 
2013)  x x 
   x 
“1) Ownership majority was held by members belonging to one family, (2) two or more family 
members were actively involved in the business, and (3) the CEO perceived the firm as a family 
firm.” (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013: 1266) 
(Boellis et al., 2016; 
Miller et al., 2014, 2013)  x 
     “A family owned an absolute majority (i.e., 50 percent) of shares. … The threshold [is] reduced 
to 25 per cent for listed companies.” (Miller et al., 2013: 559) 
(Chirico & Salvato, 2014)  x x    x 
“The majority of equity owned by a family, had multiple family members involved in their 
operations, and were recognised as a family business by the family CEO or senior executive 
member.” (Chirico & Salvato, 2014: 9) 
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(Classen, Carree, van Gils, 
& Peters, 2014)  x x 
    
“Is your enterprise controlled by a family or part of an enterprise group controlled by a family? 
In case of an enterprise controlled by a family, family members hold at least 50 % of the 
company’s shares.” (Classen et al., 2014: 602) 
(De Massis, Chirico, 
Kotlar, & Naldi, 2014)  x x 
    “The majority of equity owned by a family and had multiple family members involved in their 
operations.” (De Massis et al., 2014: 7) 
(Gentry et al., 2014)    x  x  “Founding family held two or more board seats.” (Gentry et al., 2014: 8) 
(Liang, Wang, & Cui, 
2014) x x x 
    “Ratio of family members in the top management team; % of total shares owned by the largest 
individual shareholders and their close family members.” (Liang et al., 2014: 133) 
(Obeng, Robson, & 
Haugh, 2014)  x x 
    “A family business is defined as one where one or more relatives of the owner-manager are 
employed in the firm.” (Obeng et al., 2014) 
(Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 
2014)  x 
 x    
“A majority family ownership (more than 10%) and has at least one family member on the 
board.” (Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014: 1315) 
(Singla et al., 2014)  x x x  x  
“Family controlled if any two of the following three criteria were met:1) the founding family had 
a stake of 20 percent or greater in the firm; 2) a member of the founding family was on the board 
of the firm; and/or 3) a member of the founding family was the chairperson; family managed if 
any two of the following three criteria were met: 1) a founding family member was the CEO of 
the firm; 2) a member of the founding family was an executive director, and/or (3) more than one 
member of the founding family were executive directors of the board.” (Singla et al., 2014: 611) 
(Cabrera-Suárez, Déniz-
Déniz, & Martín-Santana, 
2015) 
  x x    
“At least two people on the board of directors and/or management team have different first 
names and two identical surnames (i.e., they are siblings) and if some (or several) of the people 
occupying top management positions have at least one of these two surnames (i.e., he/she is a 
family member).” (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2015: 150) 
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(D’Angelo et al., 2016)  x x     
“The largest shareholder is a family and at least one family member as manager.”(D’Angelo et 
al., 2016) 
(Calabrò, Brogi, & 
Torchia, 2016)  x x     
“[The family has] the voting control and the majority of ownership (more than 50.0 %) … [and 
there are family members in managerial positions].” (Calabrò et al., 2016: 684) 
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1.2.2 Theories of Family Firms  
Researchers approaching family firms ground on many different theories. The most important with 
reference to the internationalisation of family firms are Agency Theory, stewardship perspective, 
Resource Based view, stagnation and socioemotional wealth perspectives, and Transaction Cost 
theory.  Agency theory and Stewardship perspective refer to the interests’ alignment between owners 
and managers in a firm. The Resource Based view focuses on the resources controlled by a firm. 
While all the perspectives mentioned above are generally applicable to all companies and they are 
also used for family businesses, the socioemotional wealth approach and the stagnation perspective 
has been applied exclusively to family firms. They have been expressly developed to study family 
firms, trying to give an explanation to the family firms’ propensity to keep a strong control of the 
company, their risk aversion, and their conservative nature. What follows is a review of each theory 
which has been applied in the field of family firms. 
1.2.2.1 Agency theory 
The focus of the Agency Theory is to analyse problems arising in the firms from the relationship 
principal-agent. A principal, typically the owner of the company, delegates to an agent the activity to 
manage the company. From the separation between management and ownership derives costs due 
principally to two main causes: information asymmetries and interests divergence between 
shareholders and managers (Chrisman et al., 2004). When owners choose their agent, they incur in 
the risk of adverse selection, while managers have the possibility to pursue private benefits taking 
decisions detrimental to the owners (Chrisman et al., 2004). Because of these agency problems, firms 
monitor and control the managers’ behaviour implementing different kinds of control mechanisms 
ranging from the composition of the board of directors (size, the percentage of outside directors) to 
the payment of stakes options to managers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Agency theory has been largely 
used in family firm literature, both from authors investigating the performance differences between 
family and non-family businesses and from those interested on family firms’ internationalisation. The 
first aim of agency theorist was to analyse the problems, and the related governance solutions, arising 
from the separation between ownership and management. Whereas some authors state that agency 
costs do not affect family firms precisely because of the absence of separation between management 
and ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), others claim that these costs are even exacerbated 
(William S Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). 
However, it is important to consider that family firms are not all equal, and at the same time, not all 
family member act in the same way (Chrisman et al., 2004). Some family firms may have higher 
agency costs than other family firms because they experience a higher divergence of interests among 
family members, or because they perceive differently to be part of a family business. Their behaviours 
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and their decisions in order to maximise the family shareholders’ performance (financial or not), 
change accordingly. Moreover, the presence of minority shareholders or the management team 
composed of managers external to the family generates different agency costs.  
The key characteristic of family firms is the unification of ownership and management (Carney, 
2005). Thus, family firms, in which ownership and management overlap, overcome principal-agent 
problems (Miller et al., 2013). The overlap between management and ownership reduces agency 
problems and promote the alignment of managers’ goals and benefits for the firm. In family 
businesses this point become of prominent importance, given that members of the same family own 
and run the company. The conflicting interests between ownership and management, given that they 
belong to the same family, if any, are solved mainly with informal mechanisms, and this may enhance 
the firm’s competitiveness (Bhaumik et al., 2010). Indeed, family firms through informal 
relationships might be quicker in solving conflicts and take decisions. The managerial involvement 
of the owning family magnifies the family ownership’s effect on strategies. Hence, we can expect 
that the managers’ willingness to take risks is not dictated by short-termism myopia to achieve 
personal goals, but they have a long-term orientation in accordance with family’s interests. According 
to the agency theory, the managers’ risk aversion increases with their percentage of stakes owned 
(Cerrato & Piva, 2012). Some authors state that family ownership is more risk averse because of the 
overlap between family’s and firm’s wealth (Lin, 2012). Indeed, as the amount of owners’ wealth 
invested in a single firm increases, they become more risk-averse (Oesterle, Richta, & Fisch, 2013). 
Moreover, some authors highlight the undiversified portfolio investments of the owning family as the 
main reason for their risk aversion (Abdellatif et al., 2010). Indeed, they are exposed to a high specific 
risk. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) state that, in family firms agency, costs arise because family managers 
sacrifice the creation of a high shareholder value to maintain family control. However, if shareholders 
are more interested in preserving family control, and managers, in order to achieve this result, 
sacrifice economic performance, this is not an agency problem. Managers are pursuing shareholders’ 
interests. An agency cost arises only if there is a divergence of interests and managers pursue their 
own benefits rather than those of shareholders. In family firms, another agency problem might assume 
a relevance importance: the principal – principal agency cost. These costs arise when, despite a high 
ownership concentration, there are some minority shareholders. In the case of family firms, the family 
is the largest shareholder, and it has sufficient power to choose managers among its members. Thus, 
when the family controls less than 100 percent of the firm, minority shareholders might be exploited 
by family shareholders (D’Angelo et al., 2016). Moreover, if family managers belong to the owning 
family with the largest percentage of equity, this may generate costs of principal-agent type for 
minority shareholders (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007). Shareholders-managers may 
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have opportunistic behaviours, pursuing the interest of the controlling family, ignoring those of the 
outside, and often minority, shareholders (William S. Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). They use 
their power to pursue family benefits even if doing so they damaged the company (Miller et al., 2013). 
Depending on how a family firm is defined, agency costs might assume an increasing relevance in 
this kind of organisations. To exemplify, consider the case in which family firms are defined 
exclusively in terms of ownership concentration or the perception of the controlling shareholder and 
is not required that managers be members of the controlling family. In this case, external managers 
might pursue high economic performance to improve their reputation in the job market, in spite of 
shareholders’ goals, as avoiding risky investments to preserve the control of the company to pass it 
to future generations. However, family firms should pursue economic performance as all the other 
types of organisations, especially in light of their long-term vision for future generations. Thus, 
contrary to what Fama and Jensen (1983) argued, this kind of organisations is not the easiest possible, 
because they should conciliate different and contrasting goals.  
1.2.2.2 Stewardship perspective 
In accordance with the stewardship perspective, managers behave as loyal stewards, subordinating 
their own benefits to achieve firm goals. This perspective is well applicable to family firms, defined 
as firms where members of the same family are both controlling shareholders and managers. 
Classifying family firms as entities with a long-term orientation and having as the main goal to 
transfer the business, hence the wealth and the reputation to the next generations, some scholars 
deduce that family managers will act as loyal stewards. Indeed, in this context, the goals of family 
managers and family ownership overlap. Managers do not have conflicts of interests (Banalieva & 
Eddleston, 2011; Chrisman et al., 2007). Thus, the stewardship perspective assumes a different 
relevance depending on the definition of family firms, as in the case of agency theory. Focusing on 
family firms interpreted as firms in which members of the same family are both owners and managers 
might give useful insights to understand the stewardship perspective. Thus, in the following of this 
section the family firm expression denotes a firm owned and ran by a family. 
The managerial involvement of the owning family promotes the alignment of the interests of the 
managers with those of the company, as forecasted by the Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Family members share more than just their wealth invested in the same business. Most of the time 
managers belonging to the owning family are involved in the company since from their childhood 
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). They share the family name and the reputation to leave as 
inheritance to the future generations (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011). Their shared experiences and 
relationships with the other family members involved in the company help them to see the business 
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as a continuum with the family. A fundamental concept in the stewardship perspective is altruism 
(Zahra, 2003). Given their strong identification with the firm, managers are more likely to act 
altruistically. They identify themselves with the company and thus are highly motivated to pursue the 
interests of the business and the family because their own interests are the same (Schulze et al., 2001). 
This theoretical approach highlights the benefits and the positive side of family firms. 
The key difference between agency theory and stewardship perspective lies in the convergence or not 
of the principal-agent interests. The stewardship perspective analyses family relationship in a more 
positive light than the agency theory does. Indeed, even if some agency theorists claim that being a 
family organization is sufficient in order to not incur in agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), other authors state that family firms experience different agency problems, which 
to some extent are harder to solve than in other firms (William S. Schulze et al., 2003). Both theories, 
starting from different assumptions, focus on the maximisation of shareholders wealth (Tosi, 
Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003). It is important to adapt the definition of “shareholders wealth” to 
family firms. Researchers testing whether family managers act more like as stewards or family firms 
face peculiar agency costs, focusing exclusively on the consequences on the firm’s economic 
performance. However, if family firms are characterised mainly by their non-economic goals, as 
many authors stated, these empirical tests are not exhaustive. Scholars should find a measure of the 
family firms’ performance regarding their non-economic goals to investigate whether are more 
effective the agency costs or the stewardship benefits. To understand which perspective best applies 
to family firms, and to understand whether shareholders’ and managers’ interests overlap, it is 
necessary to know in detail the managers’ and firms’ characteristics.  
1.2.2.3 Stagnation and Socioemotional wealth perspectives 
Research in the family business field has highlighted that from the non-financial aspects 
characterising family firms might originate a general conservative behaviour of these companies. The 
broad concept of family firms’ conservatism has been analysed from two perspectives: stagnation and 
socioemotional wealth. Both the views deal with the relevance of control in family firms. Indeed, 
these perspectives argue that family firms sacrifice economic goals to maintain strong control over 
the business. 
The stagnation perspective encompasses almost all criticisms regarding family firms (Miller et al., 
2008). Authors making reference to this perspective highlight the conservatism, the importance to 
maintain the control of the business, and consequently to do not raise debt preferring an almost 
permanent lack of financial resources (Molly, Laveren, & Deloof, 2010). However, this reluctance to 
increase debt limits the financial resources and consequently the possibility to make investments in 
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order to growth and/or internationalise. In accordance with the Resource Based view of the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), financial resources are important determinants of firm’s growth. 
They are a necessary element to gain and maintain a competitive advantage, even in international 
expansion. International diversification may require external funding and consequently the family 
should issue new stock debt or augments its debt financing, losing control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
The increase of debt proportion might create conflicts between debtholders and shareholders, 
becoming a source of agency problems. Moreover, the increase of debt financing can be easily 
translated in a loss of control. Thus, family firms might be reluctant raising debt and change the 
capital structure of the company. González et al.(2013) found that family directors are associated to 
lower level of debts, consistent with the idea that they are more risk averse. Contrary they found that 
when the family is present exclusively on the ownership, and not in management and on board the, 
the family involvement is positive related to the proportion of debt. Indeed, the family risk aversion 
is moderated by the presence of external managers and directors (González et al., 2013). Moreover, 
they point out another important scarce resource: the managerial quality of their staff. Indeed, it is 
often claimed that family firms prefer relatives in the top managerial positions even if they do not 
have the necessary skills. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) demonstrate that inferior management 
practices are associated with the presence of family members in managerial positions. Family firms 
that choose their managers exclusively between their members have a limited number of possible 
choices(Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). Some authors argued that family firms in comparison with 
non-family firms suffer a lack of managerial capabilities (Graves et al., 2006; Lin, 2012). Moreover, 
the lack of managerial capabilities might prevent the firm to undertake foreign investments 
(Fernández & Nieto, 2006). These results have been discussed in the light of the desire of the owning 
family to maintain the direct control of the firm, and with the thesis that family shareholders prefer 
employ members of the family also in high-level positions rather than refer to expertise from external 
resources (Fernández & Nieto, 2006). Hence, according to these studies, family kinship is more 
important than the skills and capabilities. Altogether, these features make the family risk averse and 
less prone to growth, especially in the international markets. 
Other scholars synthesised the idiosyncratic family businesses’ characteristics, regarding the affective 
sphere, with the expression “socioemotional wealth” (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). 
Gomez-Meija et al. defined it as the “non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s needs, 
such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty” 
(2007: 106). Thus, all the non-economic aspects characterising family firms are included in the broad 
definition of socioemotional wealth. These features explain the reason why family firms take non-
economic decisions in contrast to non-family firms (Liang et al., 2014). This perspective focuses on 
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the family firms’ risk propensity and their desire to preserve the direct control over the business. 
Berrone et al. (2012) tried to operationalize the dimensions of “socioemotional wealth”. The 
operationalisations presented in their work are based on a set of questions to ask firms through the 
submission of questionnaires. However, the same suggested questions might be used to define a firm 
as a family business or as a non-family firm. Indeed the proposed items concern the identification of 
the family with the company (Astrachan et al., 2002), the level of ownership and management 
involvement in the business (Chua et al., 1999). Thus, they define the dimensions of the 
socioemotional wealth using the same criteria used to define family firms and to make conjectures on 
how socioemotional wealth is important for family firms. Gomez-Mejia et al.(2007) state that the 
propensity toward risk of family businesses varies with regard to their socioemotional wealth. To 
preserve it they are willing to take high-risk investment decisions, and at the same time, they are 
strongly risk averse if the risk concerns the loss of the socioemotional wealth. In summary, the 
willingness to take risk is high if this is necessary to retain the direct control of the firm and to increase 
the business with entrepreneurial activities. On the contrary, if the encompassed risk is to lose the 
family wealth, family businesses are higher risk averse than non-family firms (Naldi et al., 2007).  
1.2.2.4 Resource Based view 
According to Barney (1991), the pioneer of the Resource Based view, a firm can develop a sustainable 
competitive advantage if and only if it has tangible or intangible resources that are valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991, 2001). In light 
of the Resource Based view, some authors point out that family firms control unique inimitable 
resources, deriving from the family relationships, which allow them to build and sustain a competitive 
advantage over the other type of companies (Habbershon, 2006; Habbershon & Williams, 1999; 
Zahra et al., 2004). Habbershon and Williams (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) developed the concept 
of familiness to identify “the unique bundle of resources a particular firm has because of the systems 
interaction between the family, its individual members, and the business”. Furthermore, the 
familiness is a concept that helps us to see the business, the family ownership and management, and 
family culture as a continuum of interactions and not just as a static system where ownership and 
management overlap (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003). This system of interconnected 
relationships and the shared culture make inimitable the family firms’ assets (Zahra et al., 2004). The 
family culture and vision shape the company’s strategy. For instance, the long-term perspective of 
the family contributes to undertake investments with a long-term commitment facilitating the 
constitution of a competitive advantage. In addition, in a fast changing world environment, speedy 
decisions are fundamental to build a sustainable competitive advantage. Informal relationships typical 
of family businesses are another source of competitive advantage. Indeed informal interactions among 
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family owners and family managers simplify the communication inside the company and speed the 
decision-making process (Carr & Bateman, 2009). Reputation is another key resource in family 
business. Often the name of the controlling family is closely associated with the name of the firm, or 
even it is included in the company name. Controlling families consider the business as a continuum 
of the family; hence, they carefully consider the firm’s reputation. Thus, family and firm reputation 
coincide. Families build over generations a good imagine and strong reputation of the firm, which 
facilitates relationships with customers, partners, and suppliers. Despite the presence of these valuable 
and unique resources, family firms are also characterised by the lack of some other crucial resources.  
1.2.2.5 Transaction Cost Theory 
Recently some authors began to apply the Transaction Cost theory to family firms (Gedajlovic & 
Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012). These authors apply the concept of specific assets of 
the Transaction Cost theory to the idiosyncratic characteristics of family firms (Verbeke & Kano, 
2012). Williamson distinguished between specific and generic assets, arguing that the latter are easy 
to transact and therefore are generally traded through markets. Specific assets need to be managed 
through hierarchy or markets accordingly to their degree of specificity to the investment. Gedajlovic 
and Carney (2010) grounding on Williamson’s work added that even generic assets might be difficult 
to transact. Thus, there are generic non-tradable assets, which have a wide variety of application 
inside the company but are sticky to the firm (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). They identified the family 
businesses’ resources analysed by the above-presented theories, such as social capital, reputation, and 
tacit knowledge, are generic non-tradable assets. In addition, family firms’ governance structure 
fosters the capabilities to developing, sustaining and appropriating value from these assets 
(Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010). Family firms’ behaviours are thus affected by 
these specific family assets and might be explained through the Transaction Cost lens. Thus, the 
Transaction Cost theory reconciles the conflicting predictions of the other theories applied to family 
firms. Moreover, family firms’ have different behaviours depending on whether the assets involved 
in the decision are strictly linked to the family or not. Thus, their decisions suffer from a “bifurcation 
bias” toward family-assets (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
1.3 Why are family firms different from non-family firms?  
Despite the lack of a common definition and irrespective of the theory used, research on family firms 
focuses on the characteristics and related influences of family ownership and, on the effect of family 
members involved in management. Moreover, scholars agree in associate family businesses to the 
strong desire to maintain the direct control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) and on the longer-
term orientation in comparison with non-family companies. The debate is still opened concerning the 
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family firms’ approach to risk. Indeed, is not clear whether family firms are more or not risk averse 
than non-family firms (González et al., 2013; Zahra, 2005). In accordance with these main 
idiosyncratic characteristics of family businesses, prior research demonstrated that their 
internationalisation differs from that of non-family ones. What follows is a description of the main 
family firms’ characteristics affecting their strategies, irrespective of the definition applied.  
Prior to the emergence of the family business field, ownership has been studied mainly with reference 
the degree of ownership dispersion or concentration (Cerrato & Piva, 2012). However, academic 
research demonstrated that also the shareholder type affects firm’s strategies, (Calabrò et al., 2013; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Sciascia et al., 2012; Zahra, 2003). Thus, different kinds of ownership 
affect internationalisation (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Oesterle et al., 2013), because they have different 
values, incentives, temporal preferences and risk attitude (Lin, 2012). Furthermore, different 
shareholders may provide the company with different resources and networks (Fernández & Nieto, 
2006). For instance, foreign financial owners may increase the firm’s internationalisation providing 
access to networks of business partners and local institutions of their country (Calabrò et al., 2013). 
Moreover, in continental Europe, where ownership is highly concentrated, it is even more relevant to 
study how ownership type affect firm’s strategies (Fernández & Nieto, 2006) because the main 
shareholder has a strong power to influence firm’s strategies. The complexity of the different goals 
pursued by this kind of ownership has given rise to different streams of research investigating, among 
others, the effect of family ownership on financial performance and internationalisation. Family 
ownership has many related aspects; the most important for this research are six.  
First, ownership is often linked to management. Family firms are characterised by the involvement 
of a member of the owning family in management operations. They may serve as CEO and/or 
Chairman or occupy other positions inside the top management team or in the Board. It has been 
demonstrated that family variables, as the involvement of family members in management, affect the 
degree (international sales) and the geographic scope (number of countries) of internationalisation 
(Arregle et al., 2012; Zahra, 2003). Moreover, they may also influence the timing of 
internationalisation. As stated above, family managers affect firm’s strategies because of their lack 
of capabilities or because they pursue non-economic goals.  
Second, the ownership governance promotes the desire to maintain the direct control of the firm, this 
because of family strong personal attachment, commitment, and identification with the company (Lin, 
2012). The concept of family control, defined as the family’s power to influence the business through 
ownership and managers, is strongly related to the above mentioned long-term orientation of family 
firms. Owning families exert their control over the business with a longer term orientation in 
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comparison to widely-held corporations (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Indeed, the owning family 
considers the control of the firm as a way through which preserve and maximise the family wealth 
for next generations. Having the control of the firm is indispensable for the family to achieve its non-
economic goals (Zellweger et al., 2012). Villalonga and Amit (2010) argue there are two approaches 
with regard to the benefits deriving from the control. These are the competitive advantage and the 
private benefits control. The key difference between these approaches concerns the group of 
shareholders interests whose the firm pursues. According to the first, the controlling family seeks to 
develop a firm’s competitive advantage pursuing the benefits for all shareholders, even the minority 
ones which do not belong to the family. As shown by Friedman et al. (2003) the propping practice is 
not so uncommon, especially in countries with low quality of the legal system. Conversely, in 
accordance with the latter, the controlling family pursue its own benefits exclusively, neglecting the 
benefits of shareholders other than the family. In addition, Demsetz and Lehn (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985) highlight the “amenity potential” of family firms, referring to the non-economic benefits that 
family members achieve preserving the control over the family (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003). 
These non-economic benefits might be the good reputation linked to the name of the firm or the 
pleasure to run the business together with other family members sharing the same values. The higher 
is the amenity potential, the longer the family will preserve the control, accepting a reduction in it 
only in the case of extreme necessity of capital (Burkart et al., 2003). The existence of a mixture of 
non-economic goals, values and family relationships intrinsically linked to the business, make more 
important for family firms rather than for non-family firms to preserve the control of the company.  
Third, family firms have generally a longer time horizon than non-family ones. The literature has 
emphasised the relevance of a large variety of non-economic goals for family firms. Most of them 
require a long-term orientation, i.e. a special attention to maintain and nurture a corporate reputation, 
the desire to maintain a direct control over the business and pass it to next generations. Thus, it is 
correct to state that family firms in comparison to their counterpart have a stronger long-term 
orientation that goes beside the usual meaning of going concern. Lumpkin and Brigham (2011) point 
out three dimensions of long-term orientation in the light of which analyses the choices of family 
businesses. The first dimension is futurity; it regards the activity to forecast and plan actions with 
particular attention to their future consequences (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). A meaningful example 
of this long-term oriented behaviour in family firms is their succession planning. The second 
dimension, continuity, refers to the constancy and durability of the business (Lumpkin & Brigham, 
2011). Family business research has highlighted the prominence for family firms to build and preserve 
across generations a good reputation. Future generations of family member inherit not only the 
business but also the reputation and the long lasting relationship built on time. Finally, the last 
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dimension considered in the long-term framework of Lumpkin and Brigham (2011) is the 
perseverance. This concept deals with the continuing effort to achieve the long-term objectives. The 
long-term vision of family firms has a massive impact on employed strategies. It shapes the goal to 
maintain the control and the risk attitude. Accordingly, different investments are evaluated in light of 
this long time horizon. For instance, international investments are stimulated by the long-term vision, 
since they are considered as an opportunity for growth (Claver, Laura Rienda, et al., 2009a).  
Fourth, family ownership varies in terms of risk taking, which in turn may influence the choice to 
expand internationally (Zahra, 2003). With reference to the risk attitude of family firms, there are 
opposite views. Often the family business literature qualified family firms as risk-averse (see Gomez-
Meija et al. (2007) for a summary) because their entire wealth invested in the family business. Other 
authors (Naldi et al., 2007; Zahra, 2005; Zahra, Neubaum, & Larraneta, 2007) argue that family firms 
show a higher entrepreneurial risky behaviour in comparison to non-family businesses. Another view, 
grounding on the “socioemotional wealth”, states family firms are risk willing and risk averse at the 
same time, depending on how the decision affect the preservation of the “socioemotional wealth” 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Risk aversion in family business research assumed mostly the 
connotation of financial risk aversion and it is measured as the proportion of debt (González et al., 
2013). Given the relevance that non-financial aspects assume in family firms, scholars should gain 
insights from entrepreneurial research and study different measures of risk attitudes. The first attempt 
in this direction has been made by Zahra (2005), using as proxies of the risk attitude the involvement 
in risky activities, i.e. international alliances, new foreign markets entries, investment in emerging 
radical technologies, and radical product innovation. More research is needed in this direction, and 
the introduction of the concept of fear of failure to family business might shed some light on the risk 
attitude of these firms (Cacciotti & Hayton, 2015). Indeed, especially in family firms, the fear to 
obtain negative results that might affect other family members or the fear to be judged negatively by 
the family, might have significant effects on the business. However, as entrepreneurial research 
consider the fear of failure as a force preventing to do something, research is also needed to investigate 
the striving effect of fear of failure (Cacciotti & Hayton, 2015).  
The last two aspects are related to the resource endowment of family firms: managerial and financial 
endowments. Some empirical research demonstrated that family firms in comparison to their 
counterpart have less managerial resources (Graves et al., 2006). Family ownership prefers a manager 
from the kinship rather than to hire an external professional manager (Burkart et al., 2003). However, 
the second generation of family members might have access to a qualified education more oriented 
to the involvement in the family business (Casillas & Acedo, 2005). More research is needed to 
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investigate whether family managers are effectively less qualified then managers of non-family firms, 
taking into consideration also the experience that family members accumulate since the childhood. 
Indeed, the business-specific knowledge that family members acquire since their childhood in some 
aspects overcome the disadvantages arising from the lack of professional managers (Miller et al., 
2013). In addition to managerial capabilities, financial resources assume a crucial role in family 
business literature. Researchers have pointed out that family businesses usually have lower financial 
resources than non-family firms, mainly because of their reluctance to increase debt 
proportion(Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). Indeed, family firms avoid sharing equity with external parties 
because they want to maintain the control.  
In light of the key features described above, the next section provides an account of the main empirical 
results of studies investigating the family firms’ internationalisation. 
1.4 Family firms and internationalisation 
The ownership structure (high concentration and shareholder type), in addition to the characteristics 
of the management strongly affects firms’ strategies, as international strategies. Thus, the 
international strategies of family firms, which are characterised by one family that controls the 
business through high ownership share and management, are highly influenced by these 
characteristics. Since internationalisation of family firms may differ from that of firms with different 
ownership structures (Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), 
it is important to investigate their internationalisation processes separately. That importance resides 
in the above mentioned crucial differences among these two kinds of constituencies. Indeed, the 
extant literature on internationalisation of family firms highlighted as main factors affecting the 
internationalisation of these businesses their long-term horizon, fear of losing control, limited 
financial and managerial resources, and the possibility to take quick decisions (Kontinen & Ojala, 
2010). These peculiar features have fostered a stream of international business research investigating 
whether family firms’ international strategies differ from those of non-family ones. The results in the 
field are contrasting. Although some authors found a positive relationship, most of the studies state 
that being a family business negatively affects the degree of internationalisation. Moreover, a limited 
stream of research concluded that the relationship varies according to the degree of the family 
involvement. The main findings of the empirical studies concerning the internationalisation of family 
businesses are presented in Table 1.2. 
Despite the high level of risk associated with internationalisation, the advantages related to this 
strategy are not less important. Indeed, international investments may increase, especially in the long 
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run, firms’ performance and its competitiveness (Chen, Hsu, & Chang, 2014). The altruism of family 
managers and the involvement of more generations in the business encourages the long-term 
orientation and the willingness to take risky decisions to get more benefits in the long run, as for 
instance expand the business overseas (Zahra, 2003). Moreover, in family firms, where the main 
shareholders are sharing the same values, goals and culture, the communication and consequently, 
decision-making processes are facilitated, reducing the problems related to the internationalisation 
strategy (Bhaumik et al., 2010). Thus, is not surprisingly that some authors (Carr & Bateman, 2009; 
Chen et al., 2014; Zahra, 2003) found a positive relation between family firms and international 
involvement. While Chen et al. (2014) found a positive relationship defining a family firm referring 
exclusively to the percentage of family ownership, the results are supported by the study of Zahra 
(2003), which considered both family ownership and management. Family managers choose to 
internationalise because through this strategy they foster the firm’s growth and consequently the 
family wealth increases.  
Although, prior literature has stressed the risk associated with the internationalisation and the 
consistent resource endowment necessary to undertake it. Grounding on this view and on the negative 
aspects of family firms, summarized by the stagnation perspective (Miller et al., 2008), some authors 
found a negative relationship between family control (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Fernández & Nieto, 
2005, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) and internationalisation. The negative relationship is 
confirmed even disentangling the effect of family ownership and managerial involvement (Majocchi 
& Strange, 2012). The scarcity of financial and managerial resources (Graves et al., 2006), and the 
conflicting family’s and business’ goals (Schulze et al., 2001) limit the family firms’ 
internationalisation (Fernández & Nieto, 2006). Moreover, the effect of cultural distance is stronger 
for family firms rather than for non-family firms. Indeed, when they internationalise prefer culturally 
closed countries (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
The contrasting results concerning family firms’ internationalisation have been integrated by some 
empirical studies founding a non-linear relationship between family businesses and 
internationalisation level (Liang et al., 2014; Sciascia et al., 2012, 2013). However, their findings are 
not consistent. Indeed, even if all the studies differentiate between the effect of family ownership and 
family involvement, they found opposite results. Regarding the effect of family ownership, Sciascia 
et al. (2012, 2013) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between family ownership and 
internationalisation, while Liang et al. (2014) found a U-shaped relationship. Concerning the effect 
of family involvement, Sciascia et al. (2012) found a J-shaped relationship between family 
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participation on the board of directors and internationalisation while Liang et al. (2014) found that 
family management involvement has an inverted U-shaped relationship.  
Unique among the studies on family firms’ internationalisation are the results of Casillas et al., 
(2005). Indeed, they fail t find support for the hypothesis that family involvement has a direct 
relationship with internationalisation.  
So far, this paper has focused on family businesses, concluding with the effect of their features on 
internationalisation. An important branch of international business concerns foreign entry strategies. 
Thus, if family control affects the international diversification and intensity, it is plausible that it also 
affects the foreign entry mode choices. The section that follows will focus on entry mode research. 
Since the extant literature in the field has almost neglected the effect of ownership on entry mode, the 
review of this literature in the next section does not refer to family firms. 
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Table 1.2 Empirical studies on family firms' internationalisation 
Study Results Eff Dependent variable Independent variables Control Variables 
Sample 
size 
Sector 
type 
Firm 
size 
Listed 
Country 
of 
research 
Meth 
(Zahra, 2003) Ownership is a significant variable that 
determines the degree and geographic 
scope of internationalisation. Family 
ownership and involvement also interact 
positively and significantly to influence 
internationalisation. 
+ 1) % of foreign sales; 
2) N. of foreign countries 
% equity held by the 
owner fam; % equity held 
by inside fam directors; 
fam founder is CEO and 
Chairman; % directors 
fam members; n. 
generations who worked 
on the firm; 5-item index 
fam business involvement 
in the firm's strategic 
planning process. 
Firm size; firm age; CEO 
tenure; fam status; 
industry type;  past 
performance; non-
financial motivations to 
internationalize 
409 (109 
FFs) 
Manufac
turing 
On 
average 
72 
employe
es (S.D. 
181) 
NO US OLS 
(Casillas & 
Acedo, 2005) 
 
No direct relation is verified between 
being a family firm and the 
internationalisation level. CEOs’ 
experience and education level are higher 
in firms that are more of a family-type 
than in those less of a family-type. The 
higher the family involvement, the 
smaller the size of the firm. FFs show a 
lower perception of the risks arising from 
the international expansion of the firm. 
 Export intensity; level of 
Involvement (Likert-type 
scale) 
Family status; CEO 
(education, age, language 
spoken); use of 
internationalisation 
support entities; risk 
perception; 
Firm size; firm age 222    ES PLS 
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(Fernández & 
Nieto, 2005) 
The results confirm the negative 
relationship between family ownership 
and international involvement, measured 
with both export propensity and export 
intensity. In other words, there are few 
family SMEs that export, and those that 
do export do so to a lesser extent than 
other SMEs. 
- Firm’s export propensity; 
firm’s export intensity, 
Fam ownership; second 
generation; joint 
ownership; alliances 
Firm size; indebtedness; 
R&D intensity; export 
intensity by industry 
1077 
(56%FF
s) 
Manufac
turing 
SMEs  ES Probit 
(Thomas & 
Graves, 2005) 
 
FFs are less likely to internationalise 
their operations when compared to non-
family firms. Compared to non-FFs, FFs 
are less entrepreneurial in that they are 
more likely to focus on the domestic 
marketplace rather than exploit 
opportunities in the international 
marketplace. The results highlight the 
importance of the innovation 
commitment for international expansion. 
- 1) Export status; 
2) Export intensity 
Family business status Growth intention; Firm 
size; Firm age; 
Innovation; Networking 
dummy 
871 Manufac
turing 
SMEs NO AU Logit 
(Lien et al., 
2005) 
 
FFs have been significantly more likely 
to undertake FDI than foreign-controlled 
firms. FFs have been significantly more 
likely to undertake FDI in China than 
State-controlled firms, but no more likely 
to invest in the rest of the world. Foreign-
controlled firms have been significantly 
less likely to undertake FDI in China than 
both FFs those with widely dispersed 
ownership. An independent CEO reduces 
significantly the likelihood of FDI in 
China, though not elsewhere. 
+ 1) Dummy whether a 
company had undertaken 
FDI or not; 2) Cumulative 
number of international 
projects undertaken; 3) 
FDI density ( % ratio of 
the cumulative FDI to the 
average issued capital 
Dummies corporate 
control (family-controlled, 
State-controlled, foreign-
controlled, and widely 
held corporations); total n. 
of family directors; 
Independent CEO; 
Independent Chairman 
Firm size; Firm age; 
proprietary and human 
capital; industry dummies; 
ability to generate internal 
funding; ability to raise 
external funding; 
228 Textiles, 
construc
tion, 
electrica
l, and 
service 
n.a. YES TW OLS 
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(Fernández & 
Nieto, 2006) 
Significant relationship between type of 
ownership and the internationalisation 
strategy adopted by SMEs. Negative 
relationship between family ownership 
and export intensity. Positive relationship 
between corporate blockholders and 
internationalisation. 
- 1) Export status (whether 
the firm is a non-exporter 
(i.e., export sales are equal 
to zero) or an exporter; 2) 
Export intensity (ratio of 
export sales to total sales) 
Family; Corporation 
(another company is a 
blockholder in the SME); 
Family and corporation 
(the SME belongs to a 
family, with one or more 
family members 
inmanagerial positions, 
and with a corporate 
blockholder) 
Innovation; Alliance 
dummy; Age; Foreign 
ownership; Size; Sector 
export intensity 
8497 
(56%FF
s) 
Manufac
turing 
SMEs 
(10 -200 
employe
es) 
 
ES Probit; 
Tobit 
(Graves et al., 
2006) 
The results highlight that the managerial 
capabilities of FBs lag behind that of 
non-FBs as they grow internationally, 
and this was particularly evident at high 
levels of internationalisation. 
- Export intensity Fam status; n. full time 
managers; 
nonfamily/outside 
managers; management 
training; formal strategic 
plan; 
 891 Manufac
turing 
SMEs  AU nonpara
metric 
statistic
al 
techniqu
es 
(Sirmon et 
al., 2008) 
 
The interaction effect of family influence 
and imitability on internationalisation is 
positive and statistically significant. 
Imitability negatively affects firm 
performance. the effect of imitability on 
firm performance is 
mediated by the firm’s strategic actions, 
specifically R&D investments and 
internationalisation. 
+ Firm value added Family influence; 
internationalisation; R&D 
investment; inimitability; 
Public ownership; prior 
performance; membership 
in a group; firm size; year. 
2531 Industria
l 
SMEs  FR OLS 
34 
 
(Carr & 
Bateman, 
2009) 
 
FFs are slightly more internationally 
oriented than non-FFs. No evidence of 
FFs adopting more ‘inward’ orientated 
strategic choices. FFs adopt a higher 
proportion of the most worldwide 
configurations, as compared to non-FFs. 
This propensity actually rises with the 
degree of fam ownership and control. FFs 
pursuing these more worldwide 
configurations appeared to achieve 
higher, not lower, levels of profitability. 
+ 1)RoCE; 2)Sales growth Family status; FAM 
ownership <30%; FAM 
ownership 30%-50%; 
FAM ownership >50%; 
 
Sector; Country; Level of 
ownership; Revenue; Pre-
tax profit margins; R&D 
intensity; Capital 
Expenditure/Sales; Sales 
and General 
Administration 
Costs/Sales; 
130 (65 
FFs) 
 
Large YES World Multilin
ear 
(Claver, 
Laura Rienda, 
et al., 2009a) 
Long-term encourages greater 
international commitment. The presence 
of nonfamily managers is positively 
related to international commitment. The 
more family firm managers assign 
relevance to family funds for 
international activity, the less 
internationally committed the 
organisation 
- International commitment Risk aversion; generation; 
long-term vision; family 
members in other 
countries; nonfamily 
managers; self-financing. 
Firm size; international 
experience 
92 primary 
extractiv
e, 
manufac
turing, 
construc
tion, 
trade 
and 
service 
  ES Logit 
(Gomez-
Mejia et al., 
2010) 
 
FFs differ from non- FFs in their 
diversification preferences. FFs diversify 
less than non- FFs, both domestically and 
internationally, and when they cross 
national borders they prefer to enter 
regions that are ‘culturally close’. 
Further, performance variability and 
performance hazard tend to reverse FFs’ 
preference for diversification avoidance. 
- Overall diversification 
(entropy measure); 
Foreign sales to total 
sales; 
Family status; Cultural 
distance; Systematic and 
unsystematic risk; 
Performance hazard 
Year dummies; 
manufacturing industry 
dummy; Performance; 
Firm size; firm age; 
leverage; CEO tenure; 
CEO duality; CEO 
founder; institutional 
ownership 
360 
(160 
FFs) 
all 
 
YES US OLS 
35 
 
(Bhaumik et 
al., 2010) 
 
Organisational forms involving fam 
control and concentrated ownership, 
while optimal in the home institutional 
market, may actually have a detrimental 
impact on outward expansion. Outward 
FDI is facilitated when emerging market 
firms develop strategic relationships with 
foreign investors. 
- FDI (proportion of firm's 
assets held overseas) 
Family status; Herfindahl 
index for all 
shareholdings; foreign 
investment in the firms 
(2dummies capture 10% 
and 25% ownership of 
shares by foreign investor) 
Sales; age; ratio of 
internal accrual of a firm 
to its tot cash flow, n. 
Indian subs, ratio 
intangible to tot assets, 
debt to equity ratio, return 
on assets 
777 Pharmac
eutical; 
Automot
ive 
  
IN Tobit 
(Arregle et 
al., 2012) 
 
Non-family ownership is positively 
related to family-controlled firms’ 
internationalisation. Non-family board 
members have a positive influence on the 
level of foreign activity of the family-
controlled firm (scale). Environmental 
heterogeneity negatively moderates the 
relationship between external ownership 
and a family-controlled firm’s 
internationalisation. 
(-) International intensity; 
international scope 
External ownership; 
number of external board 
members; ratio of external 
board members; 
environmental 
heterogeneity; past 
performance 
Firm’s main industry 
group is in a 
manufacturing industry or 
not; firm size; firm age; 
nonfamily CEO; CEO: 
age, gender, level of 
education, prior 
experience 
351  SMEs  SE Logit 
(Majocchi & 
Strange, 
2012) 
 
An increased family ownership has a 
significantly negative impact on 
international diversification. In firms 
where the market is inactive managers 
have greater influence over corporate 
strategy and the influence of family 
shareholders is negated whilst that of 
financial institutions remains 
insignificant. The greater the 
independence of the board, the better the 
provision of critical resources and 
information, and the greater the degree of 
international diversification. 
- International 
diversification (entropy 
index) 
Log of % stakes held by 
families, financial 
institutions, and the state; 
dummy VOTE=1 if the 
main shareholders have 
any kind of formal 
agreement between 
themselves to form a 
coalition); Dummy 
CEOC=1 if either CEO or 
the Chairman is a member 
of the controlling family; 
% outside directors 
Industry dummies; Firm 
size; firm age; debt to 
equity ratio; product 
diversification; 
globalisation industry 
index 
78 (55% 
firms 
have 
family 
ownersh
ip higher 
than 
35%) 
Manufac
turing 
 
YES IT GLS 
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(Sciascia et 
al., 2012) 
 
While family ownership enhances 
international entrepreneurship at 
relatively low levels, it does not support 
it at higher levels. This relationshipcan be 
can be graphed as an inverted U-shaped 
curve: the advantages of family 
ownership for international 
entrepreneurship are higher than the 
disadvantages until an intermediate level 
of family ownership is reached (in the 
sample 53%). 
+/- International intensity (% 
foreign sales) 
Family ownership (% 
equity) 
Firm size; firm age; 
industry; past 
performance; family 
involvement 
1035 
FFs 
large 
variety 
On 
average 
84 
employe
es 
 
US Lin. and 
quadrati
c 
(Chen et al., 
2014) 
 
Positive relationship between family 
ownership and internationalisation, 
suggesting that the positive aspects of 
family ownership seem to outweigh the 
disadvantages in this case. 
+ FSTS Fam ownership; 
Institutional ownership 
Firm size; firm age; total 
debt to total assets; 
management ownership; 
outside director ratio; 
R&D to total assets 
77 large 
variety 
SMEs YES TW OLS 
(Liang et al., 
2014) 
 
Family involvement in management has a 
positive relationship with exporting 
propensity. Family involvement in 
management has a predicted inverted-U-
shaped relationship with the likelihood of 
FDI. The percentage of family ownership 
has a U-shaped relationship with the 
propensity for internationalisation. 
+/- Export propensity; FDI 
propensity 
Fam involvement in 
management; Fam 
ownership; 
Firm size; firm age; firm 
performance (financial 
performance, 
sustainability, and 
reputation); industry; the 
founder’s management 
experience 
902 48% 
Manufac
turing 
%50 S NO CN Logit 
(Merino et 
al., 2014) 
 
The familiness approach based on F-PEC 
scale adequately captures the family firm 
characteristics (power, experience, and 
culture) influencing the development of 
export activities. Specifically, globally 
indicating that the expertise from 
different generations and the composition 
+ Export propensity; export 
intensity 
Familiness Firm size; firm age; firm 
productivity; industry 
technology intensity; 
500 Manufac
turing 
SMEs  ES Probit; 
Tobit 
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of the family business culture affect the 
export activities of family SMEs 
positively. Conversely, factors related to 
family ownership and management does 
not have any significant influence on 
internationalisation. 
(Mitter et al., 
2014) 
An inverted U-shaped relationship 
between family influence and 
internationalisation. When family 
influence on ownership, management, 
and governance boards is relatively high, 
firms tend to stay local. 
+/- International activity Family influence; 
generation; family in 
management board 
composition; supervisory 
board; advisory board; 
Firm size; firm age; equity 
ratio; profit reinvestment; 
profit reinvestment 
479  At least 
50 
employe
es 
 AT Logit 
(D’Angelo et 
al., 2016) 
 
Neither family ownership and control, 
nor the professionalisation of 
management through the employment of 
external managers, can independently 
explain the international scope of family 
SMEs. Internationalisation can only be 
maximised if both the management team 
and the ownership structure are open to 
outside influence. 
(-) International 
diversification (entropy 
index) 
External managers; family 
ownership higher than 
50%; % of family 
ownership 
Industry dummies; region 
dummies; membership of 
a business group; firm 
size; firm age; past 
profitability; innovation 
levels; past 
internationalisation 
736 Manufac
turing 
SMEs  IT Tobit 
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1.5 Entry modes: an overview 
When companies invest in a foreign country, managers have to decide which is the best strategy, 
considering that usually are long-term strategies difficult to change, particularly when they imply long-
term contracts or require a significant resource commitment. The entry mode choice affects the 
international success of firms and their performance (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). Thus, it is a crucial 
theme in international business. A review of the state of knowledge is presented below. Firstly, the main 
classification of entry strategies is presented. Then, the main determinants of entry mode are presented 
accordingly to the main theories applied in the field.  
In his commentary Shaver (2013) stated that foreign entry strategies have been over-researched and that 
in the last few years scholars are making only marginal contributions and most of them regard 
methodological issues. However, the entry mode research has been mostly focused on the unilateral 
strategic choices of the foreign firm, but it has almost neglected to study the foreign entry strategies as a 
joint decision of the foreign investor and the local firm, owning the complementary assets (Hennart, 
2009; Hennart & Slangen, 2015). The undervalued role of the local firm might explain the inconsistent 
results of prior empirical literature (Hennart, Sheng, & Pimenta, 2015). Moreover, the extant research on 
entry mode has failed to investigate the effect of corporate governance and in detail the effect of different 
ownership structure, on foreign entry strategies. Thus, the state of knowledge on the field might be further 
extended in these two directions. Entry mode regards the decision on how to enter a foreign market. 
Entering a new market means to make two important and long-term decisions. Firstly, the choice between 
contracts and equity and in the latter case the level of ownership. Second, the establishment mode: 
greenfield or acquisition. However, scholars did not follow a unique classification of entry strategies. 
Most of the studies disentangled the ownership from the establishment choice. Thus, they studied the 
contract versus equity choice, the level of equity chosen (joint venture versus wholly owned subsidiary), 
or the greenfield versus acquisition choice. However, few authors consider the two decisions at the same 
time, investigating the choice between greenfield, acquisition and joint venture. Moreover, even among 
studies that focused exclusively on the ownership mode, there are substantial differences. All the 
differences, among studies mixing establishment and ownership mode and studies focusing on ownership 
mode, could be summarised in the denotation that these authors give to the joint venture. Accordingly, it 
is possible to identify three streams of research depending on how authors connote the joint venture. 
First, the joint venture is defined as an intermediate entry mode between contracts and hierarchy. Second, 
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the joint venture is a joint hierarchy entry mode. Third, the joint venture occurs only if the assets shared 
with another company are acquired, not it the joint venture is built from scratch.  
1.6 Entry mode classifications: three different approaches 
It is important to clarify how scholars classified entry mode. The oldest and most cited articles in entry 
mode research are Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Hennart (1988), and Kogut and Singh (1988). Thus, 
these three articles, using each a different classification of entry modes, had shaped the entry mode 
research. In what follows they are presented in details. Firstly, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) is 
summarised, successively Hennart (1988), and to conclude Kogut and Singh (1988). As the following 
detailed review of these articles will show, the key difference in these approaches is concerning the 
connotation of the joint venture in defining the entry mode choices.  
Anderson and Gatignon state that the entry mode choice is a continuum of increasing of resource 
commitment, control, and risk. They consider a joint venture as an intermediate level between export and 
wholly owned subsidiary. On the contrary, Hennart argues that the choice is between contracts and 
equity. Therefore, a joint venture is not an intermediate level of hierarchy between contracts and full 
ownership. It is a joint hierarchy. Finally, Kogut and Singh consider the joint venture as an alternative to 
a greenfield and full acquisition investment.  
1.6.1 Anderson and Gatignon’s (1986) classification 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986)  ground their seminal paper in the Transaction Cost analysis as formulated 
by Williamson (Williamson, 1979). They stress the importance of trade-off between control and resource 
commitment and they provide a series of testable propositions to study the entry mode choice. They 
associate their control scale to the concept of integration of Williamson (1979). Indeed, control and 
integration are two concepts strongly related. Integrating an activity means to have complete control of 
it. They delineate a framework in which the choice of the entry mode is affected by the MNE’s desired 
degree of control. Moreover, their analysis focuses on control because it is the main determinant of risk 
and return, crucial aspects of each investment. Choosing the level of control, the firm is choosing 
simultaneously, the resource commitment and the position in the trade-off risk and adjusted return 
associated with the investment. The seventeen entry modes identified in their seminal article are 
classified in a continuum of increasing control. Firms decide which entry mode is more efficient in the 
long run, according to the desired control they want to exert, looking at the control as the determiner of 
risk and return, and therefore efficiency. Firms need to choose the most efficient degree of control. The 
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optimal choice between complete integration and complete non-integration depends on the four 
constructs that affect the decision to integrate an activity in the Transaction Cost theory. Thus, they state 
that the asset specificity, the uncertainty (external and internal), frequency, and the free riding potential 
affect the choice of the degree of control, and consequently, the entry mode and the associated long-term 
efficiency (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). When a transaction is frequent and requires high specific assets, 
is more convenient for the firm integrate the activity. On the other hand, when the assets deployed are 
not specific and the uncertainty is high, it is better for the company do not integrate it, using arm-length 
transaction.  The higher the specificity of the asset, the higher is the optimal level of integration and 
control that a firm should exert. Accordingly, they predict that businesses prefer low-control entry modes 
when the uncertainty of the firm’s external environment is high (country risk and uncertainty of the 
sector) (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). When the risk of a free ride is high, they suggest the use of entry 
modes characterised by high level of control. In their framework, the available options of entry mode, 
ranging from contracts to wholly owned subsidiaries is an increasing of commitment, with the joint 
venture seen as an intermediate point, between hierarchy and contracts. In accordance with Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988), the control of operational activities is minimum in the case of licensing and maximum 
with the wholly owned subsidiary (100 percent of equity) (Hill et al., 1990). Foreign market entry 
strategies, from export to wholly owned subsidiaries, gradually require more resource commitment. 
Indeed, each of these strategies requires a different level of assets, tangible or intangible, whose use 
cannot be changed easily without a cost (Hill et al., 1990). The higher is the resource commitment, the 
higher will be the exit barriers from a foreign market, reducing the flexibility of a firm and increasing 
risk. On the one hand, more control increases returns, facilitating coordination activities and carrying out 
strategies and assuring larger share of foreign profits (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). On the other hand, 
increase the level of control means a higher resource commitment, and, therefore, a higher risk (Anderson 
& Gatignon, 1986). Thus, the joint venture is an intermediate mode between contracts and hierarchy.  
1.6.2 Hennart’s (1988) classification 
As Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Hennart (1988) grounds on the Transaction Cost theory to explain 
the entry mode choice. His analysis focuses on two main points, why a firm chooses an equity mode 
instead of a contract and in the case of equity choice, when a shared equity option, as the joint venture, 
is to be preferred to a wholly owned subsidiary. Hennart states that the equity option is to be preferred in 
all those situations in which a market fails, and it is inefficient for the firm to complete the transaction 
through a contract. Therefore, equity modes are more efficient than contracts in the presence of high 
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transaction costs (asset specificity, uncertainty, information asymmetries, high frequency) and shared 
hierarchy is the optimal choice when full ownership is impossible. This is the case for instance when a 
firm is interested in buying a complementary asset that is indivisible from the rest of another company. 
Hennart classified the entry mode accordingly to the remuneration method choose the input providers 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Thus, the key difference between equity and contracts is that using an 
equity mode the input providers are paid ex-post, from the profits of the venture. While contracts 
specified ex-ante the payments owed to the input providers (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Therefore, 
Hennart’s classification has two main implications. First, joint ventures are not an intermediate form of 
hierarchy and contracts, but they are hierarchical investments. Second, each kind of venture where profits 
are shared among the inputs providers is a joint venture, independently by the fact that it is a partial 
acquisition or a greenfield joint venture (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007).  
1.6.3 Kogut and Singh’s (1988) classification 
Some authors following Kogut and Singh (1988) mix the two decisions, between establishment mode 
and ownership mode creating a third different classification. Kogut and Singh denote the joint venture 
investment “as the pooling of assets in a common and separate organisation by two or more firms who 
share joint ownership and control over the use and fruits of these assets. … [it] is both legally and 
conceptually different from a minority equity participation investment, where a firm invests directly into 
a second firm but does not share control with a third party.” (p. 412; 430; 1988). In addition, an 
acquisition refers exclusively to investments that allow the control over the entity. Thus, a joint venture 
is a shared ownership, but it cannot be a majority ownership. Moreover, Kogut and Singh (1988) 
recognise that greenfield investments might be either a wholly owned subsidiary or joint venture. 
However, they do not distinguish empirically between these kinds of investments. Hence, they consider 
an investment as a joint venture exclusively when the assets are acquired. If a new entity is established 
from scratch with a partner, is not classified as a joint venture but as a greenfield. They fail to recognise 
the inherent difference between build from scratch a new entity alone or with a local partner. Especially 
in their study, focused on the effect of cultural distance, disentangling the two effects is crucial. Indeed, 
the cultural distance affects joint venture choice both in the case of acquired assets from another company 
and in the case of establishing from scratch the pool of assets with a partner. Is not clear why the effect 
should be relevant exclusively when the assets are acquired. However, the main contribution of Kogut 
and Singh (1988) is the measure of a variable not on theory. Indeed the most important result of this 
research is not strictly related to the entry mode theory, but to the development of the index mentioned 
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above to measure the cultural distance through the Hofstede’s dimensions. However, Kogut and Singh 
(1988) is the most influential paper among those using the entry mode classification in greenfield, 
acquisition and joint venture. 
1.6.4 A comparison of the different classification effects 
Differently from what suggested by Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Hennart (1988) states that 
uncertainty is associated with hierarchical entry modes and not with flexible contracts. External 
uncertainty has not a direct effect on the formation of transaction costs, and thus on the entry mode 
choice, but its effect is to magnify the effect of asset specificity (Hennart, 1988). Therefore, the higher is 
the asset specificity, and the greater the external uncertainty, the greater is the probability that a contract 
will reveal its inefficiency in the long term, and thus it is better for the firm to choose a hierarchical mode 
of entry (Hennart, 1988). Anderson and Gatignon’s interpretation of the effect of uncertainty is dissimilar 
to Hennart’s thesis. Indeed, they suggest that the higher is the uncertainty the more efficient is a flexible 
contract. Thus, when investing firms perceive a high level of uncertainty they prefer a joint venture rather 
than a wholly owned subsidiary because through shared ownership they may reduce the uncertainty 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Luo, 2001).  
In Anderson and Gatignon’s framework, the risk increases with the level of control and return. Thus, 
with the hierarchical governance, the risk associated with the investment is high, but the returns are also 
high because the parent company owns all the profits directly. Hennart does not analyse the trade-off risk 
return in this way. Indeed, accordingly to the Transaction Cost framework, depending on the specific 
transaction, the equity mode of entry could be the one that minimises the risk. It is the case for instance 
of credit markets. The information asymmetries between the borrower and the lender increase the 
transaction costs. Thus, a joint venture reduces the risk for the lender, which becoming a partner in the 
investment has the right to control and monitor the decisions.  
Grounding on findings of Kogut and Singh (1988), some authors (Anand & Delios, 2002; Elango, 2004; 
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009) mixed the ownership mode with the establishment mode, without 
a theoretical explanation and confusing the results comparison. Thus, they classified foreign entry 
strategies in three typologies: greenfield, joint venture and acquisition. Meyer et al. (2009), for instance, 
validated this classification citing case studies (Estrin & Meyer, 2004) which demonstrated that the entry 
mode choice is not sequential, arguing that Hennart’s classification is sequential and therefore 
conceptually wrong. Although, the Hennart’s categorization does not imply that the ownership and 
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establishment choice are taken in two sequential steps.  What emerges from Hennart’s classification is 
that the two options are affected by different determinants. However, independently from the fact that 
Hennart and authors grounding on his classification do not intend the entry mode choice as a sequential 
process, the reason for this classification remains unclear. Indeed a joint venture must be categorised or 
in a greenfield mode because the venture is created from scratch, or in an acquisition mode because assets 
are jointly acquired with another company or because a company is partially acquired. Thus, the joint 
venture is not a third separate option. However, authors following the Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
classification exclude a priori the possibility of establishing a joint venture from scratch with a local 
partner, with the numerous advantages to overcome the lack of local knowledge. This misspecification 
is even more surprisingly in the study of Meyer et al. (2009), which aims to investigate the effect of local 
institutions on the entry mode choice. Indeed, a greenfield joint venture with a local partner should 
mitigate the negative effect of a weak institutional context.  
1.7 Entry mode determinants: the different theoretical approaches 
Authors investigating the determinants of foreign entry strategies refer to various theories. The main 
theories are Transaction Cost analysis, Institutional theory, Resource Base view, Evolutionary process 
(Uppsala model), and the Real Option perspective. In the extant research, the most applied theory is the 
Transaction Cost analysis (Yiu & Makino, 2002). However, what emerges from the literature review is 
that authors increasingly use insights from different theories instead to ground their work exclusively in 
just one theory. To exemplify, even if Transaction Cost framework remains the most applied framework, 
empirical research increasingly includes variables to measure the effect of institutions (Yiu & Makino, 
2002) (institutional theory) and previous experience (Resource Base view and Evolutionary process). 
Indeed, the determinants of entry mode are many and various. Thus one theory is not exhaustive to 
explain this complex decision. Moreover, different variables affecting the entry mode choice often have 
opposite results, thus, as suggested by Hill et al. (1990), the entry mode research needs an eclectic 
framework that reconciles these different theories and conflicting results.  
1.7.1 Transaction Cost 
Since the seminal paper of Coase in 1937, the Transaction Cost theory has been applied in wide range of 
studies. Williamson (1979) revisited Coase’s (1937) thesis to apply it to vertical integration. Successively 
other scholars grounding on Williamson’s work started to apply the Transaction Cost analysis to 
International Business (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1982; Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). The 
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transaction costs expression encompassed all costs that do not arise from the production of goods or 
services but are necessary for realising the trade (Coase, 1937). Thus, they are the cost of negotiating, 
monitoring, and governing the transaction, as well as the cost of enforcing contracts. Depending on these 
costs, organisations are created because they are more efficient than the market (Coase, 1937). While 
Coase focuses on the exchange side of the transaction to determine whether the market is efficient or not, 
Williamson concentrates on the contract side of the transaction. The transaction cost approach, as 
formulated by Williamson (1979), refers to the comparisons of the costs of integrating an activity within 
the company or outsourcing that activity. Firms choose whether integrate with a hierarchical solution or 
use the market to stipulate contracts. The determinants of this choice are the asset specificity of the good 
to transact, the uncertainty (external and internal) inherent to the transaction, and frequency with which 
transactions occur (Williamson, 1981). The trade-off between integration and non-integration of this 
framework has an extensive range of application, from the analysis of market versus hierarchy in daily 
activities, from the decision make or buy in defining the boundaries of the firms, to the choice of the 
right mode to enter a foreign market. Given the multidisciplinary application of the Transaction Cost 
theory, after its use to determine when and whether a vertical integration is efficient, scholars applied it 
also to horizontal integration, to study the expansion of firms in foreign countries (Hennart, 1982). 
Starting from the works of Anderson and Gatignon (1986) and Hennart (1988) the Transaction Cost 
framework has been largely used to analyse the entry strategies. As mentioned above, the transaction 
cost theory is the most applied theory (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004) to the entry 
mode and a wide range of variables have been used as proxies for its key determinants. 
The first determinant of transaction costs is the asset specificity. The specificity of an asset is related to 
the degree of which an asset is dedicated to a specific use in a specific transaction with another firm and 
it is not differently utilisable. Williamson (1985) describes six kinds of assets specificity related to an 
investment: site specificity, physical asset, dedicated assets, human asset, brand name capital, and 
temporal specificity (Zhao et al., 2004). However, empirical research often fails to find a proxy for all 
these kind of specificity (Zhao et al., 2004). The proxy most used to measure asset specificity is research 
and development intensity. Brouthers and Hennart (2007), in their review of empirical studies grounded 
in Transaction Cost theory, state that asset specificity (accordingly to the theory development of 
Williamson) is more appropriate in vertical integration. While, information asymmetries among the 
parties, rather than asset specificity, affect horizontal integrations, hence entry mode. However, 
empirically is difficult to maintain the same theoretical distinction between asset specificity and 
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information asymmetries (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Indeed, previous studies use R&D intensity as a 
proxy for both, making difficult to disentangle the two different effects.  
Firms prefer a wholly owned mode of entry when they perceive high transaction costs and joint ventures 
when the foreign market they want entering has high legal restrictions (Brouthers, 2002). The meta-
analysis of Zhao et al. (2004) shows that the effect of the asset specificity is higher in studies using as 
the dependent variable the percentage of equity rather than the binary variable. Most of the studies 
regarding the choice between the joint venture and the wholly owned subsidiary, applying the transaction 
cost analysis, focused on the technical knowledge involved in the transaction. Thus, numerous studies 
included as a main independent variable the R&D intensity. They argue that firms with high R&D 
intensity, having more technological capabilities and thus more specific knowledge needed to be 
protected from partner’s opportunism, prefer a wholly owned subsidiary over a joint venture (Gatignon 
& Anderson, 1988; Makino & Neupert, 2000). However, other important kinds of assets (knowledge and 
capabilities) might justify the joint venture mode. Chen and Hennart (Chen & Hennart, 2002), for 
instance, found that marketing resources are more important in determining the joint venture choice. 
According to them, some studies might have concluded that a firm decides to do a joint venture with the 
aim to acquire technological knowledge, while the real determinant is marketing resources. However, 
the recent research of Wooster et al. (2016) found that firms with high marketing intensity and investing 
in a risky country are more likely to choose a wholly owned subsidiary rather than a joint venture entry 
mode. 
The frequency of the transaction, and accordingly the number of contracts needed in each of these 
transactions, increases the costs associated, thus is more convenient for the firm choose and equity mode. 
However, the frequency effect, except for few exceptions has not been properly investigated. (Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth, 1990) used as a proxy the channel volume, whereas Taylor et al. (1998) measured the 
frequency asking firms to measure it through a questionnaire.  
Some empirical studies focused on the effect of another determinant, not expressively included in 
Coase’s and Williamson’s works: the free-riding risk. It is defined as the reputation damages that a firm 
may incur allowing another company to use its brand abroad. Indeed, the opportunistic behaviours of the 
overseas firm using the brand has consequences directly to the image of the brand owner. To measure 
the effect of this risk has been used as a proxy the advertising/marketing expenditure over sales ratio.  
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Finally, the last determinant of the transaction costs is the uncertainty related to the transaction. This 
might be internal to the company or external, concerning the environment in which the corporation invest. 
Uncertainty, either in the case of internal and external, has been denoted in a wide variety of ways. Thus, 
different concepts denote internal uncertainty, and authors have used different proxies for each concept. 
External uncertainty has been connoted as governance quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004); 
political stability (perceived or from secondary data); government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule 
of law; corruption (Slangen & van Tulder, 2009); country risk; industry growth; industry concentration 
ratio; size of market; perceived measure of target market volatility and diversity; perceived economic 
stability; perceived market potential, cultural distance. Internal uncertainty has been denoted as 
international experience and cultural distance. Previous studies use different measures of international 
experience, and the effects of this variable varied significantly depending on the proxy used. Scholars 
use mainly these proxies: host country experience (number of years of presence in the host country; the 
number of country-specific ventures); transnationality index; the number of years of worldwide 
experience; total number of foreign investments; ratio of foreign investments to the total number of 
investments; percent of foreign assets. All these proxies are firm-level variables. However, entry mode 
choices are made by managers (and directors support them). The results on the effect of internal 
uncertainty are inconclusive. Thus, it is crucial begin to consider the decision makers’ experience (Zhao 
et al., 2004).  
Cultural distance has been widely used as a measure of both internal and external uncertainty (Slangen 
& van Tulder, 2009). However, prior research gets opposite findings; this inconclusiveness might be 
explained by the difficulty to measure cultural distance. Prior research in international business, and 
especially on entry mode, among other control variables, has focused on the effect of the cultural distance 
between the home country of the investing firm and the host country. Recently, Caprar et al. (2015), 
provided a useful review of the value of culture in International Business and Management and of the 
attempts to measure it. Most of the studies rely on the Hofstede’s (1980) work, taking into account the 
first four dimensions developed, excluding from the analysis the long-term orientation, which is not 
available for all countries. Since 1988, the Kogut and Singh’s index based on these four dimensions 
became the most common proxy for cultural distance. However, Hofstede’s dimensions have certain 
limitations, and during the years have received a lot of criticisms, exemplified by the work of Baskerville 
(2003) and Mcsweeney (2002) among others). During the last decade, another index to measure the 
psychic distance has been widely applied in the field of International Business to proxy the effect of 
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differences between home and host country. This index, developed by Dow and Karunaratna (2006), is 
based on differences in language, education, industrial development, democracy and religion. 
Empirically testing of their index and the Kogut and Singh’s index, Dow and Karunaratna (2006), found 
that the latter is not significant. This test is consistent with others that used the Kogut and Singh’s index 
and found it was not significant. Another useful approach to cultural distance in International Business 
is the mapping cluster of cultures, made by Ronen and Shenkar (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985, 2013). They 
used a cluster analysis to review empirical studies on cultural distance using different parameters to 
measure it. Despite the reviewed studies used different constructs to define cultural distance, Ronen and 
Shenkar (2013) identified common clusters. Although this approach seems more comprehensive than all 
the others do, precisely because created on the basis of all the other studies that aimed to measure cultural 
distance, it does not provide a measure of the distance. The outputs of this approach are exclusively 
clusters of countries sharing a similar culture. Thus, we know which countries are different among them, 
but we do not know how wide this difference is. Therefore, the operationalization of these results cannot 
be an index to insert in regression analysis among the control variables, as scholars usually do with Dow’s 
and Kogut and Singh’s index. Empirical studies applying this approach, insert a dummy variable for each 
cluster (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). 
Moreover, Zaho et al. (2004) suggest considering also cultural heterogeneity across countries. Indeed, 
both Dow and Hofstede dimensions are developed considering each country as a source of a unique 
culture.  
Although the vast literature, the results of the studies applying the transaction cost analysis to entry modes 
are mixed and inconclusive (Zhao et al., 2004). This inconclusiveness depends on the wide variety of 
samples used. Indeed, among the other factors, both the home and the host countries, the industry and 
size of the firms considered influence the effect of the main independent variables. For instance, the 
home country has a moderating effect both on the effect of R&D intensity, on international experience, 
and on cultural distance (Zhao et al., 2004). In conclusion, entry modes cannot be entirely explained 
through the Transaction Cost analysis (Hill et al., 1990). Other theories are necessary to explain the 
determinants of foreign entry choices. 
1.7.2 Resource Base view  
Transaction cost analysis focuses on the tacitness and appropriability characteristics of knowledge, 
arguing that the more the knowledge is tacit and difficult to codify and protect, the higher is the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour. To measure this risk, scholars used research intensity. Proponents of the 
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resource base the theory, state that the focus of Transaction Cost on knowledge is too narrow. Indeed, 
organisations own different kinds of knowledge, and the technical knowledge is just one among the 
others. Therefore, because entry modes are vehicles to transfer resources in other countries scholars 
should study the effect of other kinds of knowledge. Malhotra (2003) identified three main kind of 
knowledge: basic technical, personal relationships and connections, and host country knowledge, each 
of which could be at the individual, team, and organisational level. The basic concepts of the resource 
base view (resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable are a source of competitive 
advantage), extended to include the knowledge base perspective (focused on knowledge as a resource) 
and the organizational capability view (focused on the capabilities owned by a firm) have been the 
theoretical frame for different empirical studies. Scholars using this perspective try to explain the entry 
mode choice based on the resources owned by the firm. According to this broad perspective, firms 
choosing a hierarchical governance mode are able to protect their resources, maintaining the full control 
of them and developing routines in the foreign subsidiaries they increase the value of their resources 
(Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2008). However, the results of studies grounding on Resource Based 
view are mixed and it is difficult to make generalised conclusions. Moreover, the advantages derived 
from these resources are highly context-specific (Brouthers et al., 2008). Indeed, the institutional 
environment moderates the effect of resources specific advantage. Therefore, this effect is country 
specific (Brouthers et al., 2008). Thus, is crucial to study the relevance of resources, knowledge and 
capabilities with the effect different institutional environment.  
Some of the variables used in entry mode research in accordance with the Resource Base View are tacit 
know-how; international experience (Brouthers et al., 2008); proprietary technology; reputation (Ekeledo 
& Sivakumar, 2004); and business experience (geographic and industry experience) (Ekeledo & 
Sivakumar, 2004);.  
1.7.3 Evolutionary process (Uppsala Model) 
While Transaction Cost theory analyses entry mode choices as a governance decision, in the evolutionary 
approach entry mode is denoted as a sequential process in the learning experience curve of international 
firms (Zhao et al., 2004). In the original Uppsala Model, developed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), 
firms increase their international involvement gradually, acquiring the specific knowledge through 
experience in the particular foreign market (Madhok, 1998). Firms begin to internationalise through 
export; successively they consolidate their entry with intermediaries. As sales grow, intermediaries are 
replaced firstly by own sales organisations and then by manufacturing units in the foreign market 
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(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Moreover, firms firstly choose to enter foreign markets with the lowest 
psychic distance, and then gradually enter other distant markets, in which initially they face a higher 
liability of foreignness. Thus, internationalisation is a gradual process of learning and commitment 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). In 2009, Johanson and Vahlne revised their model, indeed from 1977 many 
things were changed in the internationalisation. They described a new internationalisation process 
focused on the relevance of networks. Firms are at the centre of networks. Internationalisation is denoted 
as a direct consequence of business relationships which allow to identify and exploit opportunities. 
Gradual learning and commitment are now placed inside the relationships that a firm, or more specifically 
the decision maker, is able to develop over time (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). In the revised model, firms 
choose the market to enter on the basis of their relationships with important partners, to exploit new 
opportunities or to follow the partner. The choice of the entry mode depends on the knowledge, trust and 
commitment of the firm with its partner (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Firms acquire knowledge and 
experience of foreign markets through time. With the increasing of the experience, firms increase 
gradually their international commitment.  
1.7.4 Institutional theory  
The institutional theory holds that institutions affect firms’ structure and their strategies. This theory has 
been applied both by international management and by strategist scholars. Nonetheless, they focused on 
two different aspects of this theory (Ang, Benischke, & Doh, 2015). International management scholars 
ground on this theory to exemplify the effect of external institutions on international strategies. They 
argue that different normative and regulatory environments have different effects on firms’ decisions. 
Strategists, almost neglecting the results of international business literature, focus exclusively on the 
cognitive aspect of the theory. Indeed, they state that firms adopt the most implemented strategy in each 
institutional context, mimicking the other incumbent firms (Ang et al., 2015). In accordance with the 
institutional theory, choose to enter a foreign country with strong institutions moderates the costs of 
alternative organisational forms (Meyer, Estrin, et al., 2009; Williamson, 1985). The institutional theory 
alone, as the other theories, is not able to explain all the determinants of foreign entry strategies. 
However, it is a good complement. Thus, it should be combined with Transaction Cost analysis (North, 
1991) to understand how different institutions affect the transaction costs. Moreover, it should be 
combined with the Resource Based view (Brouthers, 2002) to investigate how the firms’ ability to exploit 
and enhance their competitive advantage varies in accordance with the institutional framework. 
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1.7.5 Real option 
Most recent articles on entry mode field applied the Real Option theory (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; 
Cuypers, Ertug, & Hennart, 2015; Tong, Reuer, & Peng, 2008).The key concept of this theory is that 
investments differ with regard to the amount of transaction cost and the benefits that they are able to 
generate. Thus, an investment might be the preferable to another because it minimises on transaction 
costs and it generates more value than another investment (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010). However, often 
firms are not able to know these outcomes in advance, and so the risk in internationalisation tends to be 
high. The higher is the surrounding uncertainty, the higher is the risk of a potential loss (Brouthers & 
Dikova, 2010). In the presence of high uncertainty firms might wait to enter a new market, but to delay 
enter has other disadvantages. Thus, the Real Option theory suggests that the best option for firms facing 
uncertainty is to make incremental investments (Tong et al., 2008). For instance, the greenfield 
investment instead of a full acquisition. 
Thus, previous empirical research, in accordance with the different theories, used a wide range of 
operationalization of the determinants affecting the entry mode choice. Majocchi et al. (2015) classified 
these factors in country, industry, and firm-specific determinants. Table 1.3 summarises the concepts and 
variables used by each theory to study the determinants of foreign entry strategies sorting by country, 
industry and firm-specific dimensions.  
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Table 1.3 Entry mode determinants 
Determinants Variable Theory Measure References 
Firm-specific  Asset specificity Resource base; 
Transaction cost 
R&D intensity (Chen & Hennart, 2002; Dikova & 
Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Lu, 2002; Yiu & 
Makino, 2002) 
 Physical asset (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; 
Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 
2003; Brouthers et al., 2008; Chen, 
Yang, Hsu, & Wang, 2009; Erramilli 
& Rao, 1993; Klein et al., 1990; 
Palenzuela & Bobillo, 1999) 
 Technology asset specificity  (Palenzuela & Bobillo, 1999; Taylor 
et al., 1998) 
 Human asset  (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; 
Brouthers et al., 2003; Erramilli & 
Rao, 1993; Klein et al., 1990; 
Palenzuela & Bobillo, 1999) 
 Dedicated asset  (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; 
Brouthers et al., 2003) 
Free-riding 
potential 
Transaction cost Advertising intensity (Chen & Hennart, 2002; Dikova & 
Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Hennart, 1991; Kogut & Singh, 
1988; Lu, 2002) 
Internal 
uncertainty - 
International 
experience  
Evolutionary; 
Resource base; 
Transaction cost 
N. of years of worldwide experience (Contractor & Kundu, 1998; 
Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996) 
 N. of foreign investments (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 
1989) 
 N. of foreign countries (Claver, Laura Rienda, et al., 2009b; 
Hennart, 1991; Hennart et al., 2015; 
Luo, 2001; Padmanabhan & Cho, 
1996; Yiu & Makino, 2002) 
 Foreign investments to total n. of 
investments ratio 
(Contractor & Kundu, 1998) 
 N. of years of presence in the host 
country 
(Delios & Beamish, 1999; Hennart, 
1991; Hennart et al., 2015; Luo, 
2001; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996; 
Yiu & Makino, 2002) 
 International business experience 
(pm) 
(Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004) 
 
 Familiarity with the host country (Gomes-Casseres, 1989) 
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Determinants Variable Theory Measure References 
Historical norm Evolutionary Prior presence in the host country 
(dummy; n. of investments) 
(Luo, 2001; Slangen, 2013)  
 Prior experience with the same entry 
mode (dummy on n. of investments) 
(Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; 
Slangen, 2013; Yiu & Makino, 2002) 
 
 Proprietary technology (pm) (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004) 
 
 Tacit know how (pm) (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004) 
 
 Reputation firm (pm) (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004) 
 
 Firm size (Claver & Quer, 2005) 
 
 Average financial performance (Claver & Quer, 2005) 
Frequency Transaction cost Channel volume (pm) (Klein et al., 1990; Taylor et al., 
1998) 
Industry  Complementary 
asset 
 Subsidiary operating in a resource 
intensive industry 
(Lu, 2002) 
 Technology industry (Claver & Quer, 2005; De Beule et 
al., 2014) 
 Subsidiary in the same sector of the 
investing firm 
(Chen & Hennart, 2002; Dikova & 
Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Hennart et 
al., 2015; Lu, 2002; Malhotra, 
Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011) 
 Concentration ratio of the target 
industry in the home market 
(Hennart et al., 2015) 
 N. of suppliers available for each 
investor  
(Hennart et al., 2015) 
 
 Host country industry structure (Chen & Hennart, 2002; Somlev & 
Hoshino, 2005) 
 
 Industry growth (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Dikova 
& Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Hennart 
et al., 2015; Kim & Hwang, 1992; 
Luo, 2001; Makino & Neupert, 2000; 
Slangen, 2013) 
 
 Industry concentration ratio (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; 
Kim & Hwang, 1992; Makino & 
Neupert, 2000) 
 
 Size of market (Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Gomes-
Casseres, 1989) 
 
 Target market volatility and diversity 
(pm) 
(Klein et al., 1990; Luo, 2001) 
 
 Relative size subs/parent (Hennart, 1991) 
Knowledge 
distance 
 Difference in patents and scientific 
production as determined by variation 
(Gaffney, Karst, & Clampit, 2016) 
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Determinants Variable Theory Measure References 
in the n. of patents and n. of scientific 
articles per 1 million population 
Mimetic entry  Rate of same entry mode established 
by competitors in the same country at 
the same time 
(Yiu & Makino, 2002) 
Country External 
Uncertainty-
Country risk 
Evolutionary; 
Institutional; 
Transaction cost 
Euromoney Country Risk Index (Delios & Beamish, 1999) 
 International country risk guide (Blevins et al., 2016) 
 Political and economic stability (pm) (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers et al., 
2003; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Luo, 
2001) 
 Policy uncertainty Henisz's POLCON index 
External 
Uncertainty - 
corruption 
distance  
Transaction cost; 
Institutional 
Corruption (Index of Economic 
Freedom from the Heritage 
Foundation) 
Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012 
 Corruption (Perception Index 
developed by Transparency 
International) 
(Malhotra et al., 2011) 
 
 Host country corruption Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, and 
Eden (2006) 
  Regulatory dimension (Brouthers, 2002; Lu, 2002; Meyer, 
2001; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005) 
External 
Uncertainty-
cultural distance 
Evolutionary; 
Transaction cost  
Index Kogut and Singh (1988) (Contractor & Kundu, 1998; Erramilli 
& Rao, 1993; Li, 2016; Luo, 2001; 
Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996) 
 Perceived similarity in cultures (Brouthers, 2002; Kim & Hwang, 
1992) 
 GLOBE data set (Malhotra et al., 2011) 
 
 Religious distance using Dow and 
Karunaratna 
(Slangen, 2013) 
Institutional 
advancement 
Institutional Index World Bank'develoment 
indicators 
(Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007) 
 
 Frost & Sullivan Country Risk Guide (Contractor & Kundu, 1998) 
 
 Restrictive foreign ownership (Gomes-Casseres, 1989) 
Institutional 
distance  
Institutional (Index from Heritage Foundation) (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; De 
Beule, Elia, & Piscitello, 2014; 
Shane, 1994) 
 
 Global city status and population 
intensity in the city 
(Blevins, Moschieri, Pinkham, & 
Ragozzino, 2016) 
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Determinants Variable Theory Measure References 
Economic 
distance 
Institutional Difference income (GDP per capita) (Blevins et al., 2016; Gaffney et al., 
2016) 
 Inflation (GDP deflator), and intensity 
of worldwide trade (exports and 
imports of goods and services). 
(Gaffney et al., 2016) 
Economic 
freedom 
Institutional Index developed by Heritage 
Foundation and Doing Business by 
World Bank 
(Meyer, Wright, & Pruthi, 2009) 
Geographic 
distance 
Evolutionary Geobytes database (Malhotra et al., 2011) 
 Great circle distance  (Blevins et al., 2016) 
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1.8 Does corporate governance affect entry mode? 
Corporate governance mechanisms include ownership concentration and board of directors. Both of them 
are able to exercise an influence on firm’s strategies, as foreign entry mode decisions. A single 
shareholder having enough voting rights, directly or through pyramids, is able to control the firm. Thus, 
is of primary importance the type of the shareholder, such as individual or family, financial company, or 
State authority, because they have different goals and risk attitudes. Moreover, a family controlling a 
company through ownership magnifies its control having its members in the management team or on the 
board of directors. Thus, shareholders with a high percentage of equity stakes are more motivated to 
influence managers’ decisions. It results that the goals and the risk attitude of the main shareholder affect 
the entry strategies. Entry modes have effects on the business and consequently on the shareholders’ 
wealth, and more wealth the shareholder has invested in the company the more he or she will be affected. 
Moreover, because corporate governance mechanisms are necessary to handle the relationship between 
ownership and management, the fact that members of the owning family are managers in the firm affect 
firm strategies. In addition to ownership concentration, the owning family might influence another 
corporate governance mechanism, the board. The board of directors has two main functions: monitoring 
and advisory. Directors influence the strategies of the firm through their experience and demographic 
characteristics as managers do.  
Despite the common acceptance that corporate governance affects firms’ strategic decisions, few studies 
investigate the role played by different corporate governance on foreign entry strategies. In International 
Business some scholars studied the effect of corporate governance on the scope and intensity of firms’ 
internationalisation. However, with few exceptions (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Musteen, Datta, & 
Herrmann, 2009) they failed to studies how the same governance characteristics, which empirical 
evidence demonstrates to affect internationalisation significantly, affect entry mode choice.  
The few empirical studies on the choice between joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary obtain 
inconsistent results, and more research is needed. Although they agree into arguing that ownership 
structure affects the choice (Filatotchev et al., 2007), they direction of the effect is still not clear. To 
exemplify, on the one hand, Musteen et al. (2009) found that institutional owners are more likely to 
choose a wholly owned subsidiary rather than a joint venture. Institutional shareholders, due to their large 
equity ownership in the firm and difficulties to disinvest rapidly, have a long-term orientation. On the 
other hand, Filatotchev et al. (2007) distinguishing between foreign and domestic institutional 
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shareholders, found that foreign shareholders are more likely to prefer a full ownership investment, while 
domestic institutional investors prefer low ownership commitment mode.  
In addition to ownership type, another corporate determinant found to be significant is the managers’ 
payment scheme. Indeed, incentive payments to managers significantly affect the probability of a wholly 
owned subsidiary rather than a joint venture. Indeed, managers with a high percentage of stakes in the 
firm are more likely to choose a full ownership mode rather than a shared ownership (Datta, Musteen, & 
Herrmann, 2009; Musteen et al., 2009). Moreover, the compensation scheme of CEO impacts the entry 
mode choice. Some scholars found that managers with compensations linked to long-term performance 
are more likely to choose a wholly owned subsidiary (Datta et al., 2009; Musteen et al., 2009). In the 
extant research, there are only a few attempts to investigate corporate governance effects on the 
establishment mode. Interesting in this sense are the results of Matta and Beamish (2008). They found 
that CEOs with a longer career prospect are more likely to make an acquisition. However, their study is 
limited to the effect on probability to make an acquisition or not. It would be interesting to study if the 
CEO career horizon also has an effect on the choice between acquisition and greenfield. Moreover, Datta 
et al. (2009) found that firms with a high percentage of outside directors prefer a full acquisition over a 
joint venture. Despite this study mix the ownership and the establishment mode, it is particularly relevant 
because focused on the directors’ characteristics. Indeed, the crucial role of directors is not limited to the 
monitoring function. They influence managers’ choice, and they provide valuable experience and 
knowledge. Lai et al. (2012), found that directors with previous acquisition or joint venture experience 
encourage managers to make an acquisition. Thus, both directors’ experience have the same result. It 
would be interesting to repeat the study differentiating between acquisition and greenfield and joint 
venture and wholly owned subsidiary to disentangle the effect of different experience on different entry 
mode (ownership and establishment). 
1.9 Family firms and foreign entry strategies 
This section synthesises the main findings and definition of family firm used in entry mode research 
focused on these companies. 
As stated above, previous research states that different ownership structures affect firms’ strategic 
decision-making. Foreign market entry choices determine the company’s resource commitment, the risk 
the firm will bear in the foreign market and the level of control a firm can exercise over its international 
activities (Laufs & Schwens, 2014). Entry mode choice is also related to firm’s network relationships 
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with customers, suppliers and competitors (Laufs & Schwens, 2014). Family firms have peculiar 
characteristics that are likely to affect their foreign market entry strategies. Indeed, previous research has 
highlighted how these businesses differ from non-family companies regarding resources, risk attitude, 
willingness to reduce their control over firm’s activities and a longer orientation. However, only a few 
studies addressed the specific issue of the entry mode in foreign markets of family firms (Claver et al., 
2007; Claver, Laura Rienda, et al., 2009a). The limited existing research with reference to 
internationalisation process of family firms indicated that this process is incremental and follows the 
Uppsala model (Chang et al., 2014).  
Lin (2012), focusing on Taiwanese listed firms, found that family ownership (defined as the percentage 
of family cash-flow rights) positively affects the speed of internationalisation, while negatively 
influences the scope and the regularity of the foreign expansion. These findings might suggest that family 
firms choose an irregular rhythm of internationalisation and a narrow scope as a way to preserve the 
family long-term wealth. Lin (2012) states that family firms are more likely to build greenfield or 
implement acquisitions than their counterparts. 
Claver et al. (2007) have concentrated their descriptive research on six family firms. They choose the use 
of case studies due to the limited number of research with reference to the foreign market entry strategies. 
Claver et al. (2007) define a firm as a family firm if a single family runs and holds the majority 
shareholdings of this firm. Firms in their sample seem to follow the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). Indeed, their findings show that companies started to internationalise through export because the 
resource commitment and the risk are low. As companies gain experience, choose other strategies with 
higher requirements than export. Family firms increase their international commitment gradually, with 
the growth of their international experience and starting in countries that are closer from a geographic 
and cultural point of view. Moreover, they found a positive relationship between international experience 
and commitment, and that large firms are able to reach a higher degree of international commitment. 
Finally, the establishment of strategic alliances is positively related to age, size and generation of the 
family firms. Despite the interesting propositions developed by the authors, their study has the important 
limitation that is based only on six companies from exclusively a small geographic area.  
Filatotchev et al. (2007) studied FDI in China made by Taiwanese listed companies. They define a firm 
as a family business looking at the percentage of ownership held by shareholders with the same family 
name. Their findings show that high level of family ownership is associated with entry mode with low 
58 
 
levels of equity commitment, measured by the percentage of equity stake taken by the Taiwanese parent 
company in its Chinese subsidiary.  
Abdellatif et al. (2010)compare the international strategies of Japanese listed family businesses and non-
family firms. They found that family businesses, due to their strong desire to keep the control of the firm, 
establish lesser joint ventures than non-family firms do. Their definition of family firms of Kurashina. 
This definition classifies family firms into three categories based on the role of family members. To the 
first category belong firms in which family members hold managerial positions or are members of the 
board of directors, as well as the main shareholder. The second category is composed of companies in 
which family members do not hold top-ranking management positions but are among the major 
shareholders characterise the second type of family firms. Lastly, firms in which family members hold 
top management positions but are not among the major shareholders compose the last category. 
Kuo et al. (2012) studied the choice of publicly listed Taiwanese companies between wholly owned 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. They define a firm as a family business if at least 50 percent of the 
directors sitting on the board are family members. Their findings suggest that family firms with low 
international experience, compared to inexperienced non-family businesses, are more likely to choose 
joint ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries because they have a greater need for local partner’ 
knowledge. Experienced family firms, compare with experienced non-family firms, are more likely to 
choose wholly owned subsidiaries over joint ventures. 
Chang et al. (2014) demonstrated that businesses tend to choose wholly owned subsidiaries when they 
enter a host country with high-quality governance, and this tendency is stronger for family firms. They 
use a sample of Taiwanese companies and measure the degree of family control exclusively with the 
percentage of family members that seat in the board of directors. They highlighted the importance of the 
political risk and legal and institutional environment as a determinant of the entry mode. Moreover, the 
suggest that the impact of governance quality of the host country is not the same for all firms. Low 
governance quality may discourage some firms from investing in that country while other companies 
may exploit the market opportunities (Chang et al., 2014). High level of risk in the host country may 
affect the entry mode choice. How family firms deal with institutional challenges and how these 
differences influence their foreign market entry strategies need further investigation. Moreover, the 
existence of support programs in the home and host country (Laufs & Schwens, 2014) might be another 
determinant of entry choices. 
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Liang et al. (2014), using a sample of 902 Chinese firms, investigate the exporting and FDI propensity 
of family firms. In their empirical analysis, the authors disentangle the family ownership effect from the 
managerial family involvement. They found that family involvement has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with FDI propensity and a positive relationship with export intensity.  
Boellis et al. (2016) investigated the establishment mode (greenfield versus acquisition) of a sample of 
Italian firms. They found that the family involvement in ownership and management foster the propensity 
toward a greenfield investment.  
Pongelli et al. (2016) studied the entry modes of Italian small and medium sized enterprises. Their 
findings suggest that firms owned by the founder family are more likely to choose an equity mode of 
entry rather than a cooperative solution. 
The limited number of studies on the effects of corporate governance on entry mode are mainly 
concentrated in Taiwan. Four out of seven of the studies on foreign entry strategies of family firms used 
samples of Taiwanese companies. The unique study conducted in Europe is restricted to six firms from 
the small region of Alicante.  Thus, the existing results family firms’ entry mode are severely limited. 
Given the mixed results of previous studies, more research is needed to shed light on the entry mode 
choices of family businesses and the related effects on firms’ post-performance. 
1.10 Conclusions 
Corporate governance characteristics affect firms’ strategies, as demonstrated by different studies 
investigating the effect of ownership type on internationalisation or the CEO characteristics on entry 
mode. Previous research has shown that family’s ownership and its involvement in managerial positions 
and the board of directors affect firms’ strategies in different ways. Irrespective of the different 
definitions used family firms adopt peculiar strategies to internationalise. Accordingly, it has been 
reviewed the literature concerning family firms’ internationalisation. To the best of my knowledge, all 
the studies in the field, with only one exception, found a significant relationship between family 
involvement and internationalisation. However, these results are contrasting. The mixed findings might 
be due to the characteristics of the sample used, to the context considered, but also to the definitions of 
family firms. Moreover, previous studies focus on the scope and intensity of family firms’ 
internationalisation, but there is still limited research on the field of foreign entry modes. Indeed, only a 
few studies investigated the entry strategies of family businesses. Given the peculiar characteristics of 
family firms, future research might investigate whether family firms differ from non-family firms 
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regarding foreign market entry strategies. As stated above, for family firms to maintain control of the 
business is crucial. At the same time, some researchers have underlined the fact that fewer resources 
characterise family firms than non-family firms. The high propensity to preserve the control of the 
company on the one hand, and on the other hand the lack of resources that characterise family firms, and 
therefore lower possibility to commit resources entering new markets, might affect their entry mode 
decisions.  
Foreign entry strategies have been analysed through different theoretical backgrounds, and scholars have 
identified clearly some key determinants affecting them (assets specificity, host country characteristics, 
firm’s experience and resources, cultural and institutional distances). However, among the studied entry 
mode determinants, the features of the main shareholder are missing. The recent and still limited stream 
of research that applied the Transaction Cost theory to family firms might offer important insights to the 
study of entry mode choices of family firms. Indeed, the peculiar characteristics of family businesses or 
their “familiness” might be analysed as the specific asset that is difficult to transact when a company 
needs to decide how to enter a foreign market. This asset might be owned by the investing firm, by the 
local firm, or both complicating the transactions and affecting the decision. To the best of my knowledge 
until now, there are no researches on foreign entry strategies of family firms based on the transaction 
cost analysis, even if Transaction has been largely used to understand entry mode. The recent use of the 
Real Option theory might offer useful insights in the family business field. Indeed, if is true that family 
firms are risk adverse they might prefer a Real Option investment (gradual investment). Moreover, more 
research is required to extend the entry mode research considering local firms assets. With this reference, 
it is important to draw the attention even on the assets owned by the local firm. Previous research has 
mostly ignored the local firm characteristics. However, the entry mode choice is not a univocal decision, 
especially if it regards a joint venture or an acquisition. Thus, it is important to fill this gap in the literature 
and investigate how being a family firm affects the entry mode strategies. 
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2 Family firms and entry mode: joint venture versus 
wholly owned subsidiary 
2.1 Introduction 
So far, previous studies have shown that firm’s ownership and governance characteristics affect 
company's strategies (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Fernández & Nieto, 2005; Filatotchev, Strange, 
Piesse, & Lien, 2007; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Oesterle, Richta, & Fisch, 2013). 
When firm’s ownership is concentrated, the main shareholder (financial institution, governmental 
authority, family) has the power to affect firm’s strategies, in order to achieve his objectives that change 
accordingly to ownership characteristics. This influence is evident in the case of family businesses, in 
which a family owns and controls firm’s operations. Family business literature has demonstrated that 
family firms have different strategies in comparison to non-family firms. For instance, the family effect 
has been studied with reference to the internationalisation level, investigating whether family firms 
internationalise more or less than non-family firms. When firms decide to internationalise their 
operations, an important strategy they have to implement concerns the entry mode. Although 
International Business scholars have shown that family firms international strategies differ from those of 
non-family firms, they have not dealt with the how question: how family firms enter a foreign market? 
Do family firms’ characteristics affect their entry mode strategies? Entry mode research has identified 
numerous determinants (firm, country, and institutional level), but it almost neglected the effect of firm’s 
ownership and governance. Only a few studies investigated the entry mode choice taking into 
consideration the key role played by a family that owns and control the firm entering a new foreign 
market. Foreign entry modes continue to be a noteworthy topic in academic research because they are 
long-term strategies with noteworthy consequences on firm performance (Brouthers, 2002; Woodcock, 
Beamish, & Makino, 1994). It is crucial that companies evaluate all the factors that might affect the entry 
mode choice and decide to enter into new markets with the most suitable mode. Indeed, as Chen and Hu 
(2002) demonstrated, firms choosing the entry mode prescribed by the theories have higher performance 
than companies that do not select the right entry strategy. This topic is even more crucial in relation to 
family firms. Indeed, they are the most widespread type of companies around the world (Faccio & Lang, 
2002; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and the first contributor to the global GDP 
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(European Family Businesses, 2012). Thus, the effect of their entry modes might have consequences for 
the worldwide economy.  
On the one hand, previous literature has shown that corporate governance and ownership type, and in 
particular family ownership and management, affect firm’s strategic choices. On the other hand, scholars 
studying the entry mode choice identified a broad range of determinants, but the ownership structure. 
Very few studies have investigated the impact of family ownership and governance characteristics on 
entry modes. The present paper intends to address this specific research gap i.e. how family firm’s 
characteristics affect entry mode strategies.  
When firms decide to enter a new market, they have a wide variety of alternative modes of entry, ranging 
from export to contractual agreements (franchising, licensing), joint ventures, and wholly owned 
subsidiary (Kuo, Kao, Chang, & Chiu, 2012). Previous studies identified many different determinants of 
the entry mode choice. Brouthers et al.(2008) argue that not only different determinants affect the 
establishment and ownership modes, but different factors determine even the choices between joint 
venture (JV) versus wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) and equity versus non-equity mode. A review of 
the extant literature suggests that among the ownership mode (equity and non-equity choice), the most 
investigated choice is between JV and WOS (Canabal & White, 2008). We decide to focus on this choice 
and to enrich the theory of entry mode, and in particular the literature on JV versus WOS, studying the 
effect of firm’s ownership structure and corporate governance.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether and how the family firms’ characteristics might affect the 
choice between JV and WOS. Moreover, previous literature on entry mode focused on the entry mode 
choice as a univocal decision made by the MNE. However, the entry mode choice should consider even 
the preferences of the local company (Hennart, 2009). Using a sample of 898 deals between MNEs from 
42 countries investing in Italy, this research also aims to investigate the family effect of both the MNE 
and the local company on the entry mode choice. To identify the family effect, we ascertain the ultimate 
owner of each firm involved in the deal. We ground on the transaction cost theory (Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986; Hennart, 1982), widely used in entry mode research, to demonstrate that family assets affect the 
entry mode choice. Thus, we make two contributions to the international business and family business 
literature. First, the paper extends our understanding of the determinants of entry mode choice, including 
in the analysis the effect of family ownership and family involvement. Moreover, in doing so, this is the 
first study that investigates the effect of family firms on entry mode defining a firm as a family business 
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using data on ultimate ownership. Second, it contributes to entry mode literature investigating the effect 
of ownership type of both the MNEs and the local company.  
This paper is organised as follow. The first section provides an overview of the transaction cost theory 
applied to entry modes and family firms, and it unifies these two interpretations. On the ground of this 
first theoretical analysis, in the second section, we formulated the hypothesis. The third section moves 
on to describe in detail the sample, the data collection and the methodology used in the empirical analysis. 
The fourth section presents the results. The last section presents the discussion and conclusions of the 
research.  
2.2 Theoretical framework  
Scholars studying the foreign entry strategies argue that it exists an important distinction between entry 
mode (based on the ownership decision) and establishment mode (greenfield versus acquisition). This 
research focuses exclusively on entry modes. Prior research on entry modes has focused on “wholly 
owned (variously defined as 80%, 95%, and 100% equity), equity joint venture, non–equity joint venture, 
level of equity ownership, contract, license, agent, majority joint venture, minority joint venture, export, 
equity, non-equity, management contract, franchise, cooperative (non-equity) ventures, and distributor.” 
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007: 420). The extensive literature on entry mode has identified many 
determinants, from the host and home country characteristics to the quality of institutions in the countries 
of origin, from the size and R&D intensity of the MNE to the sector of the local firm. However, only a 
few studies have investigated the effect of firm’s ownership and corporate governance characteristics on 
foreign entry strategies. Table 2.1 reports, to the best of our knowledge, all studies that have included in 
their empirical analysis one of these effects. This table includes only empirical studies that have used as 
dependent variable an ownership-based entry mode alternative (Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004). As Table 2.1 
shows three out of five studies investigating the entry mode of family firms are based on samples of 
Taiwanese listed companies (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Kao, Kuo, & Chang, 2013; Kuo et al., 2012). 
Results from the emerging market Taiwan are difficult to generalise to other non-emerging countries.  
Moreover, most of the studies in Table 2.1 ground on the Agency theory. However, the extant research 
on entry modes has been grounded on different theories: Transaction Cost analysis, Institutional theory, 
Resource Base view, Evolutionary process (Uppsala model), and the Real Option perspective. The 
Transaction Cost theory is definitely the most applied theory to study the determinants of entry modes. 
Thus, it is surprising that studies on entry mode and corporate governance did not apply Transaction Cost 
theory. According to this theory, firms choose the entry mode that minimises the transaction costs, i.e. 
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the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and governing the transaction, as well as the cost of enforcing 
contracts. These costs are affected by the asset specificity, the frequency of the transaction, and the 
internal and external uncertainty experienced by the firm. For instance, firms owning high specific assets 
will prefer a full control entry mode, while firms interested in buying specific assets of a local firm is 
likely they will make a JV (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Moreover, studies on entry modes, including or not 
firm’s ownership and governance characteristics, focused exclusively on the MNE’s perspective.  
Grounding on the Transaction Cost analysis, Gomes-Cassares (1989) and more formally Hennart (2009) 
argue that entry mode studies should take into account the characteristics of the local firm. Indeed, foreign 
entry strategies involving a local company, can not be studied as a unilateral decision.  
The MNE’s entry mode is indeed a bilateral decision depending on the assets owned by the MNE and by 
the local firm (Hennart, 2009). If both firms own complementary assets that are difficult to transact, and 
thus the MNE cannot acquire the necessary complementary assets from the local firm, the JV is the only 
alternative. While if the complementary asset owned by the local firm is not difficult to acquire, the 
foreign company sets up a WOS in the host country, acquiring the full ownership of the local firm. 
Finally, Hennart suggests that in the case in which only the local firm owns assets difficult to transact, 
the local company establishes a WOS licensing the necessary assets from the MNE. Hennart’s (2009) 
model, unlike other studies focusing exclusively on the asset specificity of the MNE, considers both the 
MNE’s assets and the local firm’s assets. According to this model, the entry mode selection depends on 
how easy to transact are the assets of the MNE and the local firm. Indeed, the MNE’s need of 
complementary assets owned by the local firm determines the type of foreign entry.  Thus, empirical 
models aiming to identify entry mode determinants should include both MNE’s and local firm’s assets 
characteristics (Hennart, Sheng, & Pimenta, 2015).  
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Table 2.1 Entry modes and firm's ownership and corporate governance characteristics 
Study Research question Theory 
Dependent 
variables: 
Entry mode 
Independent 
variables: 
Ownership or 
corporate 
governance 
Results Sample 
(Filatotchev 
et al., 2007) 
How ownership 
structure (family, 
non-family and 
institutional investor) 
of the parent 
company affects its 
FDI strategies. 
AT % of equity stake 
Ownership: family, 
insider ownership 
non-family, foreign 
and domestic 
financial 
institutions 
The share ownership by foreign 
financial institutions in parent 
firms is associated with a high-
commitment FDI strategy; 
while high levels of family 
ownership and domestic 
institutional investors are 
associated with low-
commitment FDI strategy. 
FDI investments 
of Taiwanese 
listed companies 
in China. 
Time period: 
1999 
(Musteen, 
Datta, & 
Herrmann, 
2009) 
How (1) institutional 
investor and insider 
ownership, and (2) 
CEO compensation 
mix influence the 
foreign entry choices. 
AT 
full control 
versus shared 
control 
Institutional 
ownership; inside 
director ownership; 
CEO compensation 
High level of institutional 
ownership and insiders’ 
ownership determine a greater 
use of full control modes. Full-
control modes are more likely 
when a higher proportion of the 
CEO compensation is linked to 
firm long-term performance. 
432 entries by 
118 US 
manufacturing 
firms. 
Time period: 
1991-1992; 1994-
1995; 1997-1998 
(Datta, 
Musteen, & 
Herrmann, 
2009) 
How board 
characteristics 
(outside director and 
board leadership 
structure) and 
insiders’ equity 
ownership and their 
compensation 
structures affect the 
choice between full 
acquisitions and joint 
ventures. 
AT 
acquisitions 
and joint 
ventures 
Outside directors; 
CEO duality in 
board of directors; 
inside directors’ 
equity ownership; 
insiders’ 
compensation 
structure 
Firms with a high proportion of 
outside directors and 
characterised by the separation 
between the CEO and 
Chairman positions are more 
likely to enter through an 
acquisition. Equity ownership 
incentives can significantly 
influence the choice between 
acquisitions and joint ventures. 
554 entries by 
US-listed firms in 
54 countries. 
Time period: 
1991-1993; 1994-
1996; 1997-1999 
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Study Research question Theory 
Dependent 
variables: 
Entry mode 
Independent 
variables: 
Ownership or 
corporate 
governance 
Results Sample 
(Claver, 
Rienda, & 
Quer, 2009) 
How family-specific 
characteristics 
influence the entry 
mode choice? 
U 
export; 
contractual 
agreement; JV; 
WOS 
Number of the 
family generations; 
managers' long-
term vision; family 
members in other 
countries; non-
family managers 
Family firms' long-term vision 
and the presence of non-family 
managers positively affect the 
international commitment. 
Entries by 92 
Spanish family 
firms 
(Lai, Chen, 
& Chang, 
2012) 
How the board of 
directors influences 
the entry mode? 
AT; RBV acquisition versus JV 
Outside director 
ratio; director 
ownership; director 
international 
experience; director 
host country 
experience 
Directors' experience in one of 
the two entry modes encourages 
the firm to choose the same 
entry mode. 
660 entries by US 
firms in 
45countries. 
Time period: 
2001-2007 
(Chang, Kao, 
Kuo, & 
Chiu, 2012) 
How the governance 
quality affects the 
entry mode choice of 
firms with different 
degrees of family 
control in the board? 
 WOS versus 
JV 
Governance 
quality; family 
board presence 
Family-controlled firms 
entering host country with high 
governance quality are more 
likely to choose a WOS rather 
than a JV 
1237 entries by 
428 Taiwanese 
listed firms in 13 
countries. 
Time period: 
1998-2007 
(Kuo et al., 
2012) 
How international 
experience influence 
the entry mode of 
family and non-
family firms? 
TC WOS versus JV 
Family member 
sitting on the board 
of directors 
Family firms with low 
international experience are 
more likely to choose a JV than 
non-family firms with the same 
experience. Family firms with 
high international experience 
are more likely to choose a 
WOS than non-family firms 
with the same experience. 
1550 entries by 
492 Taiwanese 
listed firms in 
China. 
Time period: 
1996-2006 
89 
 
Study Research question Theory 
Dependent 
variables: 
Entry mode 
Independent 
variables: 
Ownership or 
corporate 
governance 
Results Sample 
(Kao et al., 
2013) 
Which entry mode do 
family firms choose 
in host countries high 
environmental 
uncertainty? 
 WOS versus JV 
Family member 
sitting on the board 
of directors 
Firms with higher family 
control are more likely to 
choose a JV when they perceive 
environmental uncertainty. 
1644 entries by 
505 Taiwanese 
listed companies 
in 13 countries. 
Time period: 
1999-2008 
(Cho, Huang, 
& 
Padmanabha
n, 2014) 
How institutional 
ownership affect the 
entry mode choice 
between JV and 
WOS? 
AT WOS versus JV 
Institutional 
ownership; insider 
ownership; state 
ownership 
Firms with high institutional 
ownership are more likely to 
choose a JV over a WOS. 
281 entries by 
Taiwanese listed 
companies in 
China, Hon 
Kong, and 
Singapore. 
Time period: 
2001-2009 
(Pongelli, 
Caroli, & 
Cucculelli, 
2016) 
How do different 
family ownership 
structures influence 
the foreign market 
entry mode decisions 
of family firms? 
SEW 
WOS, JV, 
contractual 
agreement, 
export 
Founder ownership, 
family members’ 
ownership, other 
families’ 
ownership, external 
manager 
Founder ownership prefers 
WOS rather than JV and non-
equity modes. 
368 entries from 
204 Italian firms 
Time period 
1998-2012 
Note: AT Agency Theory; RBV Resource Base View; U Uppsala model; TC  Transaction Cost; SEW  Socioemotional wealth; 
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This research investigates the entry modes of family firms using the Hennart’s model, which is grounded 
in the Transaction Cost theory. Entry mode literature widely demonstrated that this theory prescribes 
which are the main determinants of the entry strategies. Moreover, besides foreign entries, the 
Transaction Cost theory has many implications, and recently scholars started to apply it to study family 
firms. Hence, this theory not only has been tested and empirically validated many times in entry mode 
research but also allow us to include family firms’ characteristics. Indeed, family firms’ specific assets 
are typically assets difficult to transact. Some scholars (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Pollak, 1985; 
Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012), focusing on different aspects of the Transaction Cost analysis, highlighted 
how this theory might be applied to family firms. Williamson (1985) distinguished between specific and 
generic assets, arguing that the latter are easy to transact and therefore are generally traded through 
markets. Specific assets need to be managed through hierarchy or markets accordingly to their degree of 
specificity to the investment. Gedajlovic and Carney (2010) grounding on Williamson’s work added that 
even generic assets might be difficult to transact. Thus, there are generic non-tradable assets, which have 
a broad range of applications but are sticky to the company (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). Gedajlovic 
and Carney (2010) identified as generic non-tradable assets some of the family firm’s idiosyncratic 
assets, as the social capital, the reputation, and their tacit knowledge. Moreover, family firms have a 
peculiar governance structure facilitating their capabilities to develop, sustain and appropriate value from 
these assets (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010). Thus, family firms own specific assets 
and have specific capabilities able to sustain and increase the value and the specificity of these assets. 
Moreover, the bounded rationality of family managers affects their decisions because, in the attempt to 
achieve family objectives, they make decisions that might be non-optimal in an economic logic. Family 
members, because of the emotional value that they attribute to the company, govern these specific assets 
in a different way than other assets that are not closely related to the family (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
This different treatment defined by Verbeke and Kano (2012) “bifurcation bias” affects all kind of family 
firms’ assets (human and physical), and consequently the decision making of these companies. Their 
behaviours are thus affected by family-specific assets and from the bounded rationality of the family 
members. Thus, family firms, because of their bias on specific assets with a high concentration of family 
value, make different choices from non-family firms in many cases. The entry mode decision, e.g. the 
choice between JV and WOS, is one of them.  
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2.3 Hypothesis development  
A consistent literature (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Gomes-Casseres, 1989) regarding the choice 
between JV and WOS demonstrates that this choice is determined, among other factors, by the assets 
object of the foreign investment. MNEs owning high proprietary knowledge would prefer a WOS rather 
than a JV to protect their capabilities from the potential opportunistic behaviour of local partners 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Chen & Hennart, 2002). On the other hand, MNEs choose a JV over a 
WOS when they face high entry barriers in the foreign country (Chen & Hennart, 2002). Hence in case 
of high cultural distance with the host country, legal restrictions, institutions characteristics or 
impossibility to acquire the necessary local assets the MNE would prefer a shared ownership venture 
rather than WOS. According to Hennart (2009) firms should choose the entry mode on the basis of the 
ease to transact the assets involved in the foreign activity. If the MNE needs local complementary assets 
to enter the foreign market, it has two possibilities: fully acquire the necessary assets or make a JV with 
the local firm, in which both companies contribute with complementary assets. In the first case, the MNE 
can acquire the assets from the local company or acquire the local firm. However, it could happen that 
the assets are not tradable, because they are indivisible from the rest of the company, or because the local 
firm does not want to sell them (Hennart, 2009; Hennart & Reddy, 1997). Human assets and firm’s 
capabilities, for instance, are not divisible and tradable separate from the rest of the business, and an 
MNE might be interested into acquire the know of a local firm, its relationship in the local context, or 
exploit its reputation. In these cases, the MNE could make a JV with the local firm (partially acquiring it 
or creating a new venture from scratch with it). Thus, a firm chooses the JV mode instead of a WOS 
when it is not able to overcome the market failures without the combination of its assets with those of 
another company (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 2009). The choice between JV over WOS depends, 
among other determinants, on the characteristics of the transaction, and in particular, the key factor is 
whether the assets involved are easy to transact or not. The assets to be considered could be owned both 
by the MNE and by the local company. Accordingly, scholars should consider both the asset specificity 
of the MNE and the local firm. In our model, adapted from Hennart’s (2009) theoretical model, we argue 
that the familiness of family firms is a specific asset that is difficult to transact. According to a definition 
provided by Habbershon and Williamson(Habbershon & Williams, 1999), familiness is the “unique 
bundle of resources a particular firm has because of the systems interaction between the family, its 
individual members, and the business”. Therefore, a non-family firm faces high transaction costs with a 
family firm, due to the specific asset familiness. While family firms, which own familiness specific asset 
92 
 
and understand each other asset composition, when they transact this asset with other family firms face 
fewer difficulties than non-family firms do.  
We focus our analysis on the choice between JV and WOS considering the level of stakes acquired by 
the MNE in a foreign investment. Both the local firm and the MNE can be family or non-family 
companies. The combination of their family status, and hence their possession of the asset familiness 
difficult to transact, generates four possible combinations with an associated entry mode (JV or WOS). 
According to the model, presented in Table 2.2, we have four quadrants identifying the four possible 
combinations. 
Table 2.2 Theoretical model 
  MNE 
 Asset familiness 
Family Firm assets 
difficult to transact 
Non-Family Firm assets 
easy to transact  
Local 
Family Firm assets 
difficult to transact 
1. JV 2. JV 
Non-Family Firm assets 
easy to transact 
4. WOS 3. Indeterminate 
Model adapted from Hennart (2009) 
 
Cell 1 illustrates the case in which both the MNE and the local firm are family businesses. In this case, 
since both of them owns the asset familiness that is difficult to transact, we expect a JV determined by 
the partnership of the two family firms. Cell 2 shows what happens when the MNE is a non-family firm 
and the local is a family business. In this case, since the local firm owns the asset familiness that is hard 
to transact, we expect a JV. Cell 4 shows what happens when the MNE is a family business and the local 
company is a non-family firm. In this case, since only the MNE owns the asset that is difficult to transact, 
we expect a WOS derived from the family MNEs that opts for a full acquisition of a local non-family 
firm. Cell 3 shows the case in which both the MNE and the local firm are non-family businesses. The 
fourth case (cell 3) is when both the MNE and the local firm are non-family businesses. In this case, 
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since neither the MNE or the local firm owns the asset familiness, on which the present analysis focuses, 
there is not a hypothesis concerning the effect of ownership on entry mode. Firms will behave according 
to economic principles, and the standard theory of entry modes will apply. 
In the case of two family firms (Cell 1), family MNEs are more likely to make a JV with the local firm 
than non-family MNEs. On the one hand, family firms face difficulties in transacting the specific asset 
familiness that make difficult a full acquisition. On the other hand, family firms, even if not all identical, 
they share the same long-term orientation and attention to the prominence of family values. Familiness 
simplifies relationships between family MNE and local family firms because they share the same long-
term orientation, the desire to preserve the control over the company, the involvement of family members 
in both ownership and management. The sharing of this similar modus operandi facilitates a JV between 
two family firms. Accordingly, we formulated our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. If both the MNE and the local firm are family firms, the MNE is more likely to make a 
JV rather than a WOS. 
In the second case (cell 2) the MNE is a non-family firm and the local is a family business. Even in this 
case, the MNE is not able to fully acquire from the local firm the needed complementary asset. Since the 
local firm owns the asset familiness that is difficult to transact, is more likely a JV. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2. If the MNE is a non-family company and the local firm is a family business, the MNE is 
more likely to make a JV, rather than to fully acquire the local firm. 
In the third case (cell 4), the MNE is a family firm and the local company is a non-family firm. In this 
case, since only the MNE owns the asset that is hard to transact, is more likely a WOS derived from the 
family MNE that opts for a full acquisition of a local non-family firm. In this case, the MNE can fully 
acquire the complementary assets by the local non-family firm because given that are not affected by the 
familiness they are easy to transact. A family MNE, owning a high specific asset, would prefer to 
completely acquire a non-family local company, in so doing guarantees the familiness of the firm. Thus, 
the third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3. If the MNE is a family business and the local firm is not, the MNE is more likely to 
fully acquire the local firm, rather than to make a JV. 
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2.4 Data and Methodology 
The aim of the research is to study whether entry mode choice depends on the asset specificity of both 
the MNE and the local firm, and in detail if the familiness is a specific asset that affects entry modes.  
We study the choice between WOS and JV considering full acquisitions, greenfield JVs and JVs derived 
from a partial acquisition. Our first step has been to define exactly the different typology of entry modes. 
An investment is a WOS if the MNE owns at least 95 percent of shares of the local subsidiary. Otherwise, 
it is a JV (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991; Yiu & Makino, 2002). We consider the investments 
(acquisitions, greenfield JVs) made by foreign MNEs in Italy, involving an Italian company as the target 
of the acquisition or partner in the JV. The empirical analysis involves the characteristics of both the 
MNE and the local firm. Most of the previous (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Gomes-Casseres, 
1989; Somlev & Hoshino, 2005) studies investigate the entry mode choice of MNE based in one home 
country investing in one or more host countries. Thus, they include in the analysis variables that explain 
which country characteristics increase the probability of an entry mode rather than another one. We 
choose to study entry modes made by firms from a wide range home countries in a unique host country 
(Caves & Mehra, 1986), Italy. In this way, country characteristics do not change, and we could focus on 
firm-level characteristics. Thus, the host country environment does not affect the different choices made 
by the MNEs. Moreover, the choice to consider the investments made by MNEs from all over the world, 
allow for generalizable results on MNE family firms for all countries. Indeed, having MNEs from 
different countries of origin makes it possible to investigate whether family firms’ entry strategies are 
stable across different countries. The local company is an Italian family firm. We choose as host country 
Italy because of its strong tradition of family firms. Indeed, in this country, the 71% of companies are 
family firms(Bianco, Golinelli, & Parigi, 2008).  
We collect data by Bureau van Dijk databases Zephyr for deals data and Orbis for firm-specific data. We 
select from Zephyr all deals made by a company with the headquarter based in a country other than Italy 
and an Italian partner between 01/01/2005 and 12/31/2015. Appendix 1 reports the complete list of 
MNEs’ home countries and their distribution. We selected the deals according to two criteria: the foreign 
company should have no initial stake in the Italian company, and the selected deals should allow the 
MNE to take control of at least 10% of the stake (Cuypers, Ertug, & Hennart, 2015). In this way, we 
obtained 1710 deals comprising 919 wholly owned subsidiaries and 491 JVs. We collected data on 
ultimate ownership for each of the companies involved in these deals.  
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Our second step has been to define family firms. Most of the studies in family business literature define 
a family firms on the basis of the first shareholder type (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012; 
Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010), and on other requirements 
inherent the management and the vision of the family. Only a few studies used the ultimate owner 
information (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, & Schoar, 2008; Ellul, Pagano, & Panunzi, 2010), even 
if using data on ultimate owner offers a more accurate definition of family firms. Indeed, considering the 
first shareholder type could lead to misleading results. The use of mechanisms as pyramiding, multi-
control chains, cross-holding, and dual class of shares has a huge impact on the discrepancy between first 
shareholder and the ultimate owner. “Pyramiding occurs when the controlling shareholder owns one 
corporation through another which he does not totally own. Firm Y is held through “multiple control 
chains” if it has an ultimate owner who controls it via a multitude of control chains, each of which 
includes at least 5% of the voting rights at each link. Cross-holdings means company Y directly or 
indirectly controls its own stocks.” (Faccio & Lang, 2002: 366). Through these mechanisms, an 
individual or an entity might have more power over a firm than the control exerted by the first shareholder 
exclusively through the shares that it owns directly. Thus, the first shareholder might not coincide with 
the ultimate owner of the company, the actual owner of the firm which has the control over it and the 
power to affect its strategies. The use of the ultimate owner requires making another important 
methodological choice. It is important to distinguish between the ultimate owner defined regarding 
ownership rights or control power. The control power is calculated summing the weakest links of each 
control chain. The ownership rights are calculated multiplying all the percentages of voting rights in each 
chain and summing up the value of all chains. Our definition of ultimate owner is the entity with the 
highest percentage of controlling power along with all the chain of shareholders (Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
To identify the ultimate owner, following Faccio and Lang (2002), we took account of pyramids, cross-
holdings, and multiple control chains. We took into consideration only links with at least 5% of 
ownership rights (Faccio & Lang, 2002). A practical example will clarify the discrepancy between first 
shareholder and ultimate owner and the importance to define a family firm using the ultimate owner 
instead of the first shareholder. In Figure 1 we reported the complete map of the shareholders of Tesco 
Go S.p.A. at the date 12/01/2012.  
Each link between the shareholder and the company that owns reports the percentage of his/her shares. 
At the first level, the shareholders of Tesco Go S.p.A. are: P+Z Eng. owning 10%, Mr Trucco owning 
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10% of Tesco Go S.p.A., Ma S.r.l. owning 25%, CLN owning 25%, and Grimor owning 30% of the 
stakes. Thus, the first shareholder of Tesco Go S.p.A. at 12/01/2012 is Grimor. 
Figure 1 Shareholders of Tesco Go S.p.A. 
 
However, as we can see from the map, all the shareholders of the first level (with the exception of Mr 
Trucco which is an individual) are owned by other shareholders. By calculating the percentage of control 
of all shareholders in the map, it is possible to find that the ultimate owner is the Mittal family. In this 
example of Tesco Go S.p.A. the Mittal family has four links to Tesco Go S.p.A.: two links from Mittal 
Family to CLN, and CLN is linked to Tesco Go S.p.A. directly owning 25% and through MA S.r.l.. The 
ownership rights of Mittal family are: 
(40.84%*100*11.47%*100%*25%)+(40.84%*23.53%*100%*25%)+(40.84%*100*11.47%*25%)+(4
0.84%*23.53%*25%)=0.0117+0.0240+0.0117+0.0240=7.14%. The controlling power of the Mittal 
family over Tesco Go S.p.A. is: 11.47%+23.53%+11.47%+23.53%=70%.  The Mittal family exerts a 
control of 70 percent through pyramids and multiple control chains, which is higher than the 50 percent 
of control exerted directly from the first shareholder Grimor. Thus, the first shareholder is different from 
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the ultimate owner. Hence, it is important that studies investigating the role of ownership type on firm’s 
strategies use the information on the ultimate owner instead of the first shareholder.  
We collected information of the ultimate owner of each company involved in the deal, both targets and 
acquirers. We collected data on both ownership rights and control power.  Following Faccio and Lang 
(2002), we define the ultimate owner regarding controlling power. We carefully define for each acquirer 
and target the full chain of control using the mentioned methodology. We are confident that we obtained 
more precise and accurate data through this method. The empirical analysis uses the ultimate owner 
defined in terms of control power. 
The unit of analysis is the couple ultimate owners of the MNE and the local firm. In our sample, each 
observation is made of a pair of acquirer ultimate owner and target ultimate owner. A deal composed by 
multiple acquirer or multiple targets it results in multiple observation, one for each ultimate owner 
involved. Moreover, a firm (acquirer or target) might have two or more ultimate owners because they 
hold the same percentage of controlling power. Thus, even in this case, we have one observation for each 
ultimate owner. 
Data on the ultimate owner have been collected from Orbis database using as reference date one month 
before the date of the first rumour about the deal, as indicated by Zephyr. If information on ownership 
were not available for this date, we search backwards until three years before the date of the first rumour. 
If information were still missing, we would search until one month before the date in which the deal has 
been completed. The final sample is composed of 898 deals and 1157 observations. The number of 
observations differs from the number of deals because, in some deals, two or more MNEs make the 
investment with a local company. In this case, we considered the deal as two different observations. 
Furthermore, if an MNE makes a deal with two or more local firms, we considered them as different 
observations. 
2.4.1 Variables 
Dependent variable. Scholars have typically used two different dependent variables to study the 
ownership entry mode: the percentage of equity acquired (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Chari & Chang, 
2009; Chen & Hennart, 2004; Gaffney, Karst, & Clampit, 2016; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011) or 
a binary choice (WOS versus JV) (Zhao et al., 2004). When scholars operationalize their dependent 
variable as a binary variable, they use different cut-off point of equity percentage. The widest accepted 
definition uses the threshold of 95 percent of the equity stake to differentiate between the two choices 
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(Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991). Thus, an investment is denoted as JV if a company holds an 
equity share ranging from 10 percent to 95 percent of a subsidiary (Chen & Hennart, 2002; Hennart & 
Reddy, 1997; Makino & Neupert, 2000). However, some authors consider a WOS exclusively if it is 100 
percent owned by a single parent firm (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988), others if a parent owns at least 80 
percent (Makino & Beamish, 1998; Makino & Neupert, 2000). In this study, the dependent variable 
identifying the entry mode is a dummy variable (JV) which takes the value “1” if the MNE acquires with 
the considered investment a percentage of stakes lower than 95 percent.  
Independent variables. A company is defined as a family business if the ultimate owner is an individual 
or a family, and at least one member of this family is a CEO, a CFO, a Chairman, from boards and 
committees1, from an executive department2. The main independent variables are three dummies which 
identify each possible combination of a couple of firms involved in a deal. Thus, the combinations are 
the following. First, both the acquirer and the target are family firms (Family_Family). Second, the 
acquirer is a non-family business and the target is a family firm (NonFamily_Family). Third, the acquirer 
is a family business and the target is a non-family firm (Family_NonFamily). These variables correspond 
respectively to Cell 1, Cell 2, and Cell 3 of Table 2. Table 2.3 presents the frequency of each of these 
variables. In our sample, we have 43 cases of JVs made by two family firms: both the MNE and the local 
firm are family businesses. The case of a JV between a non-family MNE and a local family firm occurs 
in 119 cases. The case in which a family MNE makes a JV with a local non-family firms takes place in 
36 cases. The most frequent occurrence of JV is between two non-family firms: it happens in 148 cases 
out of 346. We excluded this dummy from the regression. 
Table 2.3 Frequency of JV and WOS by family status of MNE and local firm 
Variable WOS JV Total obs. 
Family_Family 70 43 113 
NonFamily_Family 178 119 297 
Family_NonFamily 143 36 179 
NonFamily_ NonFamily 382 148 530 
Total obs. 773 346 1119 
                                                 
1 A family member is from the following board and committees: board of directors, supervisory board, executive board, 
executive committee, advisory board, all committees. 
2 A family member is from one of the following departments: Senior management, Product/Project/Market Management, 
Finance and Accounting, Operations and Production, Administration department, Quality Assurance, Human Resources, 
Purchasing and Procurement, Sales & Retail, IT and IS, Marketing and Advertising, Health and Safety, Customer Service, 
Legal/Compliance department, Branch Office, R&D / Engineering. 
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Control variables. Most of the studies regarding the choice between JV and WOS, applying the 
Transaction Cost analysis, focused on the technical knowledge involved in the transaction. Thus, 
numerous studies included as a main independent variable the MNE’s R&D intensity (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Makino & Neupert, 2000). The core assumption behind this variable is that firms with 
high R&D intensity, having more technological capabilities and thus more specific knowledge needed to 
be protected from partner’s opportunism, prefer a WOS over a JV. However, other important kinds of 
assets (knowledge and capabilities) might justify the JV choice. Chen and Hennart (Chen & Hennart, 
2002), for instance, found that marketing resources are more important in determining the JV choice. 
According to them, some studies might have concluded that a firm decides to do a JV with the aim to 
acquire technological knowledge, while the real determinant is marketing resources. However, the recent 
research of Wooster et al. (2016) found that firms with high marketing intensity and investing in a risky 
country are more likely to choose a WOS rather than a JV entry mode. We control for the effect of 
technical knowledge using the Research and Development intensity of the MNE (MNE’s_RDintensity).  
Kogut and Singh (1988) state that cultural distance is of particular importance for a full acquisition, due 
to the difficulties that firms face in integrating another company.  However, they do not take into account 
that also in a JV investment the cultural distance is crucial. Indeed, working with a highly different 
partner, it would be harder than collaborate with a partner with a closer culture. Thus, cultural distance 
might have opposite effect on both investments. Indeed, it complicates the relationships whether an 
organisation with distant practices is fully acquired or it is a partner to work with. It is a source of 
uncertainty in both investments (Slangen & van Tulder, 2009). Accordingly, previous studies 
investigating this choice found that inconsistent results concerning the effect of cultural distance. Thus, 
some scholars argue that firms investing in host countries culturally distant from them choose a JV mode 
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Tihanyi, Griffith, 
& Russell, 2005). Contrary, other studies found that companies facing high cultural distance prefer to 
enter the host country through a WOS (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Henisz, 2000; Puck, Holtbruegge, 
Mohr, Holtbrugge, & Mohr, 2009). During the last decade, another index to measure the psychic distance 
has been widely applied in International Business to proxy the effect of differences between home and 
host country. This index, developed by Dow and Karunaratna (2006), is based on differences in language, 
education, industrial development, democracy, and religion. In the empirically testing of their index and 
the Kogut and Singh’s index, Dow and Karunaratna (2006), found that the latter is not significant. This 
test is consistent with other international business studies in which the cultural distance measured as 
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Kogut and Singh’s index was not significant. We measured the psychic distance between the home and 
host country with the Dow and Karunaratna index (Psychic_Distance).  
Firms with a high international experience tend to prefer a WOS over a JV (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Indeed, 
their need for a partner to face the liability of foreignness continuously decreases with experience. 
However, the experience might be interpreted in different ways. For instance, the experience in terms of 
the number of foreign investment around the world allows the firms to gain international capabilities. 
Whereas the specific country experience that overcomes the difficulties in that specific context with a 
peculiar culture, norms, regulations, and so on. Moreover, experience denotes also the experience with a 
particular kind of investment, and, thus, it might be possible that firms choose an entry mode because 
they already used it previously. More research is needed to investigate experiential effect (Brouthers, 
2002). Depending on the connotation that experience assumes in the empirical research it affects the 
choice between JV and WOS differently. We measured the previous experience of the MNE in Italy 
(Experience) as a binary variable coded which “1” if the MNE made a previous investment in Italy.  
Big firms and listed companies are more likely to make JVs rather than to be the target of a full 
acquisition. We control for these effects using the natural logarithm of the number of employees of the 
local firm (Local’s Size) and a dummy variable (Local_Listed) which take the value “1” if the local firm 
is listed. Contrary, the bigger is the size of the MNE the higher is the probability that it enters the foreign 
market through a full acquisition (Chiao, Lo, & Yu, 2010; Mutinelli & Piscitello, 1998). We measured 
this effect through the natural logarithm of the number of the employees of the MNE (MNE’s_Size). 
According to previous studies (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Makino & Neupert, 2000) we control 
for the effect of the relative size of the local firm in comparison to the MNE regarding total sales 
(Relative_Size). We expect a positive effect of this variable on the choice of a JV entry mode.  
Previous studies found opposite effect of the industry growth of the host country on the JV versus WOS 
choice. To control for this effect, we include a variable (Industry_Growth) measured as the percentage 
growth of the gross value added by NACE industry 2-digit.  
Firms entering new industries prefer a JV over a WOS (Hennart, Kim, & Zeng, 1998; Makino & Neupert, 
2000). Thus, we include a dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the local and the MNE are active 
in the same macro industry (Same_Industry).  
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A manufacturing company is more likely to be fully acquired by an MNE rather than to be a partner in a 
JV (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Yiu & Makino, 2002). We enter a dummy variable 
(Local_Manufacturing) which takes the value “1” if the target is a manufacturing firm. 
Finally, we control for the year effect and for the influence of the geographical area in which is located 
the home country, using as dummy variables Europe, America, and Rest of the World. The final model 
that we estimated is the following:  
Pr (JVijt=1) = a0 + β1ijt-x Family_Family + β2ijt-x NonFamily_Family +β3ijt-x Family_NoNFamily + β4jt-1 
Industry growth + β5ijt-1 Relative size + β6ij Psychic distance + β7jt Local_Listed + β8it-1 
Foreign_RDintensity + β9it Experience + β10jt-1 Local_Size + β11it Foreign_Size + β12jt 
Local_Manufacturing + β13ijt Same_Industry + Geogr area dummies+ Year effect + εijt 
Where JV is a binary variable which is coded “1” if the entry mode, deriving from the combination at 
time t of firm i (MNE) and j (Local), is a JV. The β are the parameters to estimate and εijt is the error 
term.  
Table 2.4 provides the description of each variable and its expected effect on the JV entry mode. 
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Table 2.4 Variables description and expected effect 
Name Variable Description 
Expected sign 
(+ = positive 
effect on JV) 
Family_Family The MNE and the local company are both family firms + 
NonFamily_Family The MNE is a family firm and the local company is a non-family firm - 
Family_NonFamily The MNE is a non-family firm and the local company is a family firm - 
Local_Listed Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the local is a listed company + 
Industry_Growth Local: Annual % growth of the gross value added by Nace industry 2digit. (Source Eurostat) +/- 
Relative_Size Natural Logarithm of the relative size of the Local in comparison to the MNE, measured in terms of total sales - 
Psychic_Distance Psychic Distance between MNE's and local's countries, calculated as the Dow and Karunaratna (2006) index + 
MNE’s RDintensity MNE’s Research & Development intensity +/- 
Experience 
Previous Experience of the MNE in the host country: dummy 
variable which takes the value “1” if the MNE made previous 
deals in Italy 
+ 
Local’s Size Local size: natural logarithm of the number of employees + 
MNE’s_Size MNE size: natural logarithm of the number of employees +/- 
Local_Manufacturing The local is a manufacturing company: SIC code 3-digit is between 200 and 399 - 
Same_Industry Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the local and the MNE are active in the same macro industry - 
Europe Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the MNE has the headquarter in the European continent +/- 
America Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the MNE has the headquarter in the American continent +/- 
Rest of the World Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the MNE has the headquarter in the Asia, Africa, or Ocean continent +/- 
Pre-crisis Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the deal has been concluded in the time period 2005-2007 +/- 
Crisis Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the deal has been concluded in the time period 2008-2009 +/- 
Post-crisis Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the deal has been concluded in the time period 2010-2015 +/- 
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2.5 Results  
Table 2.5 presents descriptive statistics for the continuous variables included in the model. Table 2.6 
reports the frequencies of the binary variables. Table 2.7 presents the correlation matrix among the 
variables. The very low values of correlation do not suggest that multicollinearity might be an issue in 
this study.  The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) among variables confirms that multicollinearity is not 
a problem. Indeed, all VIFs, with the exception of the regional dummy Europe, were all less than 10 
(Wooldridge, 2015). The results of the VIFs are reported in Appendix 2.  
Table 2.5 Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Industry_Growth 0.006 0.062 -0.6 0.48 
Relative_Size 2.73 2.618 0 12.25 
Psychic_Distance 1.162 1.106 0.45 7.79 
MNE’s RDintensity 0.617 10.855 0 282.871 
Local’s Size 4.171 2.212 0 11.904 
MNE’s Size 6.078 3.487 0 12.993 
 
Table 2.6 Sample mean for the binary variables 
Variable Frequency 
JV 357 
Family_Family 113 
NonFamily_Family 301 
Family_NonFamily 187 
Local_Listed 47 
Experience 325 
Local_Manufacturing 510 
Same_Industry 527 
America 137 
Rest of the World 70 
Pre_crisis 261 
Post_crisis 551 
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Table 2.7 Correlation matrix 
Note: FF Family_Family; NFF NonFamily_Family; FNF Family_NonFamily  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. JV 1                  
2. FF 0.050 1                 
3. FNF -0.100** -0.150** 1                
4. NFF 0.120** -0.200** -0.260** 1               
5. Industry_Growth 0.090** -0.020 0.010 -0.100** 1              
6. Relative_Size -0.020 0.060 -0.020 -0.020 0.060 1             
7. Local_Listed 0.220** -0.030 0.020 0.030 0.010 -0.110** 1            
8. Psychic_Distance 0.140** -0.010 -0.010 0.080* 0.030 0.020 -0.050 1           
9. MNE’s_RDintensity -0.030 -0.010 -0.020 -0.020 0.020 0.060* 0 0 1          
10. Experience 0.020 0 -0.020 -0.140** 0.060* 0.200** 0.040 0.040 -0.030 1         
11. Local_Size 0.120** 0 -0.050 0.030 0.020 -0.280** 0.420** -0.020 0.030 0.030 1        
12. MNE’s Size 0.030 0.080* -0.050 -0.020 0.070* 0.760** 0.090** 0.010 0.080* 0.210** 0.230** 1       
13. Local_Manufacturing -0.150** 0.010 -0.020 0.080* -0.070* -0.09** -0.060 0.110** 0.050 -0.080* 0.250** 0.070* 1      
14. Same_Industry 0 0.090** -0.060* 0.020 0.030 0.230** 0 0.060 0.040 0.030 0.040 0.290** 0.130** 1     
15. America 0 -0.020 -0.030 0.050 0.020 0.120** -0.040 0.280** -0.020 0 -0.030 0.120** 0.020 0.020 1    
16. Rest of the World 0.110** -0.020 -0.030 0.100** -0.010 0.050 0 0.530** -0.010 -0.080* 0 0.060* 0.080* 0.060* -0.100** 1   
17. Pre_crisis 0.100** -0.130** 0 -0.160** 0.190** 0.080* 0.050 -0.050 -0.030 0.060 0.070* 0.070* -0.070* 0.020 -0.040 -0.040 1  
18. Post_crisis -0.140** 0.110** -0.020 0.200** -0.200** -0.070* -0.100** 0.030 0 -0.070* -0.090** -0.090** 0.040 0.060 0.050 0.080** -0.510** 1 
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Since our dependent variable JV is binary, to estimate our models we used the logistic methodology. 
We estimated five models which are reported in Table 2.8. In Model 1 we included only the control 
variables. Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 add respectively the three dummy variables defining the 
jointly family status of the MNE and the local firm. Hence, Model 4 shows our full model with all 
independent variables. Hypothesis 1 argues that two family firms (an MNE and a local firm) are more 
likely to make a JV. The coefficient of Family_Family is positive and significant (p<0.001), 
supporting our first hypothesis. As reported in the last column of Table 2.8, the marginal effect of 
this variable is equal to 0.1628. If a deal involves two family firms, the probability that it will a JV is 
higher than 16 percent. Model 4 shows a positive and significant coefficient for NonFamily_Family 
(p<0.001), predicting an increase of 15.88% in the probability of a JV in the case in which the MNE 
is non-family and the local is a family firm. Our second hypothesis is supported. The Hypothesis 3, 
argues that a family MNE is more likely to establish a WOS rather than a JV if the local is a non-
family firm. The coefficient the variable Family_NonFamily testing this Hypothesis is negative and 
significant (p<0.005), meaning that it has a negative effect on the probability of a JV, decreasing it 
by 7.8 percent. Thus, our third Hypothesis is supported. A family MNE is more likely to make a WOS 
acquiring more than 95% of the local non-family firm rather than make a JV with it. According to 
with previous literature, the Industry_Growth of the host country has a positive and significant effect 
(p<0.005) on the probability of a JV entry mode (Hennart, 1991). The sign of MNE’s_R&Dintensity 
is negative and significant (p<0.005) confirming the results of previous studies (Chiao et al., 2010; 
Makino & Neupert, 2000; Yiu & Makino, 2002). This result, according to the Transaction Cost 
theory, suggests that an MNE with strong technological capabilities prefers a WOS rather than a JV 
to protect these valuable assets from partner opportunistic behaviours. The coefficient of 
Psychic_Distance is positive and significant (p<0.005). The higher the Psychic Distance between the 
home and the host country, the higher is the probability of a JV, because the MNE attempts to mitigate 
the perceived distance with the host country collaborating with a local partner. This result confirms 
previous studies on entry mode that used the Kogut and Sing’s index and found the positive and 
significant effect (Hennart et al., 1998; Yiu & Makino, 2002), and offers a new test of the Psychic 
Distance measure developed by Dow and Karunaratna (2006). As expected (Dikova & Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007; Yiu & Makino, 2002) if the local firm is active in the manufacturing sector is 
less likely to make a JV, the coefficient is negative and significant (p<0.001). A listed local company 
is more likely to make a JV rather than to be fully acquired by a foreign company. The bigger is the 
local company the higher is the probability of a JV with an MNE. This result is in line with the 
positive and significant effect (p<0.001) of the coefficient of Local_Listed. The variables measuring 
Relative_Size, MNE’s Size, and Same_Industry effect are not significant in all models. The size of the 
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local company has a positive and significant effect in all models but in the complete Model 4. With 
the exception of this variable and the Pre-crisis coefficient, the signs and significance of all variables 
are stable across all models.  
Table 2.8 Logistic regression results 
 
Dependent Variable JV=1 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Marginal 
effects 
Model (4) 
Family_Family  0.642*** (0.00536) 
1.016*** 
(3.54e-05) 
0.915*** 
(0.000253) 0.1628 
NonFamily_Family   0.987*** (1.17e-08) 
0.884*** 
(8.80e-07) 0.1588 
Family_NonFamily    -0.426* (0.0675) -0.0762 
Industry_Growth 1.893* (0.0911) 
1.944* 
(0.0890) 
2.369** 
(0.0445) 
2.325** 
(0.0460) 0.4043 
Relative_Size -0.0395 (0.350) 
-0.0394 
(0.361) 
-0.0522 
(0.243) 
-0.0531 
(0.231) -0.0089 
Local_Listed 1.910*** (3.95e-07) 
1.954*** 
(3.09e-07) 
1.935*** 
(1.22e-06) 
1.983*** 
(8.29e-07) 0.3545 
PsychicDistance 0.237*** (0.00650) 
0.235*** 
(0.00743) 
0.221*** 
(0.00875) 
0.226*** 
(0.00731) 0.0505 
MNE’s_RDintensity -0.275** (0.0156) 
-0.297*** 
(0.00991) 
-0.304** 
(0.0123) 
-0.298** 
(0.0136) -0.0532 
Experience -0.0322 (0.840) 
-0.0288 
(0.859) 
0.0954 
(0.565) 
0.0705 
(0.674) 0.009 
Local’s Size 0.0765** (0.0444) 
0.0773** 
(0.0433) 
0.0663* 
(0.0934) 
0.0617 
(0.116) 0.0108 
MNE’s Size 0.00855 (0.753) 
0.00426 
(0.877) 
0.00498 
(0.862) 
0.00528 
(0.853) 0.0131 
Local_Manufacturing -0.842*** (3.17e-08) 
-0.839*** 
(3.32e-08) 
-0.880*** 
(8.50e-09) 
-0.876*** 
(9.93e-09) -0.1577 
Same_Industry 0.0735 (0.619) 
0.0398 
(0.789) 
0.0349 
(0.819) 
0.0290 
(0.849) 0.0052 
America -0.0434 (0.858) 
-0.0157 
(0.949) 
-0.0129 
(0.959) 
-0.0258 
(0.918) -0.0198 
Rest of the World 0.757** (0.0378) 
0.804** 
(0.0317) 
0.788** 
(0.0350) 
0.781** 
(0.0355) 0.0812 
Pre_crisis 0.163 (0.377) 
0.225 
(0.226) 
0.345* 
(0.0705) 
0.325* 
(0.0870) 0.0559 
Post_crisis -0.460*** (0.00604) 
-0.484*** 
(0.00402) 
-0.636*** 
(0.000284) 
-0.638*** 
(0.000274) -0.1134 
Constant -1.005*** (9.63e-06) 
-1.046*** 
(4.98e-06) 
-1.264*** 
(6.99e-08) 
-1.138*** 
(2.01e-06)  
Observations 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115  
Pseudo R-squared 0.101 0.106 0.131 0.133  
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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We test the goodness of fit of the model using the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
2004). The value of the Chi 2 statistic with 8 degrees of freedom is equal to 7.23, with a p-value equal 
to 0.512. Thus, we can say that the model fit. Moreover, all expected frequencies are greater than 5 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2004), supporting the conclusion that the model fits well. We test the ability 
of the model to correctly classify the observations with the classification table. Table 2.9 shows that 
Model 4 correctly classified 73.81% of the observations. The sensitivity and the specificity are 
respectively 31.88% and 92.88%. This unbalanced result is mainly affected by the number of 
observations in each group. Indeed, the classification test favours the largest group (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2004), in our case the WOS event.  
Table 2.9 Classification table 
  True   
Classified D ~D   Total 
    
+ 110 57 167 
- 235 718 948 
Total 345 770 1115 
    
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as JV != 0     
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 31.88%  
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 92.60%  
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 65.87%  
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 75.21%  
    
False + rate for true ~D Pr( +|~D) 7.40%  
False - rate for true D Pr( -| D) 68.12%  
False + rate for classified + Pr(~D| +) 34.13%  
False - rate for classified - Pr( D| -) 24.79%  
    
Correctly classified 73.81% 
 
2.5.1 Endogeneity and robustness check 
To test the validity of our results we perform some robustness check for Model 4. The results do not 
change if we measure the variable Relative_Size regarding the total number of employees instead of 
total sales. The results are consistent if we substitute the macro industry with the SIC code 3-digit or 
4-digit to measure the variable Same_Industry. As a robustness check, we also estimated all the 
Models with the dependent variable JV=1 if the stake acquired by the MNE is lower than 100% and 
lower than 80% (Yiu & Makino, 2002). The hypotheses are supported even with these different 
thresholds. The results are reported in Appendix 3. 
The final robustness check addresses the endogeneity issue. Some factors affecting the entry mode 
choice might be not included among the independent variables. It is possible that some unknown 
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factors influencing the probability to be a family firm also affect the foreign entry strategy. In other 
words, it is possible that some factors explaining the entry mode choice might also explain the family 
status of a firm.  Thus, in our model, the variables jointly defining the family status of the MNE and 
the local firm might be endogenous. Thus the results presented in Model 4 may be biased for 
endogenous issues. We perform a two-stages logistic regression to correct for this potential 
endogeneity. Our complete Model 4 has three variables (Family_Family, NonFamily_Family, 
NonFamily_Family) which identify the jointly family status of the MNE and the local firm. The 
potentially endogenous variables are: the variable Family_Family coded “1” when both the MNE and 
the local are family firms, the variable Family_NonFamily which is equal “1” when the MNE is a 
family firm and the local is a non-family business, and the variable NonFamily_Family coded “1” 
when the MNE is a non-family firm and the local is a family business. These variables are the 
combination of the two binary variables MNE_Family and Local_Family. The probability to be a 
family firm, for both the MNE and the local firm may be endogenous. To address this endogeneity 
issue, it is necessary to identify at least two exogenous variables (at least one for each endogenous 
variables) that affect the probability to be a family firm and not the entry mode. As there are two 
endogenous variables, we have to estimate two first stages, A and B, one for each potential 
endogenous variable (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
We use as instruments to estimate the probability to be a family firm, for both the MNE and the local 
firm, the Amenity potential and the Regulation binary variables (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Villalonga 
& Amit, 2010), the firm size (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), the age of the company, and the geographical 
area where the firm is located (the Italian Region for the local company and the macro area as 
indicated in Appendix 1 for the MNE). Demsetz et al. (1985) argue that some firms attributes affect 
the ownership concentration.  
The first category of instruments refers to the sector in which the firm is active. For instance, there 
are some sectors that foster ownership concentration (sport, media) and other, i.e. regulated sectors, 
which have low levels of ownership concentration. More specifically Villalonga and Amit (2010) 
added that these industries are characterised respectively by a high and low level of family ownership 
concentration. The family might gain benefits (Amenity potential) owning a firm because it is able to 
influence the goods produced (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) and because the ownership of a firm active in 
a specific sector increases the family reputation (Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, 
& Sirmon, 2014). This is true for sectors as food, fashion, sports clubs, and mass media. Thus we 
expect that given the amenity potential of these industries, a firm active in one of them is more likely 
to be a family business. Thus we use as a first instrument the Amenity binary variable which takes the 
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value “1” if the firm is active in one of the above sectors. Sectors as telecommunications, utilities, 
finance are regulated by law, lowering the need for monitoring managers and also the benefits for the 
shareholders. Thus, in these regulated sectors, we expect a low family ownership (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; Villalonga & Amit, 2010). Hence, the second instrument is the Regulation dummy which takes 
the value 1 if the target is active in one of the following sectors: telecommunications, utilities, finance. 
Moreover, Demsetz et al. (1985) argue that the higher is the optimal size of the firm more costly is to 
own a portion of it, and thus the lower is the associated ownership concentration.  Similarly to the 
sector effect Villalonga and Amit (2010) state that the efficient size correlates negatively to the family 
ownership concentration. We use as an instrument the Size of the company measured in terms of the 
number of employees. 
We include as instrument also the Age of the firm. We expect that family firms are more likely to be 
old firms because to be defined as a family firm we require the presence of the family in management 
positions and it might require time and more than one generation.  
Finally, in our first stages, we include a series of dummies to control for the geographic area effect. 
We used the Italian Regions for the local firm and the macro area (Europe, America, Rest of the 
World) also included in the second stage for the MNE. We expect that in areas with an advanced 
financial is less likely the presence of family firms. 
We used these instruments for both the MNE and the local company. The estimated model in the first 
stage is the following: 
Yi=a0+ β1Regulation+ β2Amenity +β3LogEmployees +β4LogAge + β5Geographical_Area + ε 
Where Yi is the dummy variable, which takes the value “1” if the firm (Local in Stage A and MNE 
in Stage B) is a family business. The two first stages are reported in Table 2.10. We test the joint 
significance of the instruments in both equations through the F-statistics. 
In the second stage we substituted the actual values (Family_Family, NonFamily_Family, 
Family_NonFamily) with the predicted probabilities that both the local and the MNE are family firms 
(calculated multiplying the predicted probabilities of the two first stages), the predicted probability 
that the MNE is non-family and the local is a family firm (calculated as the predicted probability of 
the first stage A multiplied by 1-the predicted probability of the first stage B), and the predicted 
probability that the MNE is family and the local is not family (calculated as the predicted probability 
of first stage B multiplied by 1-the predicted probability of the first stage A).  
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We test for the instrument relevance using the F-test. The literature (Stock & Yogo, 2005) states that 
a significant F-test higher than 10 reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to 
zero. The value of the F-Test, both in the Stage A and Stage B, is higher than 10 and its p-value is 
lower than 1%. Thus, the instruments used to estimate the probability of the local firm is family, and 
the MNE is family are respectively valid, and we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. 
The instruments used in the first stages are significant and able to predict the probability of a firm to 
be family. 
Table 2.10  First stages 
 
Dependent variable 
Local_Family 
Dependent variable 
MNE_Family 
Stage A Stage B 
Regulation -1.016*** (0.195) 
-0.582*** 
(0.161) 
Amenity 0.529* (0.289) 
0.598* 
(0.307) 
LogEmployees 8.14e-05 (0.0308) 
0.0157 
(0.0224) 
LogAge 0.168*** (0.0572) 
-0.0966 
(0.0789) 
Constant -0.666** (0.261) 
-1.406* 
(0.735) 
Geographic Effect YES YES 
Observations 1,119 1,119 
F-test 85.10*** 30.07*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
We estimated the completed model with all variables, controlling for endogeneity issues, in Model 6. 
Table 2.11 presents the results. The main independent variables, jointly defining the family status of 
the MNE and the local firm are significant and we the expected signs. The predicted probability that 
both firms are family business (Pr_FF) has a positive and significant effect (p<0.005). Thus, a family 
MNE is more likely to make a JV with a local family firm rather than a WOS (Hypothesis 1 is 
supported). Our second hypothesis argues that a non-family MNE is more likely to make a WOS 
rather than a JV if the local firm is family. The predicted probability of the variables (Pr_NFF) testing 
this hypothesis is negative and significant (p<0.005). Thus, our second hypothesis, which in Model 4 
was supported, after addressing the endogeneity issue is not supported anymore. As expected the 
predicted probability that a family MNE and a local non-family firm (Pr_FNF) negatively (p<0.005) 
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affects the likelihood of a JV (Hypothesis 3 is supported). The control variables have the same sign 
and significance of Model 4 presented above.  
Table 2.11 Model 5 
Dependent Variable JV=1 
 Model (5) 
Pr_FF 7.683** (0.0102) 
Pr_FNF -6.991** (0.0160) 
Pr_NFF -4.270** (0.0411) 
Industry_Growth 2.215* (0.0552) 
Relaive_Size 0.0173 (0.796) 
Local_Listed 2.010*** (3.26e-07) 
Psychic_Distance 0.216** (0.0139) 
MNE_RDintensity -0.254** (0.0293) 
Experience -0.101 (0.539) 
Local_Size 0.103* (0.0689) 
MNE_Size -0.0202 (0.685) 
Local_Manufacturing -0.877*** (3.34e-08) 
Same_Industry -0.0339 (0.823) 
Geographic Area YES 
Time effect YES 
Constant 2.529** (0.0198) 
Observations 1,119 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Most of the studies on entry mode do not control for the effect of corporate governance and 
specifically of ownership concentration. The few studies (Datta et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2007; 
Musteen et al., 2009) that investigated the role of corporate governance on entry mode obtain 
significant results, opening a promising new stream of research to study these effects deeply. 
Specifically, the effect of ownership concentration has been almost neglected in entry mode research. 
While numerous studies (D’Angelo et al., 2016; Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Majocchi & Strange, 
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2012; Zahra, 2003) demonstrated that ownership type and in particular family ownership significantly 
affect the firm’s strategies (e.g. internationalisation). Family firms are characterised by peculiar 
characteristics that affect their strategies. A family that is the base both for the ownership and for the 
management of a company is able to determine the firm’s strategy, pursuing family goals together 
with economic performance. We argue that family firms have different foreign entry mode than non-
family firms and that this difference also depends on the characteristics of the local company. Thus, 
with this paper, we want to demonstrate that the familiness, that characterised family firms, is a key 
factor among the others transaction costs. The familiness is the most important asset defining the 
family firm itself, and it is non-tradable, and also the family prefers to maintain the ownership and 
the control over the management. Moreover, even if not all family firms are identical, they share the 
same vision and the strong relationship between family values and benefits and firm. Therefore, as 
demonstrated by our empirical analysis, two family firms prefer to make a JV rather than one of the 
two acquire the other. We also demonstrated that the partnership between a family and a non-family 
firm is difficult. Indeed, the non-family company might not accept the different managerial practice 
of the family firm, which is biased toward the family members. Thus, in the case of a family and a 
non-family firm, is more likely that the MNE enters the foreign country through a WOS rather than 
a JV. 
Among other limits, it should be noticed that we use only one home country. Thus, our results are not 
generalizable. Moreover, our database is not a random sample but the reduced sample utilised for the 
analysis is given from the availability of ownership data on Orbis database.  
This paper makes several significant contributions to the entry mode research and family business 
literature. First, this research pays more attention to the characteristics of the local company. Entry 
mode research usually investigates the entry mode choice from the point of view of the investing 
company, neglecting that entry mode strategies are not unilaterally decisions but are also affected by 
the target preferences (Hennart, 2009). In our analysis, we take into consideration the potential effect 
of ownership and corporate governance of both MNE and local company. On the basis of our results, 
we argue that the ownership type of both the MNE and the local firm affect the entry mode decision 
of the MNE. Another important contribution is to investigate the effect of the ownership and 
governance characteristics on entry choices. Indeed, previous literature demonstrated that ownership 
type and corporate governance affect firms’ strategies, but there is a lack of knowledge of their effect 
on foreign entry modes. We investigated the choice between JV and WOS using a large sample with 
data on ownership, management and board of directors, of both the MNE and the local firm.  
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Second, this paper investigates the family firms’ entry strategies on the basis of Transaction Cost 
theory. It has been largely used to study entry modes, but rarely applied to family firms. It offers an 
empirical demonstration of the few theoretical papers that attempt to explain family firms’ 
characteristics through the transaction cost lens.  Testing our hypothesis arguing that family firms 
have different behaviours depending on which assets (family or non-family assets) are involved we 
confirm that family firms’ behaviours are affected by the bifurcation bias (Verbeke & Kano, 2012).  
Third, this research makes a significant improvement regarding the accuracy of family firms’ 
definition. It identifies the family status on the basis of the ultimate owner, and not using the first 
shareholder as most of the literature on internationalisation of family firms. Moreover, the ultimate 
owner has been identified through the control power and not using ownership rights. Indeed, 
shareholders might have control power in excess of their ownership rights because of the use of 
pyramiding, multiple control chains, cross-holding, and dual class of shares.  
The main implications of our study are that ownership type and corporate governance affects entry 
mode strategies. These factors should be investigated both at the level of the investing firm that the 
local firm in the host country. Since previous studies have demonstrated that companies choosing the 
entry mode predicted by the theory outperform the other businesses, our results also have important 
managerial implications. Indeed, we argue that the transaction cost theory, largely applied to the study 
of entry modes, should be enriched with the inclusion of ownership type of the firms (both the 
investing and the local) involved in the deal. Thus, to choose the right entry mode according to the 
theory, it should also be considered the family status of the firms.  
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2.7 Appendix 1 
Home country code Home Country Geographical area Freq. Percent Cum. 
AE United Arab Emirates Asia-Ocean 3 0.26 0.26 
AT Austria Europe 20 1.73 1.99 
AU Australia Asia-Ocean 4 0.35 2.33 
BE Belgium Europe 22 1.90 4.24 
BR Brazil America 2 0.17 4.41 
CA Canada America 9 0.78 5.19 
CH Switzerland Europe 62 5.36 10.54 
CN China Asia-Ocean 10 0.86 11.41 
CY Cyprus Europe 1 0.09 11.50 
DE Germany  Europe 108 9.33 20.83 
DK Denmark  Europe 40 3.46 24.29 
EE Estonia  Europe 1 0.09 24.37 
ES Spain Europe 340 29.39 53.76 
FI Finland Europe 8 0.69 54.45 
FR France Europe 138 11.93 66.38 
GB United Kingdom Europe 85 7.35 73.73 
GR Greece Europe 6 0.52 74.24 
HU Hungary Europe 1 0.09 74.33 
IE Ireland  Europe 10 0.86 75.19 
IL Israel Asia-Ocean 6 0.52 75.71 
IN India Asia-Ocean 14 1.21 76.92 
JP Japan Asia-Ocean 17 1.47 78.39 
KR South Korea Asia-Ocean 2 0.17 78.57 
KW Kuwait Asia-Ocean 1 0.09 78.65 
KY Cayman Islands America 4 0.35 79.00 
LU Luxembourg Europe 29 2.51 81.50 
MT Malta Europe 1 0.09 81.59 
MY Malaysia Asia-Ocean 1 0.09 81.68 
NL Netherlands Europe 39 3.37 85.05 
NO Norway Europe 3 0.26 85.31 
PT Portugal Europe 2 0.17 85.48 
QA Qatar Asia-Ocean 3 0.26 85.74 
RO Romania Europe 1 0.09 85.83 
RU Russia Europe 9 0.78 86.60 
SE Sweden Europe 20 1.73 88.33 
SG Singapore Asia-Ocean 3 0.26 88.59 
SI Slovenia  Europe 4 0.35 88.94 
TN Tunisia Africa 1 0.09 89.02 
TR Turkey Europe 4 0.35 89.37 
TW Taiwan Asia-Ocean 1 0.09 89.46 
US United Stated America 121 10.46 99.91 
VG Virgin Islands America 1 0.09 100.00 
Total   1,157 100.00  
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2.8 Appendix 2  
Variable VIF 
JV 1.18 
Family_Family 1.17 
Family_NonFamily 1.15 
NonFamily_Family 1.31 
Industry_Growth 1.07 
Relative_Size 1.65 
Local_Listed 1.30 
Psychic_Distance 1.15 
MNE’s_RDintensity 1.03 
Experience 1.10 
Local’s_Size 1.54 
MNE’s_Size 1.71 
Local_Manufacturing 1.19 
Same_Industry 1.15 
America 1.28 
Rest of the World 1.63 
Pre_crisis 1.41 
Post_crisis 1.45 
Mean VIF 1.34 
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2.9 Appendix 3  
Variables JV=1 if equity<=95% 
JV=1 if 
equity<=80 
JV=1 if 
equity<100 
Family_Family 0.915*** (0.000253) 
0.915*** 
(0.000336) 
0.824*** 
(0.000846) 
NonFamily_Family 0.884*** (8.80e-07) 
0.922*** 
(4.77e-07) 
0.851*** 
(1.72e-06) 
Family_NonFamily -0.426* (0.0675) 
-0.594** 
(0.0143) 
-0.487** 
(0.0349) 
Industry_Growth 2.325** (0.0460) 
1.583 
(0.165) 
1.955* 
(0.0827) 
Relative_Size -0.0531 (0.231) 
-0.0567 
(0.221) 
-0.0536 
(0.219) 
Local_Listed 1.983*** (8.29e-07) 
1.935*** 
(9.11e-07) 
1.918*** 
(1.86e-06) 
Psychic_Distance 0.226*** (0.00731) 
0.225*** 
(0.00771) 
0.223*** 
(0.00736) 
MNE’s RDintensity -0.298** (0.0136) 
-0.270** 
(0.0195) 
-0.289** 
(0.0119) 
Experience 0.0705 (0.674) 
0.125 
(0.463) 
0.0153 
(0.927) 
Local’s Size 0.0617 (0.116) 
0.0616 
(0.121) 
0.0630 
(0.105) 
MNE’s Size 0.00528 (0.853) 
0.00613 
(0.835) 
0.00680 
(0.808) 
Local_Manufacturing -0.876*** (9.93e-09) 
-0.873*** 
(1.93e-08) 
-0.841*** 
(3.08e-08) 
Same_Industry 0.0290 (0.849) 
-0.00918 
(0.953) 
0.0592 
(0.694) 
America -0.0258 (0.918) 
0.0133 
(0.959) 
-0.0808 
(0.746) 
Rest of the World 0.781** (0.0355) 
0.647* 
(0.0924) 
0.710* 
(0.0530) 
Pre_crisis 0.325* (0.0870) 
0.357* 
(0.0607) 
0.251 
(0.184) 
Post_crisis -0.638*** (0.000274) 
-0.759*** 
(2.43e-05) 
-0.659*** 
(0.000136) 
Constant -1.138*** (2.01e-06) 
-1.189*** 
(1.16e-06) 
-1.048*** 
(1.06e-05) 
Observations 1,115 1,115 1,115 
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.139 0.127 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3  Family firms and establishment mode: greenfield 
versus acquisition 
3.1 Introduction 
The entry mode and the related establishment mode of entry (greenfield or acquisition), are long term 
strategies difficult to change and with important effects on firm’s performance. This strategic decision 
will determine the success or the failure of the company in the new market. Thus, the company must 
consider carefully all the factors influencing the choice. Entering a foreign market requires that the 
firm makes a strategic choice between different entry modes, ranging from export to contractual 
agreement, from non-equity joint venture to equity joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary. If the 
selected entry mode is an equity mode (joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary), the firm should 
also choose between to set up a new subsidiary creating it from scratch, or acquiring an existing 
company. Grounding on the Transaction Cost theory this paper contributes to the literature on foreign 
entry strategies shedding light on the factors determining the choice between greenfield joint venture 
and partial acquisition. We focus especially on the scarcely investigated effect of family control and 
industrial cluster location. 
Most of the previous literature on establishment modes considered this choice as a unilateral strategy 
implemented by the MNE. However, as claimed by Hennart (2009), this is a bilateral choice in which 
the characteristics of the local firm’s assets determine the most suitable mode. The aim of this paper 
is to investigate how the local firm’s assets affect the choice between greenfield joint venture and 
partial acquisition. We do this in two ways. First, we study how the family control of the local 
company affects the choice between greenfield and acquisition. Second, we study how the knowledge 
specific and relationships of a local firm located in an industrial cluster affect the decision between 
greenfield and acquisition. In both cases, the local firm owns a high specific asset that affects all the 
other firm’s assets, the complex system of interactions between family and business in the first case, 
and the specific knowledge of the cluster and the connections with the other incumbent firms in the 
latter case. 
The study focuses exclusively on the joint venture entry mode: greenfield or acquisition (Brouthers 
& Dikova, 2010; Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Chen, 2008; Dikova & Brouthers, 2016; Hennart, 
1988). In the present work, we adopted the exhaustive definition provided by Hennart: “JVs arise 
whenever two or more sponsors bring given assets to an independent legal entity and are paid for 
some or all of their contribution from the profits earned by the entity, or when a firm acquires partial 
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ownership of another firm.”(Hennart, 1988). We study the family and the cluster location effects on 
the choice between a greenfield joint venture or a partial acquisition. The topic is noteworthy for three 
reasons. First, because of the economic consequences regarding performance and success in the 
foreign market of the investing company (Shaver, 1998). Second, family businesses are the most 
common type of firms around the world. Third, industrial clusters play a fundamental role in the 
formation of synergies between companies and development of the economy. 
Since we focus exclusively on establishment modes which involve a partner, then the partner’s 
strategic decision is equally important as the investor preferences. Therefore, we analyse how the 
partner’s ownership structure might affect the establishment mode selected by the investing company. 
So far, previous literature demonstrated that ownership and corporate governance characteristics 
affect firms’ strategic decisions (Filatotchev, Stephan, & Jindra, 2008). Thus, one of the factors 
influencing the establishment strategy is the ownership structure of both the investing company and 
the potential partner in the host country. Among the various ownership structures around the world, 
the family type is the most frequent. Thus, a family business looking to enter a new market will be 
influenced, among other factors, in its decisions by the family’s long-term orientation, the family 
vision, and family members’ relationships. The investing firm, among other factors, should also 
consider the ownership structure of the local company. Indeed, if the potential partner is a family 
firm, this will affect the relationships with the investing company. Family firms represent the 
backbone of the world economy. They represent more than two-third of businesses in the world, and 
they provide about 70% of the total employment (EY, 2015). Often they are undervalued and 
relegated to the category of small firms. However, even the giant firms around the globe can be family 
controlled. For instance, Ford, Koch Industries, Wal-Mart, LVMH, and Roche are family businesses. 
Moreover, family firms represent the most common ownership structure among the medium and 
small enterprises, which in turn belong to the most common company size. During the past few 
decades, given their contribution to the world economy, the academic research started to focus on 
their characteristics and their strategies that differ from those of non-family firms. Despite the 
prediction of Chandler, according to which the future should be characterised by the separation 
between management and ownership, family firms still prosper, and an increasing number of them 
survived across centuries. Thomson Reuters Corporation founded in 1799 and William Prym Holding 
Gmbh established in 1530 are only two of many other examples. Despite the relevance of the topic, 
previous literature, with few exceptions (Boellis, Mariotti, Minichilli, & Piscitello, 2016), has almost 
neglected the family effect on establishment mode choices, i.e. greenfield versus acquisition. 
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In addition, when a company decides to enter a foreign market the choice of the location is crucial. If 
the firm chooses to locate its business into an industrial cluster, it will have some advantages from 
being located near to other companies active in the same or related industries. Indeed, businesses in 
an industrial cluster benefit from the proximity to customers and suppliers and even to competitors 
because of the knowledge transfer with them. One of the strengths of the industrial clusters are the 
relationships established between firms. As the industrial literature shown this asset is internal to the 
cluster but external to the firms (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). However, a firm entering the cluster to have 
full access to this cluster specific is facilitated by the intermediation of an incumbent firm. The local 
firm is the instrument through which the investing company can exploit the benefits deriving from to 
be located in a cluster. Indeed, if a company enters the foreign market with a partner that is already 
in the cluster it will benefit from its existing relationships. The investing foreign firm will have full 
benefits if it partially acquires a firm well established in the district. On the other hand, entering the 
cluster with a greenfield investment reduces the benefits deriving from the presence in a cluster 
because the new entity needs to establish from scratch its position into the cluster. Moreover, the 
other incumbent firms may be averse to the creation of a new competitor. 
Previous studies on establishment mode have identified numerous determinants of this choice 
(Dikova & Brouthers, 2016) but the family control and industrial cluster location structure have been 
overlooked. This is the first study that investigates the determinants of the choice between a greenfield 
joint venture and a partial acquisition, studying the effect of local family ownership and industrial 
cluster location. Hypotheses were tested using a sample of 357 foreign entries made by firms from 
31 different countries in Italy, over a ten-year period (2005-2015). The sample is composed by 121 
greenfield joint ventures and 236 partial acquisitions. Focusing on one single host country excludes 
from the analysis the influence of all country-level characteristics and it allows to investigate the 
effect of firm's characteristics deeply. Moreover, focusing on one single host country we can inspect 
the existing differences between regions in the same country, for instance, the effect to be located in 
an industrial district or not.  
The paper is divided into four main sections. The first section provides an outline of the literature on 
establishment choice. The second section develops the theoretical framework on which grounds the 
hypothesis, focusing on the effect of family firms and industrial clusters. The third section describes 
the methodology used in the empirical analysis and the data. The fourth section presents the findings 
of the research. The final section of this paper presents the conclusions drawn from the empirical 
section, the related discussion and the limits of this study.  
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3.2 Theoretical background 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of family ownership and industrial cluster location on the 
establishment mode choice. We consider family characteristics and cluster-specific knowledge as 
specific assets affecting the outcome of the transaction. Therefore, the transaction cost theory offers 
a comprehensive theoretical framework able to explain both the establishment mode. This theory has 
been used in previous studies on greenfield versus acquisition choices (Larimo, 2003) and it has been 
recently applied also to family firms (Verbeke & Kano, 2010). Thus, this paper adopts the transaction 
cost theory.  
Both greenfield joint venture and partial acquisition represent a form of hierarchical control over the 
firm in which the hierarchy is shared with a partner (Hennart, 1988). The key difference between 
greenfield and acquisition is that whereas a greenfield investment consists of establishing a new 
subsidiary from scratch, the acquisition implies to acquire an existing entity. Thus, in the latter case, 
the investing company is immediately operative, while in the case of greenfield, the establishment of 
a new subsidiary requires a long time before to be completely functioning. However, even if the 
acquisition represents a faster establishment mode, it has two significant disadvantages: the 
integration with the acquired company and the high premium that the acquiring company has to pay 
because of the information asymmetries between acquiring and target firm (Krishnan, Hitt, & Park, 
2007). Moreover, acquiring firms pay a premium for the target that often is negatively related to the 
post-acquisition returns (Krishnan et al., 2007). Through a greenfield investment the company does 
not pay a premium, and it has the opportunity to increase the investment gradually. The greenfield 
investment allows firms to acquire the necessary assets gradually. Thus, greenfield investments are 
characterised by lower initial sunk costs in comparison to acquisitions, where to be operational the 
firm has to pay the overall takeover amount (Slangen, 2013). The gradual increasing investment that 
characterises greenfield investments thus might be advantageous allowing temporally firms to exit 
the market with limited losses (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; Slangen, 2013). Through a greenfield 
investment, the MNE may replicate its competitive advantage, but the long time required for the 
establishment of the new venture may determine the loss of business opportunities (Dikova & 
Brouthers, 2016), this is true especially in high-velocity markets. The empirical research on the choice 
between greenfield and acquisition investigates which are the determinants that make more 
advantageous one investment rather than its alternative. However, Slangen and Hennart (2007) state 
that findings of the empirical literature on the field are often inconsistent, not only because of 
methodological issues but also because scholars failed to identify significant determinants of the 
establishment mode choice. The acquisition investment entails the costs of searching a suitable target, 
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of gather information about the target situation and the negotiation costs (Cheng, 2006). Thus, the 
higher the transaction costs related to an acquisition the more efficient is the greenfield investment 
and vice versa. As argued by Williamson the characteristics that affect any transaction costs are the 
“uncertainty, the frequency with which transactions recur, and the degree to which investments are 
idiosyncratic” (Williamson, 1979). Often the uncertainty in entry mode research has been identified 
in various ways: cultural distance or lack of the necessary international experience. Some authors 
state that the acquisition entails high costs regarding integration, which increase with the cultural 
distance of the host and home markets but also with the organisational culture distance. Thus, these 
authors claim that the higher the integration costs, the more likely is a greenfield investment 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). However, all else constant, a firm choosing a greenfield joint venture 
will encounter the same difficulties in terms of collaboration with a cultural distant partner. For 
instance, a family firm has an organisation culture extremely different and distant from that of a 
financial firm and the conflicts between partners will persist both in partial acquisition and greenfield 
joint venture. In accordance with the Transaction Cost theory, empirical articles investigating the ex-
ante determinants of the choice between greenfield and acquisition focuses on the knowledge of the 
investing firm and the cultural distance between host and home countries. The knowledge might be 
technical (industry, product) and experiential (country specific, international experience). Firms 
owning abundant technical knowledge are more likely to choose greenfield investments because it is 
less costly and more efficient to exploit the existing knowledge in a new entity rather than acquire 
another company to transfer the knowledge (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). On the contrary, firms 
lacking technical knowledge are more likely to choose an acquisition investment because for them 
the optimal solution is to acquire knowledge rather than generate it from scratch, which requires a 
long time (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). The second kind of knowledge affecting the establishment 
mode is the experiential knowledge. Previous studies state that international experience facilitates 
greenfield investments. Thus, firms with previous international experience are more likely to choose 
greenfield, while non-experienced firms are more likely to choose acquisitions. The term 
“experience” connotes both general international experience in other countries, irrespectively of the 
entry mode used and the experience of a specific establishment mode. Acquisition experience or 
greenfield experience positively affect the subsequent decision to use respectively the same 
investment (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Thus, firms that previously used acquisition 
(greenfield) are more likely to use it again (Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999). Another factor determining 
the transaction costs related to the choice between greenfield and acquisition is the asset specificity. 
Whenever the investing firm is entering a foreign market because it needs a complementary asset (or 
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for another reason but the complementary asset is necessary to be successful in the new market) and 
this is bundled in another firm, it will be more likely an acquisition (Cheng, 2006). 
Hennart (2009) in its theoretical model distinguished between four different establishment modes: 
greenfield joint venture, partial acquisition, complete acquisition and wholly owned greenfield. 
According to his model the choice between greenfield and acquisition depends on the efficiency of 
the market for complementary assets and services. If the market is not efficient, the firm is not able 
to enter the market through a full owned greenfield since the local asset is not available for acquisition. 
Thus, it will choose between greenfield JV, full acquisition, and partial acquisition. The greenfield 
joint venture will be chosen when the market for firms is not efficient. If the market for firms is 
efficient and the integration with the target is efficient, then the investing firm will acquire the target 
completely. However, if the integration is not efficient, the firm will choose a partial acquisition. 
Therefore, according to his model a greenfield joint venture is likely to be selected in all cases in 
which the market for complementary assets and the market for firms are inefficient. Partial acquisition 
it will be chosen when markets for complementary assets and businesses are inefficient, and in 
addition, the integration with the local firm owning the complementary assets cannot be efficient. 
Hennart (2009) identifies as a common characteristic of these two types of joint venture the fact that 
they are chosen when the desired complementary assets cannot be separated from the other assets. 
Thus, whenever the investing firm needs complementary assets that are embedded to the local firm 
and are not separable from the other non-needed assets it will be chosen a joint venture: a greenfield 
joint venture if the local firm is able to replicate the assets in a greenfield joint venture and a partial 
acquisition otherwise. Therefore, two important factors affect the choice between greenfield joint 
venture and partial acquisition: the possibility to acquire the local company partially and the 
replicability of the complementary assets.  
Previous studies often investigate the cost and benefits of greenfield and acquisition comparing 
wholly owned greenfield to full acquisition (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Slangen & Hennart, 2008), 
or wholly owned greenfield, JV(only greenfield) and acquisition (complete or at least sufficient to 
have the control) (Herrmann & Datta, 2006; Kogut & Singh, 1988) and not considering the analysis 
the partial acquisitions. Some scholars (Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Somlev & Hoshino, 2005) included 
partial acquisitions in their analysis differentiating between wholly owned greenfield subsidiary, 
wholly owned acquisition and joint venture (greenfield and partial acquisition). Another consistent 
group of studies included the partial acquisitions but without disentangle its effect from that of full 
acquisition (Chen, 2008). These authors (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; Dow & Larimo, 2011; 
Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006) studied the choice between greenfield (joint venture and wholly owned 
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subsidiary) and acquisition (full and partial), treating the entry mode (shared vs full ownership) as 
completely independent from the establishment mode (greenfield versus acquisition) (Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007). However even recognising that the entry and the establishment mode are distinct 
choices determined by different factors (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007), there is a general lack of 
knowledge concerning the specific choice between greenfield joint venture and partial acquisition. 
Thus, some of the conclusions drawn from these studies are difficult to apply to the choice between 
greenfield joint venture and partial acquisition. Chen (Chen, 2008) made the first attempt in shed light 
on this important topic. While some of the previous studies included a dummy variable to control for 
the effect of full versus partial ownership capturing the effect on the intercept (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart & Park, 1993), Chen (Chen, 2008) split the sample into two sub-regimes 
obtaining the overall effect of the ownership structure in the coefficients of all variables. The results 
of Chen are extremely interesting because the same exogenous variables have a completely different 
effect depending on the sub-sample used (above or below 95 percent of ownership). Interestingly 
using the most used threshold of the 95 percent of equity stake to distinguish between full and partial 
ownership, only the industry concentration and industry growth were significant in the model testing 
greenfield joint venture versus partial acquisition. Whereas in the model investigating the choice 
between wholly owned greenfield and full acquisition the usual exogenous variables (i.e. parent’s 
R&D intensity, industry’s R&D intensity, parents’ advertising intensity, industry’s advertising 
intensity, parents’ host market experience, parent’s industry knowledge, industry growth, and 
industry concentration) used in previous literature are significant and with the expected signs. 
Therefore, it is necessary to study more deeply which are the determinants of the choice between 
greenfield joint venture and partial acquisition.  
This paper focuses on the case in which the complementary assets needed by the investing firms are 
not available into the market for assets and they are embedded into the local firm or the cluster. 
Moreover, in the latter case, the investing company needs the local firm as the means to get the needed 
complementary asset. Thus, these assets are impossible to replicate or share in a greenfield joint 
venture without affecting their competitive advantage in the original firm. In this case, the partial 
acquisition is more likely to be chosen. The next section will analyse two cases: the local partner is a 
family business, and the investment location is an industrial cluster, and it will develop the 
hypotheses.  
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3.3 Hypothesis development 
3.3.1 Family businesses 
As mentioned above the foreign entry strategy is not a unilateral choice (Hennart, 2009), especially 
when the investing company enters the foreign country with a local partner as in the case of greenfield 
joint venture and partial acquisition, the subject of this research. Thus, partner’s characteristics affect 
this important strategic decision (Hennart, Sheng, & Pimenta, 2015). For instance, the smaller is the 
local firm in comparison to the investing company, the more likely the local will be acquired. If the 
local is active in a different sector than the investing firm, it is more likely a greenfield investment. 
Another important factor that must be considered is the ownership structure of the local partner. If 
for instance, the local partner is a family company, the family business features will affect the 
partnership. Indeed, the involvement of a partner requires that the strategy is co-determined by both 
firms.  
As recognised by previous literature, family involvement affects firm’s strategies (Lien, Piesse, 
Strange, & Filatotchev, 2005). Previous scholars have studied family firms’ strategies from the point 
of view of the investing firm. They mainly focused on their international level, measured in various 
ways as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Fernández & Nieto, 2005; Sciascia, Mazzola, 
Astrachan, & Pieper, 2012), international diversification (D’Angelo et al., 2016; Gomez-Mejia, 
Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Majocchi & Strange, 2012), number of foreign countries (Zahra, 2003), 
founding opposite results. Research on establishment mode has almost neglected the effect of family 
involvement in the investing firm (Boellis et al., 2016), but, to the best of our knowledge, the family 
status of the local firm has never been considered. Thus, the first aim of this paper is to fill this gap 
in the research and to investigate how the choice between a greenfield joint venture and a partial 
acquisition is affected by the family status of the local partner. We focus on the choice between to 
establish a greenfield joint venture with a local partner or to acquire a portion of stakes of the local 
partner. The investing firm has decided to have a local partner, and, other factors being equal, the fact 
that the partner is a family firm may affect this decision. 
Transaction Cost theory predicts when it is more convenient to internalise the activity or to use the 
market depending on the characteristics of the transaction, among which the asset specificity. In 
investments involving family firms, the asset determining the transaction costs is the familiness, 
which is “the unique bundle of resources a particular firm has because of the systems interaction 
between the family, its individual members, and the business” (Habbershon and Williams, p. 11, 
1999). Hennart and Reddy (1997) state that a greenfield joint venture is to be preferred in the 
situations in which the desired assets of the local company are not separable from the rest of the firm. 
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Thus, if the investing foreign company acquires the local “it would also be buying many assets which 
are not needed” (Hennart & Reddy, 1997: 2). The local firm cannot sell the desired assets because 
are not separable, but it may share them in a greenfield joint venture because are clearly identifiable. 
Hennart (2009) specifies that whenever the assets are bounded to the firm and not separable, the JV 
(greenfield and partial acquisition) is to be preferred over the acquisition. When a local family 
business owns the complementary assets needed by the MNE, the market for firms is inefficient 
because the controlling family is hostile toward the acquisition, preferring to maintain the control of 
the company. The local controlling family hampers the acquisition. This specific asset familiness has 
a wide range of applications inside the company (relationships, networks, reputation, organisational 
capabilities) but is not tradeable (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010) and it cannot exist outside the family 
firm. Not only the family assets are not tradeable and not separable from the rest of the company, but 
it also impossible to clearly identify this asset and share it in a greenfield JV. The familiness is deeply 
connected both to the family and the firm. Thus, the only way for the foreign investing firm to get 
some benefits from this asset is to acquire the family company partially and to integrate its assets with 
the assets of the local family firm. Hennart and Reddy (1997) consider the case in which the desired 
assets are not separable from the local company but still clearly identifiable, as in the example made 
in their paper of the sales force. Through a greenfield, joint venture, the local firm shares its sales 
force and the MNE does not need to acquire all the other unnecessary assets of the local firm (Hennart 
& Reddy, 1997). However, there are cases in which the desired assets are not separable but also 
difficult to share in a separate entity. The family firm works well in that specific context because of 
the company culture, the networks, and the relationships that often have been built across generations. 
This is also the reason why often the first step of a full acquisition is the partial acquisition maintaining 
the family management of the target company. Indeed, the investing firm needs time to integrate the 
family firm completely, and to understand how to retain the competitive advantage of the family 
culture and continue to build on it. It is the case for example of LVMH acquiring the 80% of Rimowa, 
or when acquired the 80% of LoroPiana, in both cases the original families maintain an important 
role in the management.  
The partial acquisition of a family firm allows the investing firm to acquire a share in the complex 
system of interactions between the family and the business that characterises the partner. The foreign 
company is interested in this system and considers it as a strength of the local company. Otherwise, 
it would opt to acquire completely it and change the management structure. While some scholars 
highlighted the negative aspects of family firms (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007), they have also many 
strengths (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010; Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013). Indeed, 
the involvement of family members in the firm since the childhood generates an emotional attachment 
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to the businesses and encourage family managers to act as loyal stewards. Moreover, family members 
own a specific knowledge of the business that in some aspects overcome the disadvantage arising 
from the potential lack of professional managers (Miller et al., 2013). Furthermore, family members 
are more able to establish a system of relationships that endure across generations. Family firms 
usually have a strong reputation built across generations, and the family name is often linked to the 
firm’s brand. The foreign company aims to be part of the family firm to leverage on these strengths. 
Through a partial acquisition, the foreign company is able to enter the market exploiting the 
competitive advantages deriving from the familiness of the local firm more efficiently than through a 
greenfield joint venture. The business in which the foreign company is interested is the product of the 
familiness, the reputation linked to the family name, the related family networks, the managerial 
practices of family members acting as loyal stewards. Thus, the familiness could represent an issue 
of integration but also a strength on which leverage and the best way to do that is through a partial 
ownership of the firm. Because of its wide range of implications, the familiness affects all the assets 
owned by the family firm, which is valuable also because of the familiness. Thus, a company 
interested in an asset owned by a family firm it will be not able to gain advantage from this asset out 
of the familiness influence. The family firm cannot share its assets eliminating the effect of the 
familiness without decreasing their value.  
Hypothesis 1: MNEs that decided to invest in a foreign country with a family firm as a local partner 
are more likely to make a partial acquisition of the partner rather than a greenfield joint 
venture with it. 
3.3.2 Industrial clusters 
The relevance of industrial clusters has been well documented in previous research as well as 
establishment strategies. However, previous studies fail to focus on the interaction of these two 
relevant topics. An industrial cluster is an agglomeration in a restricted area of firms active in related 
industries that have accumulated competencies, long-term relationships and mutual trust (Majocchi 
& Presutti, 2009). The key characteristic of districts is the system of interactions between firms 
located in proximity, from which numerous advantages derive. Firms benefit from the cooperative 
external environment because each firm is functional to the activity of the others (Belussi & Caldari, 
2009). Because of these advantages, industrial clusters attract foreign direct investments because 
MNEs entering a foreign market prefer to locate near to incumbent firms in related industries 
(Majocchi & Presutti, 2009). However, research on establishment mode has overlooked the potential 
effect of an industrial cluster. 
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Previous studies exploring the effect of experience on establishment mode, obtain opposite results. 
This mainly because they did not distinguish properly between general international experience and 
expertise in the specific country (Dow & Larimo, 2011). Dow and Larimo (Dow & Larimo, 2011) 
recognise the importance to disentangle the effect of these two different types of knowledge because 
given that countries can be strongly different one from the other, a specific knowledge of one country 
has a different effect. This significant contribution can be extended across the same countries. Indeed, 
even across the same country exist important differences. For instance, the conditions in an industrial 
cluster are completely different from an area in the same country out of the cluster.  
If a firm is entering an industrial cluster, the specific knowledge of the country is not enough to 
overcome the liabilities of foreignness. Indeed, to take full advantage of the location in an industrial 
cluster, it needs to be part of the network. Thus, in addition to the two levels of knowledge identified 
by Dow and Larimo (2011) (general international knowledge and country specific knowledge), there 
is a third level more region specific, the cluster specific knowledge. The local partner active in the 
industrial cluster, have a set of experience, knowledge, a reputation on which it bases networks with 
the other firms in the cluster. A business that decides to localise in an industrial cluster may benefit 
from the set of externalities (skilled labour force, availability of complementary services and 
intermediate products, knowledge transfers) deriving from the agglomeration of related firms 
(Roberto, 2004). The investing firm aiming to exploit these benefits is more likely to acquire the local 
firm partially. Even in the case in which the MNE is interested in other local’s asset, not necessary 
the specific knowledge or networks, all the assets of the local firm in the district are affected by its 
specific asset. Companies in the cluster are based on that, and more important, all the assets gain 
value from this knowledge and set of relationships. The local firm is not able to share these assets 
disentangling them from the asset composed of the mix of specific knowledge and relationships. It 
cannot sell its knowledge and set of connections, and it cannot share this asset in a greenfield joint 
venture without decreasing the value in the original firm. Moreover, a greenfield partnership means 
to create a new competitor in the cluster, and this may complicate the relationships with the other 
incumbent firms. Acquiring partially an existing firm enables the investing company to take 
advantage of its tacit knowledge, existing relationships, and established networks. The partial 
acquisition is to be preferred to a greenfield joint venture because partially acquiring the local partner 
the investing firm is able to acquire the presence into the district without the necessity to replicate the 
assets of the local firm.  
Hypothesis 2: If the foreign investing firm aims to enter an industrial cluster is more likely that it 
will opt for a partial acquisition rather than a greenfield joint venture. 
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3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Sample 
The sample has been drawn from Zephyr, a database of Bureau van Dijk containing information on 
1,300,000 deals. We collected data on all partial acquisitions and greenfield joint ventures made in 
Italy from a foreign firm and a local target/partner. The investing firms are located in 31 different 
countries. Thus, we decided to focus on investments made in a single host market by companies from 
various home countries (Caves and Mehra, 1986). The deals were completed in the period ranging 
from 01/01/2005 to 12/31/2015. The investment to be selected should satisfy two requirements. First, 
the MNE should not have an initial stake in the local firm in case of a partial acquisition. Second, 
with the investment the MNE should acquire at least 10 percent of stakes. The initial sample was 
composed of 473 investments, 155 greenfield joint ventures and 318 partial acquisitions. The final 
sample is composed of 357 foreign entries, of 121 greenfield joint ventures and 236 partial 
acquisitions. The reduction of the number of observation is mainly due to missing values in the 
independent variable concerning the family status of the local firm. Indeed, each time was not possible 
to identify with accuracy the ultimate owner of the firm, the observation was dropped.  
3.4.2 Variables 
Dependent variable. The establishment mode is identified by a binary variable coded “1” if the 
foreign entry is a greenfield joint venture with a local partner and “0” if it is a partial acquisition of 
the local firm. The threshold used to define a joint venture is the 95 percent of equity (Chen, 2008; 
Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999).  
Independent variables.  
Local family firm. To capture the effect of the family status of the local partner we used a dichotomous 
variable which takes the value “1” if the local firm is a family business. A firm is defined as a family 
business if the ultimate owner is an individual or a family, and at least one member of this family is 
a CEO, a CFO, a Chairman, from boards and committees3, from an executive department4.  
The main requirements to define a firm as a family business are the percentage of ownership held by 
an individual or a family and on other requirements inherent the management and the vision of the 
family. Most of the studies in the field to accomplish the first requirement use data on the first 
                                                 
3 A family member is from the following board and committees: board of directors, supervisory board, executive board, 
executive committee, advisory board, all committees. 
4 A family member is from one of the following departments: Senior management, Product/Project/Market Management, 
Finance and Accounting, Operations and Production, Administration department, Quality Assurance, Human Resources, 
Purchasing and Procurement, Sales & Retail, IT and IS, Marketing and Advertising, Health and Safety, Customer Service, 
Legal/Compliance department, Branch Office, R&D / Engineering. 
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shareholder (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012; Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2010). However, the first shareholder often does not coincide with the ultimate owner, i.e. the 
shareholder with the highest percentage of controlling power over the firm. This discrepancy is due 
to frequent use, in most of the countries, of pyramidal structures, multiple-control chains, cross-
holding, and dual class of shares. Thus, considering the first shareholder type could lead to misleading 
results. However, only a few studies employed the ultimate owner data to define a family firm 
(Bertrand et al., 2008; Ellul et al., 2010). “Pyramiding occurs when the controlling shareholder owns 
one corporation through another which he does not totally own. Firm Y is held through “multiple 
control chains” if it has an ultimate owner who controls it via a multitude of control chains, each of 
which includes at least 5 percent of the voting rights at each link. Cross-holdings means company Y 
directly or indirectly controls its own stocks.” (Faccio & Lang, 2002: 366). Through these 
mechanisms, an individual or an entity might actually exert more control over a firm than the first 
shareholder through its shares directly owned5. Thus, it is important to identify accurately who is the 
actual owner of the company which has the control over it and the power to affect its strategies. We 
distinguished between ownership rights and control power. The ownership rights are calculated 
multiplying all the percentages of voting rights in each chain and summing up the value of all chains. 
The control power is calculated summing the weakest links of each control chain. Thus, the ultimate 
owner is the entity with the highest percentage of controlling power along with all the chain of 
shareholders (Faccio & Lang, 2002). To identify the ultimate owner, following Faccio and Lang 
(2002), we took account of pyramids, cross-holdings, and multiple control chains. We took into 
consideration only links with at least 5% of ownership rights (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Studying the 
effect of ownership type on firm’s strategies is preferable to use the information on the ultimate owner 
instead of the first shareholder. We are confident that through this methodology we obtained more 
precise and accurate data to define a firm’s family status. 
Data on the ultimate owner have been collected from Orbis database using as reference date one 
month before the date of the first rumour about the deal, as indicated by Zephyr. If information on 
ownership were not available for this date, we search backwards until three years before the date of 
the rumour. If information were still missing, we would search until one month before the date in 
which the deal has been completed. 
Industrial cluster. To test the second hypothesis, we construct a binary variable Cluster.  Data on the 
cities belonging to an industrial cluster in 2001 and 2011 have been collected from the Italian National 
                                                 
5 A practical example showing the difference between ultimate owner and first shareholder is reported in the second 
chapter “Entry mode strategies and family firms: joint venture versus wholly owned subsidiary”. 
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Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), for 2001 and 2011. To build the variable Cluster the city of the local 
partner has been compared merging the information about the two years. The variable Cluster is 
coded “1” if the city of the local partner is located in an industrial cluster in 2001 and/or 2011. 
Control variables. According to the different theoretical frameworks, previous studies have identified 
determinants at the firm, country, industry, and subsidiary level (Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). 
However, for the reasons explained above and in the light of the study of Chen (2008) it is difficult 
to extrapolate general conclusions from previous studies and to infer the choice between greenfield 
joint venture and partial acquisition from them. We included some of the most used variables in 
previous studies as per the transaction cost theory to control for their effect on the establishment 
choice.  
Related investment. Previous studies state that an MNE investing in a different industry is likely to 
incur in high transaction costs because of its lack of specific knowledge of that industry (Brouthers 
& Dikova, 2010; Hennart & Park, 1993). This knowledge is embodied into the local partner and it is 
difficult to acquire in disembodied form, thus is more likely that the MNE will opt for an acquisition 
(Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Larimo, 2003). However, these studies tested this hypothesis 
comparing greenfield and acquisition without distinguishing on the level of ownership. Thus, the 
results are difficult to compare. Indeed, the MNE investing in a different industry may benefit from 
the specific knowledge of the partner through a greenfield joint venture. For instance, the greenfield 
joint venture established between De Beers (mining sector) and LVMH (fashion) to create jewellery. 
De Beers through this greenfield joint venture could enter the market of luxury goods in which the 
experience of LVMH has been crucial. Thus, having a partner the MNE can overcome the high 
transaction costs arising from the lack of specific knowledge. The variable has been measured by a 
binary which takes the value 1 if the investing company and the local partner are active in the same 
3-digit SIC industry.  
Product-specific knowledge. The specific knowledge of the industry might have a different impact 
on the establishment choice if the investing company is going abroad to manufacture a product that 
does not produce elsewhere. In this case, the MNE lacks the product-specific knowledge and to 
acquire this tacit knowledge in disembodied forms through the greenfield is difficult and costly 
(Slangen & Hennart, 2007). MNEs that are entering a foreign market to manufacture a product 
unrelated to their business are more likely to choose a partial acquisition investment. To measure the 
effect of the product specific knowledge we build a binary variable equal to “1” if the local partner is 
a manufacturing firm active in a different 3-digit SIC industry from the investing firm  (Hennart & 
Park, 1993) 
136 
 
MNE’s Size and MNE’s Resources. Previous studies found opposite results concerning the effect of 
the size if the investing company (Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). Yip (Yip, 1982) states that greater size 
allows overcoming entry barriers so better greenfield. Some authors state that larger firms have more 
resources to make an acquisition. However, as suggested by Dikova and Brouthers (2016), it is better 
to measure the resources of the investing company with the assets and not with the number of 
employees. Thus, we adopted two different measure. The natural logarithm of the number of 
employees as a proxy for the size and the natural logarithm of the total assets as a proxy of the 
resources. Both variables are measured one year prior the investment. 
PartnerSize. We include the size of the local partner has been included as a control variable because 
the higher is its size, the more difficult will be to acquire it for the MNE. It has been measured as the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees of the partner one year before the investment.  
CountryExperience. Uncertainty increases the costs of integration. Thus, is more likely that firms 
with limited experience prefer acquisition than greenfield to exploit partner’s country-specific 
knowledge and to overcome the liability of foreignness (Larimo, 2003). Previous experience in the 
host country allows the investing firm to have a specific knowledge of the host country reducing the 
transaction costs. Thus, previous experience in the host country is likely to affect positively the 
probability to make a greenfield joint venture. We measure the variable CountryExperience with a 
binary variable coded “1” if the MNE made previous investments in Italy.  
Diversification. Diversified firms are able to reduce the transaction costs related to new acquisition 
investments because through diversification they have developed management control system 
capabilities (Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). We measure the diversification 
with the number of 3-digit SIC industries in which the investing firm is active.   
IndustryGrowth. In industries growing at a fast rate the entry barriers deriving from the incumbent 
firms are likely to be more severe than in industries with a low growth rate. Thus, a high industry 
growth is likely to affect positively the likelihood of a greenfield rather than an acquisition (Brouthers 
& Brouthers, 2000; Somlev & Hoshino, 2005). We collected data on the industry growth rate in the 
year before the investment have been collected from Eurostat website.  
Psychic Distance. Psychic distance is likely to positively affects the probability of greenfield 
investments because it makes difficult to transfer MNE’s practices in the acquired firm. While, in a 
new subsidiary established from scratch, the employees are more likely to accept the practices. Thus, 
the transaction costs are lower with a greenfield investment. We measure the psychic distance with 
the composite index of Dow and Karunaratna (2006) (Dow & Larimo, 2011). 
137 
 
Time. Because the sample contains investments made over a ten-year period, ranging from 2005 to 
2015, we control for the time fixed effect. We use three dummy variables dividing the period into 
three clusters: prior the financial crisis (2005-2007), during the crisis (2008-2009), and post-crisis 
(2012-2015). We use the years during the financial crisis as a baseline.  
Table 3.1 describes each variable and the expected sign of its effect on the likelihood of the 
establishment mode.  
Table 3.1 Independent variables and expected sign 
Name Variable Description (Source) 
Expected sign (+ 
= positive effect 
on GreenfJV) 
PartnerFamily The Local company is a family firm (Orbis) - 
Cluster The investment is made in an industrial cluster (Istat) - 
RelatedInvestment 
Binary variable coded “1” if the MNE and the local partner are active 
in the same 3-digit SIC industry (Orbis) 
- 
Diversification Natural logarithm of the number of MNE’s SIC industries - 
Industry_Growth 
Local: Annual % growth of the gross value added by NACE industry 
2digit (Eurostat) 
+ 
PsychicDistance 
Psychic Distance between MNE's and local's countries, calculated as 
the Dow and Karunaratna (2006) index 
+ 
CountryExperience 
MNE’s previous experience in the host country: dummy variable 
coded “1” if the MNE made previous deals in Italy (Zephyr) 
+ 
Local’s Size 
Natural logarithm of the number of employees of the local partner 
(Orbis) 
+ 
MNE’s Size Natural logarithm of MNE’s number of employees (Orbis) + 
MNE’s Resources Natural logarithm of MNE’s total assets (Orbis) +/- 
MNE Manufacturing 
The local is a manufacturing company: SIC code 3-digit is between 
200 and 399 (Orbis) 
- 
SameIndustry 
Dummy variable which takes the value “1” if the local and the MNE 
are active in the same macro industry (Orbis) 
- 
Product Knowledge 
MNE and Local partner are in two different industries and the MNE is 
a manufacturing firm (Orbis) 
- 
Time 
3 dummies identifying the period (before, during, or after the crisis) 
during which the deal has been concluded: 2005-2007, 2008-2009, 
2010-2015 (Zephyr) 
+/- 
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Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show respectively the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables and 
the frequency of the binary variables.  
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics continuous variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MNE’s Size 357 6.1968 3.6365 0.6931 12.8551 
Partner’s Size 357 4.4587 2.6096 0 11.5976 
MNE’s Resources 357 12.1675 6.2289 -52.5195 37.9605 
Industry_Growth 357 0.0134 0.0621 -0.23 0.48 
Diversification 357 0.4296 0.5768 0 2.0794 
Psychic_Distance 357 1.3706 1.4781 0.48 7.79 
 
Table 3.3 Frequencies binary variables 
Variable Frequency 
Greenfield JV 121 
PartnerFamily 164 
Cluster 42 
Country_Exp 106 
MNE Manufacturing 94 
Related_Investment 63 
Product_Knowledge 97 
Pre-crisis 102 
Crisis 120 
Post-crisis 135 
 
To assess the issue of multicollinearity, we performed a correlation analysis; the results are reported 
in Table 3.4. From the correlation matrix does not appear that the multicollinearity is a problem. As 
an additional test, we also compute the variance inflation factor (VIF). The highest value is 1.68. 
Thus, we can conclude that the multicollinearity is not an issue. In the next section that follows, we 
will present the results of the empirical analysis.  
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Table 3.4 Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Greenf_JV 1               
FamilyPartner -0.173* 1              
Cluster -0.151* 0.099 1             
RelatedInvestment -0.021 -0.043 -0.032 1            
Diversification 0.008 -0.058 -0.107* 0.005 1           
ProductKnowledg -0.144* 0.207* 0.206* -0.282* -0.185* 1          
IndustryGrowth 0.108* -0.236* -0.055 0.024 0.033 -0.058 1         
PsychicDistance -0.003 0.111* 0.234* 0.053 -0.039 0.149* 0.033 1        
CountryExp -0.012 -0.131* -0.028 0.053 -0.003 -0.093 0.128* 0.023 1       
Partner’s Size 0.269* 0.010 0.003 -0.016 -0.007 0.206* 0.087 -0.005 0.042 1      
MNE’s Size 0.153* -0.084 0.089 0.163* -0.285* 0.023 0.154* 0.010 0.286* 0.180* 1     
MNE’s Resources 0.021 -0.034 -0.074 0.107* -0.111* 0.052 0.149* -0.090 0.134* 0.125* 0.410* 1    
Manufacturing -0.025 0.163* 0.097 0.123* -0.232* 0.192* -0.016 0.241* -0.096 0.097 0.293* 0.047 1   
Pre_crisis 0.149* -0.346* -0.096 0.211* 0.014 -0.093 0.158* -0.112* 0.091 0.131* 0.152* 0.127* -0.054 1  
Post_crisis -0.289* 0.266* 0.163* -0.027 -0.064 0.173* -0.279* 0.102 -0.114* -0.017 -0.107* -0.086 0.097 -0.493* 1 
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3.5 Results 
Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, we tested the hypotheses by using a binomial 
logistic regression. We estimated three models and the results are reported in Table 3.5. The Model 
1 is a parsimonious model in which are included only the control variables, in Model 2 we add the 
independent variable testing the first hypothesis and in Model 3, the complete model we also added 
the independent variable testing the second hypothesis. The sign and significance of all variables, 
except for the PsychichDistance, are consistent across all the three models, while the explanatory 
power of the model increases. A positive sign of the estimated coefficient denotes an increase in the 
probability of a greenfield joint venture. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 1 if the local partner is a family business, is more likely that the investing 
firm will opt for a partial acquisition rather than a greenfield joint venture. The coefficient of the 
variable capturing the familiness effect of the local partner (coded “1” if the local firm is a family 
firm) is negative and significant (p<0.1), supporting our first hypothesis. As reported in the fifth 
column of Table 3.5, the familiness of the partner decreases by 9 percent the probability of a 
greenfield joint venture. The coefficient of the variable exploring the effect to invest in an industrial 
cluster is negative and significant (p<0.01), as predicted by Hypothesis 2. If the investing company 
is entering an industrial cluster, it is more likely that it will do through a partial acquisition rather than 
a greenfield joint venture. The marginal effect shows a decrease by 22 percent of the probability. 
Thus, both our hypothesis are supported, and the results confirm that when the local partner owns a 
specific asset that affects all the other assets of the company, the investing firm is not able to obtain 
access to the desired complementary assets through a greenfield joint venture, but it will choose a 
partial acquisition. According to the transaction cost theory firms having previous experience in Italy 
are more likely to choose a partial acquisition, rather than a greenfield joint venture. The coefficient 
measuring the host country experience is negative and significant (p<0.01). Both the coefficients 
measuring the size of the investing and the local firm are positive and significant (p<0.01), as we 
expected according to the theory. Larger firms are more likely to opt for a greenfield joint venture. 
While the diversification of the MNE is not significant, the product-specific knowledge has a 
significant negative effect (p<0.01) on the choice of the establishment mode. Firms entering a foreign 
market to manufacture a product that they do not manufacture elsewhere, and thus they lack this 
specific knowledge owned by the local partner, are more likely to choose a partial acquisition 
investment. The coefficient of the variable measuring the psychic distance between the host and the 
home country is positive and significant (p<0.01). Thus, firms entering a highly psychic distant 
141 
 
market are more likely to choose a greenfield joint venture to overcome the difficulties arising from 
the integration in a partial acquisition.  
The percentage of correctly classified observation is 74.51%. Thus the model performs well. As 
robustness checks, we construct the variable Cluster using only data on 2011 or 2001. Results do not 
change. We control for the geographic effect grouping the home countries in 3 geographic macro 
areas: Europe, America (North and South) and rest of the world. The two hypotheses are still 
supported but the Psychic Distance and the variable measuring the resources of the MNE are not more 
significant.  
Table 3.5 Logistic regression models greenfield joint venture versus partial acquisition 
Dependent variable Greenfield JV= 1 if the establishment mode is a greenfield joint venture, 0 if it 
is a partial acquisition 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Marginal effects Model (3) 
FamilyPartner  -0.509* (0.0791) 
-0.557* 
(0.0567) -0.0946 
Cluster   -1.351*** (0.00609) -0.2293 
Related_Investment -0.625 (0.140) 
-0.563 
(0.178) 
-0.536 
(0.196) -0.0908 
Diversification -0.0338 (0.886) 
-0.0437 
(0.858) 
-0.0549 
(0.819) -0.0093 
ProductKnowlegde -1.200*** (0.000341) 
-1.153*** 
(0.000676) 
-1.084*** 
(0.00196) -0.1839 
IndustryGrowth -0.223 (0.911) 
-0.835 
(0.679) 
-1.054 
(0.607) -0.1789 
Psychic_Distance 0.126 (0.130) 
0.135 
(0.120) 
0.189** 
(0.0393) .0320 
Country_Experience -0.725** (0.0189) 
-0.754** 
(0.0134) 
-0.820*** 
(0.00847) -0.1391 
Local’s Size 0.278*** (5.01e-08) 
0.282*** 
(3.50e-08) 
0.282*** 
(1.03e-07) 0.0479 
MNE’s Size 0.122*** (0.00561) 
0.114*** 
(0.00992) 
0.134*** 
(0.00273) 0.0227 
MNE’s Resources -0.0255 (0.182) 
-0.0232 
(0.233) 
-0.0317 
(0.109) -0.0054 
Manufacturing -0.356 (0.260) 
-0.315 
(0.326) 
-0.301 
(0.348) -0.0510 
Pre_crisis -0.109 (0.722) 
-0.287 
(0.371) 
-0.332 
(0.307) -0.0564 
Post_crisis -1.498*** (8.54e-06) 
-1.515*** 
(8.45e-06) 
-1.478*** 
(1.68e-05) -0.2508 
Constant -1.355*** (0.00138) 
-1.095** 
(0.0143) 
-1.042** 
(0.0199)  
Observations 357 357 357  
Pseudo R-squared 0.181 0.188 0.204  
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper makes several important contributions. First, we contribute to the entry mode literature 
because grounding on the Transaction Cost theory. We demonstrated that assets embedded into a 
local firm, or external to the local firm but internal to the district, with a wide range of applications 
inside the firm, but not tradeable in a disembodied form and not replicable in a greenfield joint venture 
without affecting the value in the original firm, affect the establishment mode choice. Our empirical 
analysis shows that this is the case of the familiness asset and the mix of knowledge and connections 
of firms in an industrial cluster. When an MNE decides to enter a foreign market with a local partner, 
because it is interested in some asset owned by the local partner, the partner’s ownership structure 
and its corporate governance play a key role. If the partner is a family business, its familiness affects 
all the assets owned by the firm. The assets in which is interested the MNE are valuable only in 
combination with the familiness. Family business assets are impossible to disentangle from the 
familiness. Thus, the family partner cannot share its assets in a greenfield joint venture without the 
effect of the familiness. The only way for the MNE to exploit the partner’s assets without losing their 
original value is through a partial acquisition. The cluster location is a completely different context 
with many similarities. In the case in which an MNE enters an industrial cluster with an incumbent 
firm as a partner because it aims to exploit the competitive advantage of the partner to be in the 
cluster. All the assets of the local partner are affected by a generic asset specific knowledge and 
connections with the other firms in the cluster. Whether the MNE is interested in the generic asset 
but not replicable in a greenfield joint venture. Indeed, the local partner cannot share its knowledge 
and networks in a greenfield joint venture without affecting its competitive advantage and its other 
assets.  
Second, we contribute to the family business literature because we demonstrated that the family 
ownership and its involvement in the corporate governance affect foreign entry strategies. Confirming 
the theoretical model of Hennart (2009), stating that entry strategies are bilateral choices, we 
demonstrated that the partner family control affects the establishment mode choice. Our results 
demonstrate that family firms own a specific asset that affects their transaction costs. Thus, the 
Transaction Cost theory, that only recently has been started to be applied to family firms (Gedajlovic 
& Carney, 2010; Verbeke & Kano, 2010) is a theoretical framework to explain also the family firms 
strategies.  
Third, we contribute to the entry mode research focusing on the effect of the location in an industrial 
cluster. Previous studies on entry modes focused more on the location at the country level. Using a 
single host country we were able to study more deeply the different location in one single country, 
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demonstrating that the cluster location is an important determinant of transaction costs and therefore 
of the establishment mode decision.  
Fourth, regarding the methodology and the empirical analysis, we use a more accurate definition of 
family firms, defining them in term of the ultimate owner and management control of the family 
members.  
Finally, because the choice between greenfield joint venture and partial acquisition has been 
overlooked in previous studies, with the only exception of Chen (2008), we contribute to the literature 
shedding light on this specific choice. Even if the establishment and entry mode decisions are 
determined by a different set of factors, the choice between greenfield and acquisition should be 
studied taking into consideration also the presence or not of a partner. Indeed, if a firm decided to 
have a partner, it is important to know which are the discriminants in the decision to establish a 
greenfield joint venture with it or to partially acquire it. According to our results, we state that the 
family ownership and the cluster location are two significant factors.  
The most important limitation of this research is that we focused on only one host market, Italy. Thus, 
generalisation is not possible. Future studies could extend the study to more host countries. Second, 
an issue that was not assessed in this study is the effect of the ownership of the investing company. 
Future research could study how the family control of the MNE affects its establishment mode 
decision if the local partner is a family firm. 
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